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A B S T R A C T 
south and west Asia has come to occupy added strategic 
significance in international relat ions espec ia l ly after the 
second World War. Various factors have been attributed in 
enhancing the strategic s ignif icance of t h i s region. The 
onset of cold War in the immediate aftermath of the conclu-
sion of second world war and i t s tangible outcome in the 
form of r ivalry between soviet union and united States to 
win over the newly independent countries to their respective 
spheres of influence played a s ignif icant ro l e in th i s 
regard. The United States in i t s pursuit of the policy of 
global containiTient of communism under Truman doctrine paid 
special attention to countries whidi were geographically 
contiguous to soviet union or could be vulnerable to Soviet 
influence, 
in south and west Asian region, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Kuwait and i n i t i a l l y Iraq, responded favour-
ably to US overtures and either entered into bi lateral 
defence pacts with the united States or joined Central 
Treaty Organization (CEOTo) and South-east AsianTreaty 
Organization (SEATO) under the us patronage. Another 
concomitant factor that attracted US s trategic interest in 
the region, especia l ly in West Asia was the ava i lab i l i ty 
of large reserves of o i l , uninterrupted and continuous 
supply of o i l from the Persian Gulf to Washington was 
very vi tal for the us economy. Besides, the West Asian 
region was the biggest market foi American arms. The us 
commitment for the security of Israel was another contri-
butory factor that enlivened American Interest in the region. 
The cumulative Impact of these factors had been that the 
united s tates had developed v i t a l strategic s ta tes in south 
and West Asia and henceforth us policy towards the region 
was directed to preserve i t s strategic i n t e r e s t s . 
The present study deals with us strategy towards South 
and West Asia during 1970s. The decade of 1970s was most 
crucial for the united States foreign pol icy . The Arab-Israel 
conf l ic t of October 1973, use of o i l as p o l i t i c a l weapon by 
Arab oi l producing countries and i t s resultant Impact on 
American economy, growing Soviet influence in the region 
and us strategy to contain soviet influence while preserving 
i t s s trategic interes ts and the challenge to American 
states in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 were some of the crucial developments which 
wielded tremendous influence in shaping US strategy 
towards the region. All these developments haee been 
analysed in the present study which has been d'.vided into 
f i ve main chapters besides introduction and conclusion. 
The introductory chapter endeavours to br ie f ly 
analyse the main factors which have been instrunental in the 
evolution and sustenance of US strategic in teres t in south 
and West Asia. Then i t proceeds to make a review of 
representative selected l i t e r a t u r e in the form of books and 
research a r t i c l e s on the subject. An endeavour has been made 
to ascertain as to how far the available l i t e r a tu r e has been 
sufficient to present a dispassionate and indepth analysis 
of US strategy towards south and West Asia par t icular ly 
duriny 19708. I t has been found that the available l i te ra ture 
on the subject sheds ample l ight on American policy towards 
the region pr ior to 1970s and there i s rea l ly a paucity of 
serious academic study which can present detailed assessment 
of the role played by the united States during 1970s in the 
region vis-a-vis the response of the countries of the region 
towards the United States, 
The chapter further proceeds to point out that the 
present study i s an humble endeavour to f i l l up the gap by 
presenting a dispassionate, objective and indepth analysis 
of united States strategy towards South and West Asia during 
1970s. I t als*> refers to the methodology and sources relied 
upon during the course of the completion of the present study 
In the f i r s t chapter, an attempt has been made to envi-
sage the s t ra teg ic significance of the countries situated 
in south and West Asian region for the united States. The 
chapter proceeds with the theoret ical analysis of the 
concept of "strategic significance", with a view to have 
perceptive, crystal ,c lear and indepth assessment of the 
strategic significance of the region, the chapter envisages 
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two sub d i v i s i o n s . The f i r s t sub-divis ion deals with south 
Asia and i t s s t r a t e g i c s ign i f icance for the united S ta tes , 
south Asia comprises seven c o u n t r i e s - Ind ia , Pakistan, 
Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Sr i Lanka and Maldives. 
Si-nee main t h ru s t of t he present study i s on us 
s t ra tegy towards South and West Asia from t h e advent of Nixon 
adminis t ra t ion t i l l the closing years of Car te r administrat ion 
hence an endeavour has been made in the f i r s t chapter to deal 
with US s t r a t egy towards the region from the onset of cold 
War t i l l 1968, with an avowed object ive to have an indepth 
assessment of h i s t o r i c a l background which would render valulable 
help in having deeper i n s i g h t s in to the US po l i cy towards 
the region during 1970s. 
Ind ia and Pakistan had been prominent countr ies of 
South Asia towards which the us pol icy remained directed 
p r i o r to 1968. The chapter deals with the contemporary deve-
lopments t h a t ensued in the wake of cold War and eventual 
US s t ra tegy of wooing both Ind i a and Pakistan t o i t s sphere 
of inf luence, while analysing broad US objec t ives in t he 
region during t h e Cold War pe r iod , the chapter a lso re fe rs 
to the response of India as well as Pakistan to American 
over tu res . 
The mutual d i s t r u s t , suspicion and antagonism mainly 
over the quest ion of jammu and Kashmir ( j & K) were the 
main h igh l i gh t s of estranged r e l a t i o n s between India and 
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Pakis tan . Ind ia had declared i t s opposition t o "power-poli t ics 
of great powers" and refused t o jo in m i l i t a r y pac ts sponsored 
by e i t h e r superpower. However Pakistan in i t s antagonism 
agains t a formidable r i v a l - Ind ia - responded favourably t o 
American ove r tu res . The r e s u l t a n t outcome was t h a t Pakistan 
entered in t o a b i l a t e r a l defence pact with the uni ted States 
and also joined American sponsored regional m i l i t a r y a l l i ances 
CENTO and SEATO. Thus between 1954 and 1965, Pakistan received 
massive economic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance from the uni ted Sta tes . 
In the wake of outbreak of s ino- lndian h o s t i l i t i e s , 
when uni ted S ta tes and U.K. provided "nominal" mi l i t a ry 
ass i s t ance t o Ind ia , then Pakistan lodged strong p ro t e s t s 
with the United S ta tes arguing t h a t arming India would 
fur ther endanger Pak i s t an ' s s e c u r i t y . Pakistan s t a r t ed 
befriending China. In the wake of Indo-Pakistan war in 1965, 
when the uni ted S ta tes imposed embargo on suppl ies of 
m i l i t a r y equipments to both India and Pakis tan, t he l a t t e r 
looked towards China for m i l i t a r y ass i s tance and i t did get . 
An attempt has been in the chapter t o show the 
quantum and type of weapons acquired by Pakistan from the 
uni ted Sta tes during 1954-1968 period with t h e help of 
t a b l e s . P a k i s t a n ' s s t r a t e g i c loca t ion and i t s own readiness 
to accept American arms ass i s t ance to a t t a i n s t r a t e g i c 
p a r i t y with Ind ia , proved instrumental in prompting united 
Sta tes t o use Pakistan as "an idea l base" for the execution 
of the American foreign pol icy object ives of "containing" 
sovie t union and China as Pakis tan lay below Soviet Union and 
shared contiguous boundary with China, 
The chapter fur ther proceeds to analyse the fac tors 
respons ib le for enhancing the s t r a t e g i c s ign i f i cance of West 
Asia for the uni ted S t a t e s . The region assumed s t r a t e g i c 
s ignif icance for Washington mainly on four counts : (1) presence 
of I s r a e l in t h e region and American commitment to defend i t ; 
( i i ) a v a i l a b i l i t y of petroleum and i t s immense s t r a t e g i c 
s igni f icance for the United S t a t e s and i t s western a l l i e s , 
( i i i ) v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the region to soviet influence and 
geographic con t igu i ty of coun t r i e s l i k e Turkey, I ran and 
Afghanistan to the Soviet union; and (iv) s t r a t e g i c s ign i -
f icance of sea lanes of communication (SLCX:s) l i k e Suez canal . 
S t r a i t s of Hormuz and Persian Gulf for t h e un i t ed Sta tes 
t o counter Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, 
S t r a t eg i c s ignif icance of Gulf o i l for American economy 
i s evident from the f ac t in 1950, o i l accounted for about 
30 per cent of the combined energy requirements of North 
America, Western Europe and Japan, by 1973, the f igu re was 
about 53 per cent . However, by 1979, 45 per cent of the 
uni ted S t a t e s , 55 per cent of t he EEC's and 70 per cent of 
Japan ' s energy consumption was through o i l . The cha^pter also 
examines t he impact of r i s e in o i l revenues of the Persian 
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Gulf coun t r i e s on the domestic and external developments. 
During the pre_l968 period I s r a e l in West Asia and 
I ran in the Persian Gulf region developed spec ia l r e l a t i o n -
ship with t he un i ted S t a t e s . Therefore the chapter examines 
the nature and extent of US-Israel and US-iranian r e l a t i ons 
b r i e f l y . The continued American support to I s r a e l had been 
t h e s ingle most potent fac tor influencing us po l i cy towards 
West Asia. Washington played c ruc i a l ro l e in the establishment 
and subsequent sus t inance of the s t a t e of I s r a e l , 
Though during the ear ly years of Cold War, us main-
ta ined a low key p r o f i l e v i s - a - v i s I s r a e l but when soviet 
inf luence s t a r t e d increasing in Syria and Egypt, US-Israel 
axis a lso grew s t ead i l y . During 1950s, the quantum of US 
economic a s s i s t ance t o I s r ae l was about $ 55 mi l l ion on an 
average every year which rose to $ 126,8 mi l l ion in 1966 of 
which $ 90 mi l l ion was in the form of mi l i t a ry equipment. 
Thus I s r a e l was one of the important dec is ive fac to r s in 
making west Asia s t r a t e g i c a l l y s ign i f i can t for the united 
S t a t e s . 
Iran proved to be another important pawn in the 
Chess board of US s t r a t e g i c game in the region. Because of i t s 
vast o i l r e s e r v e s , geographic con t igu i ty with Soviet Union 
and Shah of I r a n ' s dependence on uni ted s t a t e s for h i s 
p o l i t i c a l su rv iva l , were some of the main f a c t o r s t ha t 
proved helpful in forging spec ia l r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
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Tehran and Washington, The un i t ed States had p layed , s ign i -
f i can t ro le i n dislodging the Mosdegh's government and r e s to -
r a t ion of throne t o Shah of I r a n . Subsequently shah of I r a n ' s 
a p p e t i t i t e for acqu is i t ion of sophis t i ca ted American arms 
continued t o grow. I t was coupled with Shah's des i re to 
strengthen h i s own pos i t ion domestical ly and to make Iran as 
the "police man" of the region. 
I t has been shown in t he chapter with t h e help of 
t ab l e t h a t I ran received massive economic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s -
tance from the united S t a t e s , Between 1953 and 196i, Iran 
received $ 10 27,7 mi l l ion from t h e United S ta t e s of which 
m i l i t a r y component was to t he tune of $ 410 mi l l ion , u n t i l 
I960, the m i l i t a r y component of t o t a l US ass i s t ance to Iran 
was 40 per cent whereas in subsequent years i t grew to 60 
per cent and above while economic component decl ined. The 
main reason for t h i s reverse t rend was due to increase in 
I ranian revenues from o i l exports which shah of Iran used 
for bui lding up I r a n ' s m i l i t a r y muscles. 
The ana lys i s of developments make i t c l ea r tha t 
presence of vast o i l reserves in the region, growing market 
for American arms and t r ade , US investment, fear of soviet 
expansion and p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c impl ica t ions of continued 
Arab-Is rae l i h o s t i l i t i e s rendered the region acquire 
pre-eminent s ign i f icance for t he United S ta tes in p o l i t i c a l , 
economic and s t r a t e g i c terms. 
The us po l i cy towards South Asia assumed new dimensions 
with the advent of Nixon adminis t ra t ion in 1969 and following 
the f a l l of Shah of I ran in January 1979 and sovie t invasion 
of Afghanistan in December 1979, t he region of south Asia 
was linked to West Asia by the American s t r a t e g i s t s and 
chris tened i t as South-West Asia. Keex^ing these aspects in 
view, t h e second chapter endeavours to analyse t h e p o l i t i c a l , 
economic and m i l i t a r y p o l i c i e s of the uni ted S ta tes towards 
Pakistan and India between 1968 and 1980, 
The embargo on supply of American weapons t o Pakistan 
imposed in t h e aftermath of outbreak of Indo-Pakistan hos-
t i l i t i e s of 1965, was l i f t e d by Nixon adminis t ra t ion in 
l a t e 1969, During August 1969, American Pres iden t , Richard 
Nixon v i s i t ed Pakistan and in October 1970, Pakistan 
president paid an o f f i c i a l v i s i t to Washington, The chapter 
presents an assessment of developments which culminated 
i n t o Bangladesh c r i s i s . 
The Nixon adminis t ra t ion adopted ambivalent a t t i t u d e 
towards Bangladesh c r i s i s . On t h e one hand i t publ ic ly 
deplored Pakistan repress ion on the people of Bangladesh 
while i t continued t o supply arms t o Pakis tan. Though the 
Foreign Rela t ions Committee of the American senate through 
a reso lu t ion adopted on 6 May l97 l , ca l led for t h e sus-
pension of a l l American and t o Pakistan u n t i l the conf l ic t 
in East Pakistan was reso lved ,ye t the Nixon adminis t ra t ion 
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continued suppl ies of arms to Pakistan c landes t ine ly . I t 
was only in ea r ly November 1971 t h a t Washington suspended 
aid t o Pakis tan. 
While analysing the developments leading t o the out-
break of Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971, t h e chapter 
makes an ana ly t i c a l assessment of "pro-Pakistan t i l t " in 
American po l i cy towards Pakistan during the war period when 
uni ted S ta tes sent i t s nuclear-powdered Naval " Task force 
t o c ru i se i n to the Waters of Ba-y of Bengal t o bui ld up 
psychological pressure on India and to boost Pak i s t an ' s 
morale. Following l i b e r a t i o n of Bangladesh, United s t a t e s 
offered l i b e r a l economic a s s i s t ance to Pakistan in early 197 2. 
In the post-Bangladesh per iod, Pakistan under 
Bhutto made f r a u t i c e f fo r t s t o acquire arms a s s i s t ance from 
the uni ted S t a t e s . I t i s evident from the chapter as to 
how Pakistan used t a c t i c a l ploys t o build up pressure on 
America ' t o l i f t embargo on suppl ies of American weapons 
to Pakistan. I n d i a ' s conduct of Peaceful nuclear explosion 
(PNE) on 18 May 1974 was used as the main plank by Pakistan 
t o e l i c i t acqu i s i t ion of American weapons. Haunted by the 
fear tha t Pakistan might go nuclear in view of I n d i a ' s PNb 
and in order to keep Pakistan within i t s fo ld , Washington 
l i f t e d embargo on supplies of weapons t o Pakistan and 
India in February 1975, 
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The cumulative effect of these developments was the 
resumption of arms supplies to Pakistan while India was 
offered only token economic ass i s tance between 1975-76, 
Pakistan managed t o procure sophis t ica ted weapons l ike A-7 
ground a t tack a i r c r a f t , an t i - t ank miss i les ••gearing" Type 
destroyers and armoured personnel c a r r i e r s from the United 
S ta t e s . 
The advent of Car ter adminis+^ration in 1977 in 
Washington and s h i f t in US arms t r ans fe r po l icy with i t s 
a t tendant impact on Pakistan have a l so been analysed in t h i s 
chapter . However, during 1977-79, t he Carter adminis t ra t ion 
did not adopt a l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e towards Pakistan as far 
as the suppl ies of American weapons t o Islamabad was 
concerned. The main impediment in the process was Pakis tan ' s 
reported at tempts to acquire nuclear c a p a b i l i t y . However the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 led t o 
change in us percept ions about the s t r a t e g i c s ignif icance 
of Pakistan for Washington in t h e changed power configuration, 
The chapter fur ther proceeds to analyse United 
S t a t e ' s pol icy towards India during the period under review. 
The advent of Nixon adminis t ra t ion did not augur well for 
the Indo-US r e l a t i o n s which got fur ther estranged in the 
wake of "pro-Pakistan t i l t " in us pol icy, unin ter rupted 
supplies of American arms t o Pakistan during 1969-70 caused 
consternat ions in Ind ia . This pa r t of the second chapter 
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delves in to de t a i l ed analys is of I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n t o US 
supplies o£ arms to Pakis tan. 
From 1965 t o June 1971, Ind ia procured American arms 
of 
worth $ 118 mi l l ion while P a k i s t a n ' s acquis i t ion/arms from 
the United S ta t e s were to the tyjte of $ 601 mi l l i on . While 
analysing the impact of developments t h a t culminated in to 
Bangladesh c r i s i s on indo-Us r e l a t i o n s . The chapter proceeds 
to describe at tempts made by Indian leadership to apprise 
Washington about impl ica t ions a r i s ing out of Bangladesh 
c r i s i s and I n d i a ' s concerns over American gun-boat diplomacy 
during Indo-Pakistan War of 1971. 
The post-war period enhanced I n d i a ' s c r eden t i a l s as 
dominant power in south Asia and by ear ly 197 3, Nixon 
adminis t ra t ion conceded I n d i a ' s reckoning as a leading 
power in the region and expressed i t s wi l l ingness t o t r e a t 
Ind ia in accordance with i t s new s t a t u r e . The chapter also 
examines t he expressed de s i r e of both s ides to br ing indo-US 
r e l a t i o n s on an even heej. during 1975-76 but continued 
supplies of American arms t o Pakistan marred t h e prospects 
of improvement, 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n of conventional arms coupled with the 
problem of nuc lea r i za t ion in South Asia and po l icy of 
United S ta tes towards i t c o n s t i t u t e the subject matter of 
c r i t i c a l appra isa l for t h i rd chapter of t he present study. 
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In view of unimpeded flow of American arms Into Pakistan, 
India In I t s quest for attaining strategic paxlty with 
Pakistan* also procured arms from soviet union* U.K. and 
France, Pakistan was also provided with sophisticated weapons 
by China. In t h i s way# an fseoabatlon in arms race was in i -
t ia ted into the region. 
In t h i s regard, the third chapter presents an 
analytical assessment of Soviet mil i tary assistance to India. 
In view of emerging triangular axis between Washington, 
Islamabad and Beijing at a time when security scenario in the 
Indian subcontinent had become precarious in the wake of 
Bangladesh c r i s i s , India concluded a treaty of peace and 
friendship with soviet union. During the India Pakistan 
war of 1971, the Indo-ooviet treaty stood in India's good 
stead. The United s tates and China did not dare t o involve 
themselves by the side of Pakistan. India acquired Su-7 
Sukhov fighter planes, SA-2 type miss i l e s and other equipment 
from soviet Union during 1970-71, 
The arms supplied by Soviet Union to India during 
1970-79 have been shown in the chapter with the help of a 
detai led table . India received MIG-21 fighter planes, Ka-4 type 
and Ml-8 hel icopters , Valwons types missiles^main bat t le 
tanks, miss i l e boats and other naval vesse ls from soviet 
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Union. Besides, Ind ia a lso procured SA-315 B type and 
SA-316 type he l i cop t e r s and SS-11 type miss i les from France 
during t h e period under review. I n d i a ' s acqu is i t ion of 
weapons from U.K. included Ghat-2 type and jagu-ar f igh ter 
p lanes . 
The chapter a lso provides an asses'sment about 
Pak i s t an ' s acqu i s i t i on of arms from China which included 
MiG-19, F-6 Shenyang and P-6 Bis f i g h t e r planes, T-59 
tanks , gunboats and "W" c lass submarine. 
The problem of nuc lea r i f i ca t ion in south Asia assumed 
s ign i f i cance a f t e r India conducted i t s peaceful nuclear 
explosion in May 1974. Reported move by Pakistan t o 
acquire nuclear capab i l i t y e spec ia l ly between 1978-79 
provided ser ious dimensions t o t he question of nuclear iza-
t i o n in south Asia. The t h i r d chapter endeavours t o 
c r i t i c a l l y appra ise t h i s problem from various perspect ives 
with special re fe rence to US po l i cy . I n d i a ' s nuclear pro-
gramme also came under a t tack from Washington. The chapter 
examines the s t r e s s e s and s t r a i n s in indo-US r e l a t i o n s 
over, the nuclear i s s u e . I t fur ther proceeds t o examine 
Pakis tani nuclear programme, American misapprehensions 
about Pak i s t an ' s r e a l i n t en t ions and Washington's pol icy 
measures to deter Pakistan from acquring nuclear capab i l i ty 
in the form of t h r e a t s t o ce r t a in economic and arms 
a s s i s t ance , i t has a lso been shown in t h i s chapter t ha t 
15 
how Pakistan managed t o acquire necessary equipment clandes-
t i v e l y and how China helped Pakistan t o acquire uranium 
enrichment c a p a b i l i t y . I t also deals with the concommitant 
developments in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 which thawarted American e f fo r t s in disuading 
Pakistan from acquring nuclear capab i l i ty . and resumption of 
suppl ies of soph is t i ca ted conventional weapons to Pakistan. 
The fourth chapter p resen ts a de ta i led assessment 
about American po l icy towards West Asianregion between 1968 
and 1980. While taking a stock of s i t u a t i o n obtaining in 
t h e aftermath of j une I9t)7 Arab- I s rae l i war, t he chapter 
moves towards the p a t t e r n of US-Israel r e l a t i o n s which grew 
th i ck and s t ronger during the period under review. Washington 
remained committed t o I s r a e l and ©ffered i t l i b e r a l economic 
and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . Following t h e disrupt ion in Egypt-
Soviet r e l a t i o n s and in t he aftermath of October 1973 Arab-
I s r a e l war, uni ted S ta tes t r i e d t o inc rease i t s sphere of 
influence and stem t h e t i d e of Soviet influence in the region . 
The chapter chronic les the development whereby Washington 
f a c i l i t a t e d reapproachement between I s r a e l and Hgypt in 1978. 
Developments in the p o l i t i c a l , economic and mi l i t a ry 
realms between uni ted S ta tes and I ran during 1968-1980 period 
have a lso been c r i t i c a l l y examined in the fourth chapter . 
Shah of I r a n ' s quest for modernizing I ran ian army by 
equipping i t with l a t e s t sophis t i ca ted weapons was supplemented 
by t h e sudden boom in augmentation of 6 i l revenues a f te r 
l u 
1974 when the Arab o i l producing count r i es used o i l as an 
e f fec t ive p o l i t i c a l weapon against uni ted States and other 
Western Countries. Besides, Shah of I ran was also inc l ined 
t o make Iran as t h e most powerful country in the region, 
Washington found in Shah of I ran a viable and ambi-
t i o n s medium who could serve American object ives by 
Thus uni ted Sta tes unhes i t a t ing ly met I ranian reques ts to r 
arms and ammunition. This proximity and matuali ty of i n t e r e s t s 
was more advantageous t o Washington which found a ready 
market for i t s weapons. The chapter chronicles in d e t a i l 
t h e various types of weapons acquired by Iran from t h e 
uni ted S t a t e s , I t has also drawn a p a r a l l e l between I s r a e l i 
acqu i s i t ion of American weapons and I ran ian procurement of 
US arms. While I ran paid for i t s import of arms whereas 
Washington e i t he r gave or loaned at extremely favourable 
repayment terms# t o I s r a e l the money i t needed to acquire 
weapons. The p o l i c i e s pursued by I s r a e l proved detr imental 
t o American i n t e r e s t s in the region while I ran served American 
i n t e r e s t s by proxy . However the f a l l of Shah of I r an in 
January i979 and emergence of Is lamic revolut ion in tha t 
country not only made America t o lo se a r e l i a b l e a l l y but 
served a severe blow t o US s t r a t e g i c s takes in the region. 
The united S t a t e ' s approach t o arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n 
in West Asia forms t h e subject of f i f t h chapter, s ince the 
conclusion of second world War, t h e West Asian including 
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Persian Gulf region had witnessed a rapid p r o l i f e r a t i o n of 
arms. I t accounted for 48 per cent of tne major arms imports 
during the 1970s. The chapter endeavours t o subs t an t i a t e 
t h i s fac t with t h e help of de ta i l ed t a b l e s showing import of 
arms by various reg ions . 
The continued s t a t e of h o s t i l i t i e s between Arabs and 
I s r a e l ' s had played major r o l e in compelling t he countr ies to 
envisage increase in m i l i t a r y expenditure and arms imports. 
Besides, various i n t e r and i n t r a - s t a t e conf l i c t s which occurred 
in West Asia e spec ia l ly along the Persian Gulf during i97Us 
also caused spurt In arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n in rhe region. Another 
con t r ibu tory fac tor was t h * phenomenal increase in crude o i l 
p r i c e which brought fo r th quick wealth to same count r ies m 
the region which diverted the major chunk of t h i s wealth 
for extensive purchases of modern arms and equipment. Besides, 
f i nanc i a l support from some of the r i c h e r countr ies of the 
region, notably Saudi Arabia, in tu rn allowed some of the 
poorer countr ies t o embark upon ambitious arms acquis i t ion 
programme. 
While present ing an indepth ana lys is of reasons 
respons ib le for arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n in t he region, t h e chapter 
c r i t i c a l l y appraises t h e ideologica l perspect ives of I s r a e l i ' s 
and Arabs in t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l and polenrtcal context to 
a sce r t a in t h e i r impact on secur i ty percept ions . I t a lso 
exaiTilnes the per cap i t a defence expenditures incurred by the 
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coun t r i e s of t he region and t h e i r t e n t a t i v e plans to augment 
t h e i r defence c a p a b i l i t i e s by procuring arms and r a i s i ng the 
s t rength of armed fo rces . 
Subsequently, t he chapter dea l s with t he acquis i t ion 
of arms by respec t ive countr ies of the region. I t i s to be 
observed from the ana lys i s tha t Saudi Arabia which maintained 
a low p r o f i l e with regard to importing sophis t ica ted arms in 
the beginning of 1970s, suddenly emerged as one of t h e 
l a r g e s t arms importers between 1975-79. Saudi Arabia ' s share 
of arms imports in the t o t a l share of West Asia was only three 
per cent between 1970 and 1974. However, during 1975-79 
per iod, Saudi Arabia accounted for over 14 pei cent of the 
t o t a l arms imports in t h e region. I t i s fur ther revealed tha t 
during 1974-75, uni ted S ta tes and France made bulk of the 
suppl ies of arms ava i l ab le t o Saudi Arabia but from 1976 
t o 1980, uni ted S t a t e s remainea the l a r g e s t suppl ier of 
arms t o Saudi Arabia followed by France, U.K., and West 
Germany, 
Acquisit ion of arms uy joraan , as analysed in t h i s 
chapter , was almost neg l i g ib l e in ear ly 1970s but from mid-
1970s onwards, Jordan emerged as the t h i r d l a rges t importer 
of arms. I t s arms imports were worth $ 2,6i5 Jidllion which 
accounted for 13 per cent of r e g i o n ' s t o t a l arm imports . 
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Egyptian import of arms showed a var iab le t rend . During 
the f i r s t half of 1970s, Egypt ranked second, a f te r Syria, in 
importing arms. Between 1970 and 1974, arms imports by Egypt 
accounted for 23 per cent of West Asian r eg ion ' s t o t a l import 
of arms during tha t per iod. During ea r ly 1970s, Egypt was 
l a r g e l y dependent on Soviet union for i t s defence requirements 
but following d is rupt ion in Soviet-Egyptian r e l a t i o n s , Cairo 
sought arms from France, U,K,, uni ted S ta t e s and West Germany. 
The chapter a lso deals about the import of arms by Syria. 
During t h e f i r s t half of 1970s, Syria had been the l a rges t 
customer of Soviet arms in t h e region. Between 1970 and 1974, 
Syrian imports of arms accounted for 25 per cent of t h e t o t a l 
arms imported by the region, i t i s fu r the r revealed t h a t during 
the second half of 1970s, Syria accounted for aDout 6 per cent 
of r e g i o n ' s t o t a l import of arms. Though soviet union remained 
the biggest suppl ier of arms to Syria yet a t rend towards 
d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n was a lso not iceable from 1975 onwards when 
France, West Germany, Switzerland and I t a l y also entered 
the Syrian arms market. 
The chapter a lso makes a c r i t i c a l appraisal of the 
p a t t e r n of arms imports by Iraq which accounted for 4 per cent 
of r e g i o n ' s t o t a l arms Imports between 1970 and 1974, but 
during 1975-79 period, I raq accounted for 12 per cent of 
r e g i o n ' s t o t a l imports of arms. I t i s fu r the r revealed tha t 
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though for many y»ars I raq had been dependent on Soviet union 
for the supply of arms/ however, t h i s t rend got reversed 
from 1974 onwards when Iraq d ive r s i f i ed i t s sources including 
France, Brazil and Czechoslovakia. 
The chapter f i n a l l y surmises tha t due to above 
mentioned f a c t o r s , t he r e was rapid p r o l i f e r a t i o n of arms in 
t he region. 
The f ina l chapter in t h e form of conclusion which 
i s based on the t rends emerging out of the present study 
submits tha t South and West Asian region occupied pr,e-eminent 
pos i t ion m the overal l American global s t r a t egy . Thetig^West 
Asian and t e r s i a n Gulf region had re ta ined i t s pre-eminence 
while South Asia offered l i t t l e opportunity for furthering 
O'S object ives but following the Soviet invasion of Afghanis-
t an , got i n t e r l i nked West Asia to become South West Asia 
assuming added s igni f icance for us s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t . / 
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INTKODOCTION 
S o u t h and West As ia r e g i o n o c c u p i e s a p r e - e m i n e n t 
p o s i t i o n i n o v e r a l l US g l o b a l s t r a t e g y . Whe the r i t was 
u n d e r Truman and E l s e n h o w e r d o c t r i n e s i n t h e wake of c o l d 
war p e r i o d h o t l y c h a s e d d u r i n g 1950s and 1960s o r t h e p e r i o d 
of d e t e n t e d u r i n g 1970s o r t h e r e v i v a l of c o l d war i n 
e a r l y 1980s o r t h e i n a u g r a t i o n of an e r a of accomoda t ion 
from c o n f r o n t a t i o n be tween t h e s u p e r p o w e r s s i n c e l a t e 1980s , 
Sou th and West A s i a ' s s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e h a s n e v e r 
d i m i n i s h e d i n u n i t e d S t a t e ' s g l o b a l p o l i c y . T h i s r e g i o n 
i s endowed w i t h c e r t a i n c h a r a c t i e r i s t i e s w h i c h a r e n o t 
p r e s e n t i n o t h e r r e g i o n s . 
s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n of t h i s r e g i o n i s v e r y v i t a l f o r 
u n i t e d s t a t e s b e c a u s e of p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y and economic 
r e a s o n s . C o u n t r i e s l i k e I r a n , T u r k e y and A f g h a n i s t a n h a v e 
g e o g r a p h i c c o n t i g u i t y w i t h s o v i e t Un ion , an a r c h a d v e r s a r y 
of U n i t e d s t a t e s . Pro-US s t a n c e o r a n t i - s o v i e t a t t i t u d e of 
t h e s e c o u n t r i e s i s v e r y v i t a l f o r t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s no t 
o n l y t o c h e c k t h e e x p a n s i o n of S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e b u t a l s o 
t o e n h a n c e i t s own i n f l u e n c e . 
I n w e s t A s i a , t h e P e r s i a n Gulf r e g i o n c o n t a i n s b u l k 
of p e t r o l e u m r e s e r v e s and , c o n t i n u e d and u n i n t e r r u p t e d s u p p l -
i e s or p e t r o l e u m i s v e r y v i t a l t o r t h e economic s u r v i v a l 
of western i n d u s t r i a l i z e d countr ies in general and the 
United S ta tes in p a r t i c u l a r . Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran 
possess about two-third, of world 's Oi l wealth. During 
1970s, uni ted S ta tes maintained Cordial and f r iendly r e l a t i o a s 
with t he se coun t r i e s . However, a cool-off stage was envi-
saged in US-iranian r e l a t i o n s a f te r t h e f a l l of Shahs regime 
in January 1979. 
Apart from having pro-Westezm regiines in o i l produ-
cing count r ies of Persian Gulf, United S ta tes had also 
assumed unto i t s e l f the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of ensuring contineous 
and • ' Uninterrupted supply of o i l through sea lanes of 
communicationsCSLDCs) such as persian gulf^ s t r a i t of Hormuz 
and o ther v i t a l o u t l e t s in t he Indian Ocean. Enhanced Soviet 
presence in Indian Ocean, e spec ia l ly in the shadow of cold 
war could have hampered t h e smooth flow and supply of .o i l 
to t h e United S ta tes and i t s West European a l l i e s . 
I n t e r and i n t r a regional r i v a l r i e s between and anong 
the count r ies of Persian Gulf region and West Asia mainly 
on account of disputed borders as a consequence of colonia l 
legacy and the weak regimes apprehensions from the powerful 
neighbours prompted these count r ies e i t h e r to depend upon 
united S ta tes or Soviet Union for procuring armaments. 
The disputed nature of borders cons t i tu ted a constant source 
of tension which contributed to regional in s t ab i l i t y , 
I r aq ' s border disputed with Iran and Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and South Yemen etc. are some such examples, 
I s rae l has been the most significant factor of deter-
mining US policy towards West Asia and in evoking the 
response of region's countries towards Washington accordingly. 
Since i t s establishment in May 1948, I s rae l has enjoyed US 
patronage, united s t a tes regards I s rae l as i t s re l iable 
s t ra teg ic a l ly in the region. Because of American patronage, 
po l i t i ca l ly , economically and mi l i t a r i ly , I s rae l has been 
in occupation of Arab t e r r i t o r i e s since June 1967, and 
despite UN security counci l ' s resolution 242 which called 
for I s r ae l i withdrawl from Arab occupied t e r r i t o r i e s , the 
intrasigent and aggressive a t t i tude of I s rae l has led to 
outbreak of Arab h o s t i l i t i e s in 1948-49, 1956, June 1967 
and October 1973. During 1970s, United States provided 
massive economic and mil i tary assistance to I s rae l , The 
Arab countries regard Is rae l as a constant source of threat 
to the i r t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty and regional security. 
The region of West Asia, especially persian Gulf 
has been the largest importer of arms almost accounting 
for 48 percent of to ta l arms imports by the Third World 
countries since the end of second world war. Induction 
of arms into the region registered substantial increase 
in the aftermath of October 1973, when the ac t ive p a r t i -
c ipan t s in t he war I s r a e l , Egypt and Syria , which had 
incurred heavy loss of weapons and equipment, sought to 
import arms to recoup the losses and a t t a i n s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y 
as de te r ren t to t h e i r adversa r ies . The us© of o i l as p o l i t i c a l 
weapon a f te r t h e October 197 3 war had resu l t ed in the sub-
s t a n t i a l augmentation of revenues of Arab o i l producing 
count r i es - Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and I r a q . Iran also reaped 
r i ch dividends. Since these count r ies also increased t h e i r 
arms imports to modernize the i r defence forces and to equip 
them with l a t e s t weapons. 
uni ted S ta tes and Soviet Union were the major arms 
supp l ie r s to the region, Soviet arms suppl ies were mainly 
confined to Syria, I r aq and Etjypt, Following estrangement 
in Soviet-Egyptian r e l a t i o n s in ea r ly 1970s, Cai ro ' s 
dependence on Soviet arms decreased. By the l a t t e r half of 
1970s, Egypt had s t a r t e d importing arms in bulk from 
Washington. Other c l i e n t s of US arms were I s r a e l , Saudi 
Arabia, Kuwait, jprdan and I r an . 
I t was because of these major f a c t o r s tha t United 
S ta tes had developed v i t a l s takes in the region. With 
respect to South Asia, the s t r a t e g i c locat ion of Indian 
subcontinent mainly because of i t s proximity to Indian 
Ocean and Gulf region and to Soviet union and China sui ted 
American foreign po l i cy ob jec t ives under Truman doctr ine to 
contain communism. Pakistan because of i t s antagonism with 
I n d i t mainly on Kashmir i s sue was looking for a powerful 
a l l y which could provide mi l i t a ry and economic a s s i s t ance . 
Thus the mutual i ty of s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s brought Pakistan 
and uni ted s t a t e s c lo se r to each o the r . United States 
obliged Pakistan by providing subs tan t i a l economic and 
m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance . Pakistan responded by joining a n t l -
coimiunist mi l i t a ry a l l i a n c e s CENTO and SEATO under the 
US patronage. 
The f a l l of Shah regime in Iran in mid January 1979 
and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1999 served 
a severe blow to US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in South aod west 
Asia. Consequently Washington contemplated to make up by 
propping up Saudi Arabia and Pakistan as the custodian of 
v i t a l American i n t e r e s t s in the region . Consequently during 
1980s, Washington provided massive suppl ies of soph i s t i ca -
ted weapons to Saudi Arabia and made a v i l a b l e subs t an t i a l 
econonric and mi l i t a ry ass i s tance t o Pakis tan . 
The unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of South and West Asia 
l ike I t s s t r a t e g i c loca t ion and s ign i f icance , as the nerve 
centre of superpower r i v a l r y , as a key to the future of 
international peace and secuti ty especially in the after-
math of major Arab-Israeli confl icts , Suez c r i s i s and 
Indo-Pakistan wars, which on occasions entailed the 
poss ib i l i ty of direct confrontation between the super-
powers, presence of substantial o i l reserves and the 
largest buyer of sophisticated arms, have been instrumen-
t a l in at t ract ing the attention of in te l l ec tua l s , acade-
micians, social s c i en t i s t s , defence experts, journal is ts 
e tc . A plethora pf l i t e r a tu re in the form of books, research 
a r t i c l e s and journa l i s t ic coiwnents has appeared which 
portrays different aspects of geo-pol i t ical , mil i tary and 
other realms of ac t iv i ty in South and West Asia, A brief 
and select ive review of some of the important works on the 
subject would be both interest ing and ins t ruct ive . Articles 
appearing the newspapers and edi tor ia l comments have been 
excluded though they have been occasionally made use of 
in the present study as per requirement, 
Amltava Acharya's scholarly book deals with United 
State ' s s t rategic involvement in the Persian Gulf region 
with the avowed objective of securing access to the region's 
o i l resources, containing Soviet influence and ensuring 
the preservation of the conserative regimes in the Arabian 
Peninsula. The author has endeavoured to explain the nature 
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and dimensions of the US power pro tec t ion s t r a t egy in the 
Gulf in t he formative years which followed the f a l l of 
Shah of •'•ran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and t h e 
outbreak of -^ran-lraq war. The book fur ther deals with the 
formation of US Rapid Deployment, j o i n t Task Force and the 
US Cent ra l Command, t h e i r force s t r uc tu r e and mobil i ty 
a s s e t s and the network of US bases and f a c i l i t i e s in t he 
reg ion . The nature of US contingency planning to counter 
both Soviet and i n t r a - r e g i o n a l , including t h e I r an - I r aq 
war, the t rends in US secu r i t y doopcration with t h e Gulf 
coun t r i es and the ro l e of pro-Western count r ies such as 
I s r a e l , Jordan e t c , are discussed and analysed in t h i s book. 
The period of 1970s marked a watershed in US s t r a t egy 
towards southwest Asia because the Nixon doctr ine was put to 
acid t e s t in the wake of development which obtained in the 
region during t h i s per iod . However the book i s useful for 
discerning US s t r a t e g y toward Iran by the close of 1970s. 
I t does not shed l i gh t on US pol icy toward south-west Asia. 
I t serves very l imited purpose for t h e present study. 
Amin Hewedy's book has a fac inat ing t i t l e but i t 
f a i l s to meet eved p a r t i a l l y one requirement to a sce r t a in 
1. Amitava Acharya, US Mi l i t a ry S t ra tegy in the Gulf 
(London t Routledge, 1:^ 89) . 
2. Amin Hewe^y, M4l i ta r iza t ion and Secur i ty in t h e Middle 
East t I t s Impact on Development and Denocracy (London: 
P. 
8 
the r o l e of United S ta tes in south-west Asia espec ia l ly 
during 1970s, The book p r imar i ly deals vdth t he impact of 
excessive m i l i t a r i z a t i o n by the prominent count r ies of the 
Middle East on t h e i r developmental programmes. Main t h r u s t 
of t he book i s on t he f ac t t h a t increased m i l i t a r i z a t i o n 
can lead t o ac t ive apposi t ion by p o l i t i c a l d i s s iden t s and to 
a country*s i n t e r n a l u n r e s t . This in turn can gear the 
economy to mi l i t a ry expenditure which c r e a t e s external 
aggression and regional s e c u r i t y . The author has argued 
tha t lack of democracy in Arab countr ies and I s r a e l i treatment 
of the P a l e s t i n i a n s had been maintaining t h e conf l ic t in 
t h e region. The book i s i n t e r e s t i n g for general reading. 
However i t does not con t r ibu te much in unfolding the sub-
t l l i t i e s of American s t r a t e g y in the south-west Asia, 
Anthony H, Cordesman and Abraham R. Wagner in t h e i r 
book^ have d e a l t in d e t a i l s about the g e o p o l i t i c a l impli-
ca t ions and s t r a t e g i c f a l l out of the Arab- I s rae l i c o n f l i c t 
of 1973 and subsequent developments in the region . I t covers 
the Arab- I s rae l i arms race from 1973 to 1989, as well as wars 
tha t have plagued the region . In a d i spass iona te ana lys i s , 
the authors have focussed on mi l i t a ry events and lessons . 
The p o l i t i c s of each c o n f l i c t has been discussed only to the 
3. Anthony ^ H. Cordesman and Abraham R, Wagner, The Lessons 
of Modern War, Vol .1 . The Arab-Is rae l i Confl ic ta . 
1973-198^ (Boulden West view Press , 1990). 
extent necessary t o understand the grand s t r a t egy , the 
s t r a t egy and the t a c t i c s of the c o n f l i c t . Though the book 
deals with l imited period of Arab-Is rae l i c o n f l i c t , yet 
i t i s valuable from s t r a t e g i c and defence aspects because 
t he topics covered in i t inc lude combatants, t e r r a i n , 
threa t -essessment technologies , command, con t ro l and 
communication and types of weapons used. All t h e s e add to 
the u t i l i t y of the book though for a l imited period. 
4 S imi la r ly A.G. Naidu in h i s book has t r i e d to analyse 
tha t the po l icy of the United S ta tes towards west Asia had 
been guided by i t s determination to safeguard and promote i t s 
economic, p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in t h e region. 
Towards t h a t end, t h e United Sta tes had s t r i ven to respond t o 
the chal lenges posed t o i t s i n t e r e s t s by Soviet union and had 
directed i t s e f fo r t s towards stemming and countering an 
increase in Soviet influence in the region. The book has a 
l imited scope because i t dea ls with only Arab-Israel conf l i c t 
of June 1967. The book has presented an in-depth analysis 
of developments leading t o the outbreak of June 1967 war, 
the inf luence of Jewish lobby within t h e uni ted s t a t e s on 
the evolution of American po l i cy towards West Asia and the 
consequences thereof. Because of i t s l imited scope, the book 
i s of p a r t i a l u t i l i t y in understanding t h e Us s t r a t egy 
4. A.G. Naidu, US Policy towards the Arab-Israel conf l ic t 
(New Delhi; Tuls i Publishing House, 1981). 
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towards South-west Asia. 
Another commendable work has been authored by Charge 
A, Rubenberg • In a provocative and probing alternative view 
of a cornerstone of American foreign policy the author has 
argued that US Israel partnership far from furthering Ameri-
can national interests in West Asia, has severely damaged 
them. Tracing the histoiry of US-Israel relations from the 
partition of Palestine in 1947 through the war in Lebanon 
the author has illtminated the reasons for America's enormous 
support for Israel, deceenates the pivotal the role of the 
"pro-Israeli lobby" in maintaining that support, and reveals 
the extent to which American Foreign policy in the Middle 
East has been "mistakenly based on the assumption that Isreal 
can be a true extension of American power* The author has aptly 
focussed on the ways in which US-Israeli partnership has both 
contributed to the cycle of conflict and the bloodshed in 
the Middle-east and under-mined US efforts to contain Soviet 
Influence in the region. 
Though this book does not take into account South-
west Asian region as a whole which limits its contours to 
west Asia alone, yet the book is quite informative, analy-
tical and adds abundantly to one's understanding of the 
intricacies of US policy towards West Asia particularly 
Israel. 
5. Charge, A. Ruberberg, Israel and the AmPrHr.;;>n National 
interest (Urbana : University of isiions PreSs? 1986). 
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Another i n t e r e s t i n g study^ has been done by Arthur 
J . Klinghoffer and Jud i th Apter which premarily deals with 
sovie t un ion ' s pol icy towards I s r a e l . Though the subject i s 
of inmense s igni f icance because i t deals with Soviet pol icy 
which has been instrumental in determining American respon-
se towards, the region, yet i t f a l l s short of comprehensive 
assessment of superpowers i n t e r a c t i o n in south-west Asia. 
Similarly Abdul Redu A s s i r l ' s study atout Kuwait sheds l ight 
on the foreign pol icy of one of the coun t r i es of the Gulf 
region. 
in t h i s booH,'^ the author has examined the major 
external events tha t have shaped Kuwaiti foreign policy and 
looks at how regional i n s t a b i l i t i e s and domestic turmoil 
have l imited Kuwait 's foreign pol icy op t ions . Since t he 
book deals with one of the count r ies of Persian Gulf namely 
Kuwait, hence i t has l imited scope. However i t provides 
passing references to regional developments. 
Colin Leguin's edited book contains co l lec t ion of 
a r t i c l e s on d i f fe ren t aspec ts and developments in the 
Middle East, In t h i s book, the proader Middle Eastern 
p o l i t i c a l scene during 1970s has been analysed under 
6"^  Arthur J . Klinghoffer and Jud i th Apter, I s r a e l and the 
Soviet Union? Alienat ion or Reconcitation (Boulderj 
Westview press , 1985). 
7. Abdul-Redu Ass i r i , Kuwait*^ Foreign Pol icy (Boulder; 
westview Press, 1990), 
8. Colin Leauin<e<3L.) C r i s i s and con f l i c t s in the Middle Easti 
The changing s t r a t egy from Iran to Afghanistan (New York: 
Holmes and Meier, 1981) . 
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th ree headings-the superpower r i v a l r y , regional p o l i t i c s 
and dofnestic p o l i t i c s . The mid-^gTOs were years of achie-
vement for t h e U.S. pol icy in t h e Middle Eas t . The book 
h igh l igh t s as to how the American diplomacy made good use ot 
the ambiguous outcome of the October 1973 war and i t s own 
contr ibut ion to the opening of the "peace process" in the 
Arab-Is rae l i c o n f l i c t . I t r e -es tab l i shed Washington's 
cent ra l pos i t ion in the core area of the Middle East, 
expedited t h e Soviet Union's ous te r from Egypt and began 
to make in roads in to the Soviet Union's pos i t ion in Syria. 
But impressive as i t may have seemed a t the time, the 
new American po l icy In the Middle East and t h e new pos i t ion 
i t created were not f ree from ser ious flows and weaknesses 
such as the growing American dependence on Middle Eastern 
o i l . These were se r ious ly exacerbated during the closing 
years of 1970s Syria Soviet counter-offensive which began 
in the ou t ly ing areas of the Middle East and by the er rors 
and f a i l u r e s of the Carter Adminis t ra t ion 's po l icy in the 
years 1977-1979, p a r t i c u l a r l y i t s I s r a e l i a n and Afghan 
setbacks. The book shows how the image of a vigorous and 
resourceful American po l i cy was replaced at t h e end of the 
decade by that of an e f fec t ive Soviet offensive encountering 
a he lp less and l e s s than c r ed ib l e American response. 
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William J . Barnds in h i s book has provided in 
b r i l l i a n t ana lys i s of Soviet and American r i v a l r y in the 
Indian subcontinent from t h e conclusion of the second world 
war to t h e Bangladesh c r i s i s . The author in t h i s book has 
taken pains to provide an indepth assessment of the evolu-
t ion of US foreign pol icy towards t h e Indian sub-continent 
espec ia l ly during the cold war period. The book i s useful 
in ascer ta in ing the background to developments in the 
Indian subcontinent and the pol icy response of both Soviet 
Union and United S ta t e s . However since i t dea ls with l imited 
period and does not cover the west Asian region hence i t 
f a l l s short of providing a compr eh erosive assessment of US 
s t ra tegy towards south-west Asia p a r t i c u l a r l y during 1970s, 
However i t i s helpful in enriching one ' s knowledge about 
p o l i t i c a l developments in South Asia during 1950s and 1960s. 
Leela Yadav's book provides a comprehensive analys is 
of r e l a t i o n s between Pakistan and United S ta t e s from mid 
1950s t i l l the beginning of 1970s. I t i s a useful study 
which keeps in knowing the proximity of i n t e r e s t s between 
Pakistan and the United s t a t e s , i r r i t a n t s which developed 
10. Leela Yadav, US Pol icy In South Asian (New Delhi. 
Harman Publishing House, 1989), 
9 . William J . Barnds, India , Pakis tan and Great powers (New York: Praeger , i972) . 
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between the two countr ies from time to time and I n d i a ' s 
react ion to US ro l e on arms bu i ld up by Pakis tan , I t i s 
a valuable and research o r i en ted work which equips the 
reader with shapp a n a l y t i c a l t o o l s t o extangle the knotty 
i n t r i c a c i e s of American s t r a t e g y of propping up mi l i t a ry 
d i c t a t o r s h i p s in the Third World with Pakistan as a special 
case study. The author has provided per iphera l reference 
t o west Asian and Gulf coun t r i e s as wel l . Hence i t i s a 
useful addi t ion t o ava i lab le l i t e r a t u r e , on South Asia, 
Another book^^ deal ing with superpower's r i v a l r y 
in t he Indian sub-continent i s writ ten by Timothy George, 
R. Lotwak and Shahram Chubin, These authors have taken up 
the period from mid-1970s to ea r ly 1980s. The main focus i s 
on India , I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s , with Soviet Union united 
Sta tes and China have been ap t ly analysed. I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s 
with the uni ted Sta tes have been analysed mainly during 
president Carter and Pres ident Reagan's f i r s t term in o f f i ce . 
Besides, Indo-Soviet r e l a t i o n s have been d e a l t with more 
meticulously. The book i s useful in understanding the super-
powers a t t i t u d e towards Ind ia and l e t t e r ' s response. I t i s 
a valuable addit ion to the exis t ing l i t e r a t u r e on South 
Asia. However i t s main focus on India makes i t s scope 
11, Timothy George, R, l*otwak and Shahram Chubin (eds.) 
Secpndlv in Southern Asia i India and the g rea t power^ (London t Gower, 1984) . 
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l i ad ted because the west Asian region f inds no treatment 
in t h i s book. 
Why South Asian region had been engaging lesser 
American a t t en t ion p r io r to 1970s and why during the Bangla-
desh c r i s i s and in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
in December 1979 in region suddenly assumed added signif icance 
in US s t r a t egy and what prompted Washington t o prefer Pakistan 
than to Ind ia , are such propping quest ions which have been 
^y 12 
ap t ly d e a l t wltl-/B,M. j a i n in h i s book , The hallmark of 
Dr. J a i n ' s book i s that i t devotes subs t an t i a l portion to 
the nuclear programme of Pakistan and American e f fo r t s in 
disuading the former to abandon i t s nuclear weapon programme. 
The author has meticulously analysed the Indian dilemma in 
view of suppl ies of sophis t i ca ted weapons by the United 
Sta tes t o Pakis tan, The book i s useful for having an analy-
t i c a l assessment about US pol icy towards South Asia. However 
since i t does not deal with South-west Asia, as such i t 
become l imi ted in scope. 
Pakistan as the focal point of US s t r a t e g y in South 
Asia has a t t r a c t e d considerable academic i n t e r e s t and prof. 
13 Surendra Chopra's edited book contains a r t i c l e s in t h i s 
regard. The book i s qu i te useful in enriching ones under-
12. B.M. J a i n , South Asi^ India and the United States 
( jai i :ur , R.B.S.A, Publ i shers , 1987) . 
13. Surendra Chopta.,(ed.) Perspect ives on Pak i s t an ' s 
Foreign Policy (Amritsar ; GNDU Press , 198 3) . 
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standing about Pakistan, i t s r e l a t i o n s with superpowers. 
Is lamic coun t r i e s e s p e c i a l l y I ran and Saudi Arabia and 
Pak i s t an ' s nuclear programme. Since Pakistan occupies a key 
posi t ion in subserving US s t r a t e g i c ob jec t ives In South 
Asia, hence i t s understanding i s e s sen t i a l in comprehend!nrj 
the South Asian g e o p o l i t i c s . This i s useful book but because 
of i t s too much emphasis on Pakistan, i t does not serve the 
purpose of making an indepth assessment of US s t ra tegy 
towards South-west Asia. 
After having made a brief review of selected bunch of 
books re levant to the subjec t , now I t deems appropriate to 
re fer to some of the important a r t i c l e s which have appeared 
on the subject in various research jou rna l s . The working of 
research a r t i c l e s not only as source of research a r t i c l e s , 
not only as source of information but also as c a t a ly s t s and 
s t imula tors of thought and ana lys is for researcher enabling 
how to t e s t h i s views and hypothesis and sharpen his 
methodological tools and techniques cannot be over-emphasized, 
14 Bruce R. Kuniholm in his ana ly t i ca l a r t i c l e has 
t r i e d to define the g e o - s t r a t e g l c contours of South-West 
14. Pruce R. Kuniholm, •The Carter Doctrine, the Reagon 
Corol lary and Prospects for United s t a t e s Policy in 
South west Asia " in te rna t iona l joyrnaj. . Vol, XLI, No. 2, 
Spring 1986, pp. 342-361. 
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in t h e aftermath of Indo-Pak war of December 1971, Pakistan 
continued to receive American arms c landes t ine ly . The 
author has drawn his own broad conclusions with regard to 
US pol icy towards Pakistan, 
j . K . Baral and V.E, Anand in a j o i n t l y authored 
a r t i c l e have endeavoured to develop parameters of US 
diplomacy towards South Asia on the bas i s of American arms 
supplies to Pakistan.The authors have based the i r analysis 
on US arms supplies to Pakistan in the wake of Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, The period covered 
and data used for a n a l y t i c a l assessment i s too less to 
draw broad or even spec i f ic conclusions about United States 
diplomacy towards South Asia. However authors seem to have 
rea l i zed t h i s l imi ta t ion and tiae- avoided any ambigious 
approach. 
in t he s imi lar view, Leela Yadav in her a r t i c l e 
delves in to t h e c i rcumstant ia l evidence to h ighl ight 
Pak i s t an ' s r e l a t i o n s with t he United S t a t e s . The major 
p a r t of the a r t i c l e s i s devoted to b i l a t e r a l r e a l t i o n s 
during 1950s and 1960s. The developments having bearing 
on US-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s during 1970s f ind cursory treatment 
in t h i s a r t i c l e . 
These a r t i c l e s have been writ ten with specif ic period 
and hence the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of data and co l lec t ion of 
f ac t s are harnessed to support t ha t spec i f i c theme. Though 
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these a r t i c l e s do not provide subs tan t ia l help in develop-
ing a comprehensive framework for US s t r a t e g y towards 
south-west Asia, yet they do serve t h e purpose of providing 
background informat ion, . 
Besides these, there have appeared scores of a r t i -
c l e s in d i f f e r en t pe r iod i ca l s in India and abroad on the 
various aspects of south-west Asia, i t s h i s t o r y , economy 
and foreign r e l a t i o n s with spec ia l reference to the ro le 
of superpowers. However, the review of each individual 
a r t i c l e i s beyond the scope of the present study. Such 
a r t i c l e s have been made use of a t appropr ia te places in the 
succeeding pages, 
A br ief survey of the selected books and research 
a r t i c l e s , as analysed in the proceeding page, reveals tha t 
there i s a pauci ty of au then t ic -indepth ana ly t i ca l s tudies 
on US pol icy towards South-west Asia, Of those who have 
wri t ten on the subject , qu i t e a few have e i t h e r covered 
cer ta in spec i f i c aspect of west Asia or South Asia or 
have pe r s i s t ed t he present ing b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s between 
USA and indiv idual country. 
As regards the research a r t i c l e s , the author of 
a research a r t i c l e i s confronting with many cons t r a in t s 
l ike l imi ted number of words, speci f ic frairework of 
h i s theme and compressed t reat i rent of the i s sues In t a i l ed 
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in the a r t i c l e , which sometimes do not permit the author 
to present the entire problem in i t s fu l l content. 
The tangible outcome i s that a whol i s t ic treatment 
and interlinked issues l ike why Us strategy toward West 
Asia had been nore active that South Asia, linkages between 
o i l and security of the region, US preference far Israel 
at the expense of other countries of the region, why there 
i s no permanent peace in South West Asia, and why united 
s tates had been encouraging arms proliferation in the region 
and conld us stop Pakistan and Israel from going nuclear etc . 
have not been attempted lyj^taposedly. The available l i t e r a -
ture in the subject does provide a l o t of inc i s ive material 
but in a piecemeal manner requiring a systematic compilation, 
analytical treatment and assessment. 
Apparently the subject of American strategy towards 
Southwest Asia which gained prominently act ive role in the 
region during the closing part of 1970s in the wake of down-
f a l l of Shah regime in Iran in January 1979 and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, seems to have 
received l i t t l e serious attention from the academic quarters. 
Paocity of such l i terature confounds the confusion created 
by extensive general, journal i s t i c and/or coiwiitted writings 
on the subject. The present study i s a humble endeavour 
made in the tradition of academic objec t iv i ty to present an 
indepth assessment on the subject nore f u l l y and intensively. 
2! 
The present study has been divided into five main 
chapters. The f i r s t chapter attempts to show the strategic 
significance of South and west Asian region for the US 
foreign policy. While giving the geographic location of 
South Asia, the chapter also br ief ly touches upon geopolitics 
of the region. The second chapter i s an attempt to show the 
evolution of US strategy towards South Asia with major 
focus in the Indian subcontinent. I t also t r i e s to analyse 
American p o l i t i c a l , economic and military ass i s tan t to 
Pakistan, the s t ra tegic a l ly of the United States in. the 
region. The th i rd chapter deals with the issues like arms 
proliferat ion in the region, Ind ia ' s reactions to US arms 
supplies to Pakistan and Ind ia ' s acquisition of arms from 
Soviet union and other sources to attain s t ra tegic pari ty 
with Pakistan and the question of nuclearization in South 
Asia with major emphasis on Pakistan's nuclear programme. The 
hallmark of t h i s chapter i s that a l l these developments are 
analysed as policy response by the united States . 
The fourth chapter comprises an Indepth analysis of 
US policy towards west Asia. The West Asianregion contains 
I s rae l , E^ypt, Jordan, Syria, as main actors and the 
Persian Gulf countries, prominently Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arebl^ 
and Kuwait. In t h i s chapter, the major focus i s on Israel 
and Iran which served as bastions of Amerlcafe strategic 
in te res t s in the region. The US po l i t i ca l , economic and 
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mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance to I s r a e l and Iran during 19708 has been 
analysed in t h i s chapter with pre-eminent emphasis as Arab-
I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t in October 1973. 
As a 'Sequel to massive arms supplies to I s r a e l and 
Iran and in the aftermath of October 1973 war, t h e seaurch 
for arms by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Persian Gulf countr ies 
espec ia l ly I raq and Saudi Arabia to a t t a i n s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y 
against t h e i r main adversary - I s r a e l and loca l r i v a l s , 
provided impetus to arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n in the region,Besides , 
the increase the o i l reveneues of the Gulf o i l producing 
coun t r i e s in the aftermath of use of o i l as a p o l i t i c a l 
weapon, count r ies l i k e I r an , Kuwait, I raq and Saudi Arabia 
d iver ted t h e i r revenues for procuring l a t e s t and sophis t ica-
ted weapons. All t he se developments are analysed in the 
f i f t h chapter . While I ran t i l l 1978, Saudi Arabia, I s r a e l 
Jordan and Kuwait received massive armaments from the uni ted 
S ta t e s , and Egypt, Syria and Iraq emerged as the major arms 
market fa r Soviet Union. Besides, France, IJ,K., West Germany 
and I t a l y also supplied weapons to these coun t r i e s . The 
chapter deals with these aspects thoroughly. 
The t r ends emerging on the bas i s of t h i s study have 
been svimmed up in the conclusion. I t ' s evident t h a t 
during 1970s, united S ta t e s propped up regional surrogates 
l ike I s r a e l and Iran by providing t h e i r massive economic 
and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance in nest Asia to safeguard American 
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s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in the region and Pakistan in South 
Asia to subserve US ob jec t ives in t h a t region. However in 
the wake of downfall of Shah of Iran in mid-january 1979, 
US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s suffered a severe j o l . The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 portended ser ious 
th rea t to US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in Southwest Asia. Hence 
for th , V'.ashington concentrated on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan 
by bui lding up t h e i r m i l i t a r y s t rength to serve as an effec-
t i v e af f ront to Soviet expansionism and safeguard American 
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in Southwest Asia. 
vvhile pursuing the present study, r e l i a n c e has been 
placed upon both primary as well as secondary sources, 
primary sources have been used to provide a u t h e i s t i c data 
and co r r ec t statements and while subs tan t ia t ing the arguments 
the use of secondary sources i s made as supportive evidence 
or to supplement the evidence. Empirical data about arms 
ass i s t ance has been analysed. The contents have been analy-
sed in t h e i r h i s t o r i c a l and appropriate content . Adequate 
to 
use of t a b l e s has been made/substant ia te the f indings and 
to p resen t cogent view. 
The basic tools of research-comparat ive, h i s t o r i c a l , 
ana ly t i ca l and empirical have been r e l i e d upon, optimum 
care has been taken to present a d ispass ionate and ob jec t ive 
indepth ana lys i s . 
CHAPTER . I 
STRATEX3IC SIGNIFICANCE OF SOUTH AND WEST ASIA 
FOR THE U^a:TED STATES 
i n t h e p o s t - s e c o n d World War p e r i o d t h e power c o n f i -
g u r a t i o n both a t t h e r e g i o n a l and g l o b a l l e v e l s has wi tnessed 
tremendous a l t : e r a t i o n s and t h u s t h e concept of s t r a t e g i c s i g -
n i f i c a n c e has a l s o undergone change i n t h a t c o n t e x t . C u r r e n t l y 
t h e empnasis h a s s h i f t e d from an expos t f a c t o h i s t o r i c a l 
approach towards a f u t u r e p r e d i c t a b l e a n a l y s i s . The key 
emphasis on p u r e l y m i l i t a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t h e o r i g i n a l 
approach t o s t r a t e g y has now been s h i f t e d t o t h e b roader 
concep t s of " n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y " and " i n t e r n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y " . 
S t r a t e g y h a s become an i n t e g r a l component of f o r e i g n 
p o l i c y . I t has emerged as a bltend of m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l 
a f f a i r s . Broadly speaking , s t r a t e g i c a n a l y s i s i s p o l i c y 
o r i e n t e d and p r o v i d e s s u b s t a n t i a l i n p u t i n t o t h e p r o c e s s 
of p o l i c y f o r m u l a t i o n s a t t h e h i g h e s t l e v e l s . Undoubtedly, 
t h e a n a l y s i s of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y e n t a i l s t h e f i e l d s of 
s t r a t e g i c s t u d i e s and f o r e i g n p o l i c y and c o n s t i t u t e s an 
i n t e g r a l p a r t of t h e b o t h . j . B a y l i ' s and o t h e r s have 
opined J " I t a n y t h i n g , t hey r e f l e c t d i f f e r e n c e s of emphasis 
r a t h e r than d i f f e r e n c e s i n s u b j e c t m a t t e r " . ^ The term 
1, For d e t a i l s see, Michael Banks, "The Evolution of I n t e r -
nat ional Theory" in Michael Banks (ed.) Confl ict in World 
Societv (Scissese ; 1984) pp. 3-21. 
2. J . B a y l i ' s e t . a l . . Contemporary s t r a t egy • Theories and 
p r a c t i c e s (Reprint) (London ; 1976), p . 4. 
"strategy" acquires added significance by providing an 
opinion for action aimed at the maximization of own values 
including interests or own position based on an indepth 
accessment of all potential game and losses as well as the 
identification of hostile action - which is also called 
threat perception. This concept of threat perception 
encoijpasses the whole threat spectrujn. Thus the concept of 
"strategic significance" whidi is derivative of the term 
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"strategy is from to be closely linlced to perception ". 
According to Raymond A.ron# the concept of strategic 
significance is viewed historically in the same light as 
strategy, that is, in terms of military superiority and 
the ability to wage war • Broadly spealcing, there are three 
main determinants of strategic significance. In the first 
place, strategic signifieance is lin)ced to the sruntotal of 
a country* s capabilities. As Lerche and Said have observedt 
"It is the general strategic role played by a state in 
world politics that raises issues of capability in the 
first place ". 
Besides, the role perception of the state in the 
global and regional context is another deteinninant. "A 
3. N.J. Padleford and G.A. Lincoln, The Dynamics of 
International Politics, Second ed« (kew YorXi 1967}, 
P« 52. 
4. Raymond Aron, Peace and War (Londont 1966), p. 52. 
5. C O . Lerche and A.A. Said, Concepts of International 
Politics (Englewood, Clif f st 1963), p. 67. 
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second manifestation of the impact of the state's interna-
tional strategic position ujxjn capability is derived from 
its interpretation of the position it occupies in the 
world^". Thirdly the preception ofother states in the 
international political system is also significant because 
this perception determines the strategic significance of 
a country. As Padleford and Lincoln have observedi "The 
relations of the states are partly the interaction of the 
way the people and leaders of one stat;e view the world 
situation and respond to it, as contrasted with ways the 
other people and leaders view the same situation and 
factors *. This is in essence the geo-political thinking 
based on perceptions of the geographical space in the 
contest of national outlook about the world order. The 
power and politics is thus viewed in the geographical 
pattern. 
The strategic significance of a country depends 
on its own national power and capabilities with those 
of other states which "indicates a relative power rela-
tionship and influences the strategic significance of 
that country ". Therefore the strategic significance of 
6. I b i d . , p . 68. 
7 . Padleford and Linco ln , n . 3, p . 52. 
8 . R . s . C l ine , World Power Assessment i A Calculus of 
S t r a t e g i c Dr i f t (WastiAnoton. n . r : 1Q1^^ ^ p JK 
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a coxintry i s determined by i t s own p o t e n t i a l c a p a b i l i t i e s . 
The percept ion based ro l e of s t a t e s in the i n t e r -
nat ional p o l i t i c a l system, at the g lobal or reg ional l e v e l s 
which are l inked t o s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e , are not always 
in agreement with t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s . Thus the r e l a t i v e 
power p o s i t i o n s of such countr i e s s t i l l depend on the percep-
9 
t i o n of other s t a t e s in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system ; which i s 
a l s o the r e s u l t of i n t e r - s t a t e interdependence and competi-
t i o n . 
I t i s in t h i s context t h a t the s t r a t e g i c s i gn i f i cance 
of south and West Asian region for United S t a t e s has been 
analysed in t h i s chapter . The countr i e s ^adling wi th in the 
geographical f o l d of South Asia and West Asia are about two 
dozen. Since the emergence of Assoc ia t ion of South Asian 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in e a r l y 1980s, seven countries 
comprise South As ia . The West Asian region comprises 
Bahrain, I ran , I raq , Saudi Arabia, I s r a e l , Jordan, Oman, 
Lebanon, Syr ia , Muscat, Kxjwait, Turkey, Qatar, North Yemen 
12 
and South Yemen * . Syr ia and Egypt, because of t h e i r geo-
9 . V. Van Dyke, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c s , Second e d . (New Yorki 
1966), p . 210T 
10. These c o u n t r i e s are India , Nepal , Bhutan, Pakis tan, 
Bangladesh, Sr i Lanka and Maldives. 
11. This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the region i s envisaged by George B . 
Cressey, Asia*s Lands and P e o p l e s . Third ed . (New Yorki 
1963), pp. 495-500. Also see Walter Eogg'^South West Asia" 
in W.G. East and O.H.K, Spate ( eds . ) The^ Changing Map of 
Asia (Londont 1950), pp. 51-118. 
12. On 22 May 1990, North Yemen and South Yemen were United t o 
form Yemen Arab Republic. 
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graphical proximity are also generally ident i f ied with West 
Asia, Similarly Afghanistan i s linked with e i ther South Asia 
or with West Asia or Middle East, 
Majority of the countries fa l l ing within West and 
South Asia are e i ther l i t t o r a l or hinterland countries 
s i tuated in the Persian Gulf region and Western Indian Ocean 
region. These are also cal led Persian Gulf-Western Indian 
Ocean (PGWIO) region countries. This region assumed tremen-
dous strategic s ignif icance in the global U. S, foreign policy 
in the wake of the Cold War and in view of the geographic 
proximity of some of the countries l ike Turkey, Iran with 
the Soviet Union - the arch r iva l . Presence of o i l in the 
West Asian region. United State ' s special relationship with 
Israel especia l ly in view of the Arab-Israeli h o s t i l i t i e s 
and strategic sea lanes l ike Persian Gulf, s t ra i t of Hormuz 
e t c . have been additional factors that enhanced the strategic 
significance of t h i s region for the United States . 
Until the late 1970s, South Asia and West Asia had 
been treated as separate regions for s trategic analysis 
v i s - a . v l s superpowers. However since 1979, the term South 
West Asia has been used within the United States government^•^, 
According to Harold Saunders, the fonrer US ass is tant 
13. Bruce R. Kuniholm, TThe Carter Doctrine, the Reagon 
Corollary and Prospects for United States Policy in 
South-West Asia", International Journal (Toronto) 
Vol. XLI, No, 2, Spring 1986, p, 343, 
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Secretary of state for near Eastern and South Asian affairs, 
it was no longer possible to allow continued use of "the 
Middle Eastern problems as synonymous with "the Arab-Israel 
problem*. Thus, the term "South West Asia was introduced to 
broaden the focus to include the problems of the Persian 
Gulf and those stemming from the Soviet thrust in to 
Afghanistan^'*". Saunders further observed? No sharplines can 
be drawn and that relations of the states in the region with 
neighbours such as Turkey and India are on occasion important 
15 parts of the picture ". 
Keeping in view the period to be covered in the 
present study which is from 1968 to 1980, the term South 
West Asia will not be used as it gained legitimate currency 
only after 1979. With a view to have indepth analysis of 
the strategic significance of South and West Asian regions 
for the United States, it deems advisable to divide this 
chapter into two main partst 
(A) Strategic significance of South Asia for U.S.; and 
(^ ) strategic significance of West Asia for the United 
States. A endeavour is aiso made to analyse the developments 
that occurred in the respective regions prior to 1968 vis-a-
vis the United States. 
14. The Middle East Problem in the 1980s (Washington, D.C.; 
American Enterprise Institute, 1981), p. 83. 
15. Ibid. 
(A) Strategic Significance of South Asia for U«S,< 
A region has a geographical as well as a po l i t i ca l 
connotation an<3 i t i s something more than a country and l e s s 
than a continent. In international re lat ions , while analysing 
a region one i s faced with the problem of delineating i t s 
geographical perlmet-^r. In certain areas, the problem i s 
re lat ive ly simple because geographically i t Is d i s t inct even 
as the cultural , Ideological and, roost importantly, the 
foreign policy orientations of these areas are c learly 
distinguishable from the neighbouring areas. However the 
task becomes simpler when the said area's linkage pattern 
with the superpowers i s more or l e s s unlfojrm, meaning 
thereby that the constituent s ta tes of the area, e i ther on 
the ir own volt lon or under super power Influence, svibscrlble 
to Identical po l i c i e s towards the one or another as in the 
case of European Economic Community (EEC) COMECON, Associa-
t ion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Gulf-Cooperation 
Council (GCC) etc^^. 
However in the region of South Asia geographical 
demarcation are neither clear-exit nor the foreign policy 
orientations of the countries f a l l i n g within the region 
are syrametrical. in recent years some western scholars have 
16. Perth S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia (New Delhi i Manohar, 1989) , p, 4. 
0 1 
indulged in committing academic taHacy of t r e a t i n g a l l coiin-
t r i e s belonging t o the so -ca l l ed South and Southeast Asia 
as belonging t o one s ing le region. According t o Par th S, 
Ghosh* the South Asia I n s t i t u t e of the Heidelberg Univer-
17 
s i t y in West Germany sutoscribee t o " fa lacy" . Even scholars 
l i k e Howard Wrlggins and James Guyot have a l so t r e a t e d South 
and Southeast Asia as the same. In the in t roduct ion to t h e i r 
j o i n t l y ed i t ed book, t he scholars c l a r i f i e d t h a t s ince 
countr ies belonging t o both south and Southeast Asian 
regions had f a l l en within the scope of the book they had 
chosen t o use t he expression ••Southern" and not ••South^* in 
18 
the t i t l e t o t h e i r booX . However since t he formation of 
ASEAN and SAARC, t h i s controversy seems t o have been put 
t o r e s t . For the puirpose of present study* South Asia' 
region i s taken as denoted by the SAARC. In o ther words. 
South Asia comprises Ind i a , Bangladesh.Bhutaia, Nepal, 
Pakis tan, Sr i Lanka and Maldives. 
While analysing US s t r a t egy towards South Asia p r io r 
t o 1968, i t should be noted t h a t prime ac tors in regional 
p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c scenario towards which American policy 
was d i rec ted were Ind ia and Pak is tan . During t h i s per iod. 
17, I b i d . , p . 5. 
18, See Howard Wrigglns and James Guyot (eds.) Population, 
P o l i t i c s and the Future of^Southern Asia (New Yorkt 
Colvimbia Univers i ty Press 1973) , 
\^ ' *• 
Bangladesh cons t i tued a par t of Pakistan and was known as 
East Pakis tan , and the re was almost l i t t l e i n t e r a c t i o n 
between United S t a t e s and o ther cot intr ies of South Asia 
during t h i s pe r iod . 
P a r t i t i o n of the Indian sub-continent in August 
1947 in the wake of B r i t i s h withdrawl led t o emergence of 
I nd i a and Pakis tan as two independent and sovereign 
coun t r i e s , Ind ia shared borders with Pakis tan , China, Burma, 
Nepal and Bhutan along with sea coast in Indian Ocean. 
Pakistan shared land borders with Afghanistan, Ind i a , I r an , 
and China, In the imnediate aftermath of the p a r t i t i o n , 
both India and Pakis tan had developed some i r r i t a n t s 
e spec ia l ly with regard t o the accession of Jammu and Kashmir 
to Ind ia , Pakis tan was d i s inc l ined t o accept I n d i a ' s claim 
t h a t Jammu and Kashmir was an i n t e g r a l pa r t of Ind ia while 
Ind ia re jec ted P a k i s t a n ' s demand t h a t the future of Jammu 
and Kashmir should be decided on the ba s i s of the p l e b i s c i t e . 
Thus in view of cont radic tory pos i t ions on jammu 
and Kashmir, the r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakis tan 
remained s t r a i n e d . The p a r t i t i o n of the Indian sub-
continent took place at a time when the global p o l i t i c a l 
scenario in the post-world war per iod had been embroiled 
in Cold War ho t ly chased by United S ta tes and Soviet Union. 
Enter ta in ing few i l l u s i o n s during the war about making the 
world safe for democracy, l eadersh ip in Washington hoped 
t h a t a peaceful world orders could be b u i l t upon the post-
19 
war cooperation of the v ic to r ious a l l i e s . 
The Wartime close cooperation between Washington 
and Moscow turned i n t o a b i t t e r r i v a l r y in the immediate 
aftermath of the conclusion of second world war. The 
growing Soviet inf luence in Eastern Europe and elsewhere 
c rea ted apprehensions in Washington about impending Soviet 
domination and expansion of communisro. Consequently Truman 
adminis t ra t ion through a dec la ra t ion roa<^ by US Pres ident , 
Harry Truman in ea r ly March 1947, committed t he United 
S t a t e s t o the defence of democratic nat ions everywhere in 
the World "agains t d i r ec t or i n d i r e c t aggression" and against 
20 
subjugation by armed minor i t i es o r by outs ide pressure . 
This a lso came t o be known as Truman Doctr ine. 
During the ear ly years of Cold War, t he US foreign 
pol icy veered round f ive main planks - Truman Doctrine, 
Marshall Plan, containment, a l l i a n c e s and foreign aid -
which were adhered t o thwart Soviet endeavours t o expand 
i t s sphere of inf luence as well as t o stem the t i d e of 
expanding communism* The Truman Doctrine was supplemented 
19, William J , Bamds, Ind ia , Pakis tan and the Great Powers 
(New Yorki Praeger Publ ishers 1972), p . 83. 
20. Department of S ta te Bu l l e t in (Washington), Vol. XVI, 
NO, 403, 23 March 1947, p . 536. 
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by policy of containment. With a view t o implement t h i s 
policy,Washington embarked on a pol icy of re-armament and 
based t roops on foreign s o i l . I t had a lso drawn aro\ind 
21 i t s e l f a network of a l l i a n c e s . 
Under the Marshall Plan, United S ta tes followed a 
programme of development of the count r ies in Europe by an 
economic programme of s e l f -he lp coupled with US ass i s tance 
and l a i d the bas i s for the i n t eg ra t i on of much of the world 
22 
economy on American terms t o maximum extent • By f loat ing 
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s in Europe through North A t l an t i c Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and o the r m i l i t a r y pacts in various 
reg ions . United S ta t e s aimed at bringing the newly indepen-
dent countr ies of Asia and Afr ica . Through these a l l i a n c e s , 
the United S t a t e s obl iga ted i t s a l l i e s t o cooperate with 
23 Washington and i t a l so served as a useful r e s t r a i n t on 
a l l i e s provided the United S t a t e s an access t o and in f lu -
ence on governments with p o t e n t i a l l y d is rupt ive loca l 
24 grievances and ambitions . 
21 . Michael Banks, "^he Foreign Policy of the United S ta t e s" , 
in F .S . Northedge (ed#) The Foreign P o l i c i e s of the 
Powers (London 1968) , pp. S2-53. " 
22. Noam Chomsky, At War with Asia x Essays on indo-China (New York: 1970), p« 15. 
23. Robert E. Osguod, Al l iances and the American Foreign 
Policy (Calcutta* 1970), p . 7 . 
24. I b i d . , p . 14. 
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Because of antagonism between Ind ia and Pakistan mainly 
on the question of Kashmir, Pakis tan was looking for a powerful 
a l l y . Besides, the force behind P a k i s t a n ' s establishment was 
25 based very largely"on a feel ing of i n secu r i ty », Following 
the advent of communist regime in September 1949 in People 's 
Republic of China, Washington's s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in count-
r i e s geographical ly contiguous t o Soviet Union and People 's 
Republic of China (PRC) were enhanced. 
The US s takes and i n t e r e s t s in South Asia were, to a 
g rea t ex ten t , d i c t a t e d by i t s global s t ra tegy t h a t witnessed 
s h i f t s and depar tures in accordance with the response and 
reac t ions of Soviet Union and PRC t o the contemporary develop-
roents obtaining in the region . The pace, degree and d i rec -
t i o n of American presence bui ld ing in South Asia was largely 
dependent on the diplomatic and s t r a t e g i c manoeuvres adhered 
t o by Moscow and Bei j ing in the region. The assessment of 
s t r a t e g i c ob jec t ives in South Asia prompted the United States 
27 to" include Pakistan in the conception of containment " as a 
component of i t s g lobal s t r a t e g y . I n d i a ' s re luctance t o be a 
s a t e l l i t e or temporary a l l y persuaded Washington t o find in 
25. Keith Cal la rd , Pakistani A P o l i t i c a l Study (London: 1957; , 
pp. 11-33, 
26. For d e t a i l s see , Ronald A. P a r i , American Commitments 
^ f o a d (New Brunswick; N.J, 197 3), Also see M,S. Raj an and 
Shivaj i Ganguly, Great Power Rela t ions , World Order and 
Third Worl<^ (New Delhit 1981) . 
27. Henry A. Kiss inger , White House Years (Boston* L i t t l e 
Brown and Co, , 1979) , p . 8. ~~ 
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Pakistan a manageable a l l y . Besides , the United S t a t e s could 
foresee in geographical loca t ion of Pakis tani"evident s t r a t eg i c 
advantages in meeting supposed t h r e a t s from USSR and People 's 
28 Republic of China ". 
By the onset of 1950s# Ind ia had ca t ego r i ca l ly declined 
American over tures of jo in ing US sponsored mi l i t a ry a l l i ances 
d i r ec ted against Soviet Union and China. Even p r i o r t o I n d i a ' s 
attainment of independence, Jawahar la l Nehru as the Vice-
Pres ident of the In t e r im Government had sa id on 7 September 
19 461 
"We propose, as for as p o s s i b l e , t o keep away from the 
power p o l i t i c s of groups, a l igned agains t one another, which 
have led in the past t o world warfi and which may again leaa 
29 t o d i s a s t e r s on an even vas te r s c a l e . . . . " . 
This connotation of keeping away from power p o l i t i c s of 
groups gained the currency of po l icy of non-alignment. Hence 
I n d i a , a f t e r a t t a i n i n g independence pursued the pol icy of non-
alignment i n i t i a l l y when the United S ta tes evinced i n t e r e s t in 
c u l t i v a t i n g Ind ia as i t s a l l y agains t communism in the region, 
then India* s Prime Minis ter Jawaharlal Nehru not only spumed 
28. Rajeshwar Dayal, "The Super Powers" in Seminar (New Delhi) , 
No. 246, February 1^66, p . l 3 , 
29. Jawaharlal Nehru, I n d i a ' s Foreign Pol icy , Selected Speeches. 
Segterober 1946-Aprll 19^1 (New Delhii pi^licaf.^on n^Uc^^^^•^ 
1961) . p . 2. 
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the American over tures but declared I n d i a ' s s t eadfas t commit-
ment t o the p r i n c i p l e s of non-alignment. However in Pakis tan, 
the US fotond a wi l l i ng a l l y which read i ly accepted America's 
f r iendship because of i t s weak pos i t i on and fear of Ind ia , 
Pakistan had developed disenchantment with U. K. led 
commonwealth and the Soviet Union, with the former because 
i t had allowed Ind ia t o become i t s member and with the l a t t e r 
because the Pak i s t an i i n t e l l e c t u a l s regarded Moscow to be an 
31 i n f e r i o r country as compared with the United S t a t e s . Besides, 
the leadership in Pakis tan viewed Soviet Union as a t h r ea t to 
32 Is lam which was i t s ra isondet re and way of l i f e . Some 
sec t ions in Pakistan a lso be l ieved t h a t t h e i r r e l i g ion did 
33 
not allow them t o forge an a l l i ance with Moscow • 
Pakistan* s l eadersh ip unequivocally s o l i c i t e d American 
he lp by pointed out mutuali ty of i n t e r e s t s and s t r a t e g i c 
s igni f icance of Pakis tan for United S t a t e s . During h i s v i s i t 
t o the United S t a t e s in 1950, the then Premier of Pakistan 
had said t h a t he had come to ••assist America t o discover 
30, Arif Hussaln, Pakistani I t s Ideology and Foreign Policy (Londom 1961) , p . 83 . 
31. M.A. Chaudhari, P a k i s t a n ' s Relat ions with the Soviet Union", 
Asian Survey (Berkeley), Vol. VI, No.9, September 1966, 
p , 493, 
^^' ^ft.^' i.^i^: gQvie^ Policy Towards Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhlt Radiant Pub l i she r s , 19^4^ , p . 44, ^—^^^ 
^^' ^Af A^"*®^' Pa^^lstan and the United Nations (New York: i 9 o o ; , p , 4, — 
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34 Pakistan •*• While emphasising the i d e o l o g i c a l and s t r a t e g i c 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of h i s cotintry* the Pakis tan i Premier sa id that 
Pakistan would throw a l l i t s weight t o he lp the maintenance of 
" s t a b i l i t y in Asia"^^", 
During 1951, the US administrat ion mooted the idea of 
proposing arms s a l e s t o Pakistan and in December 19 51, the 
Pentagon sanct ioned i t s approval t o the US s t a t e Department for 
d i scuss ion with Pakistan for arms and agreement which had 
become propi t ious by mid 1952. However the deal could not be 
carr i ed fo l lowing i t s premature leakage . The sen ior American 
diplomats and a n a l y s t s l i k e Chester Bowles and George F, Kennan 
disapproved US p o l i c y , of arming Pakis tan , For, ^" t h e i r 
opinion, I n d i a ' s non-a l igned p o l i c y was n e i t h e r a n t i t h e t i c a l 
to the US i n t e r e s t s in Asia nor was an o b s t a c l e in the f u l f i l -
36 
ment of i t s g loba l o b j e c t i v e s . According t o Will iam J . Bamds, 
the key policy-makers and ana lys t s in Washington f e l t that the 
d e c i s i o n t o supply arms t o Pakistan "would be exacerbating the 
t ense r e l a t i o n s between India and Pakis tan , par t ly by upsett ing 
the balance of power and part ly by adding d i f f erences over 
t h e i r approaches t o the co ld war, t o t h e i r already formidable 
37 
antagonisms *. 
34, Liaquat A l l Khan, Pakistani The Heart of Asia (Harvard, 
Mass* 1950) , p . 4, 
35, I b i d . 
36, Quoted the B.M, J a i n , South As ia . India and United States 
(Jaipur, R,B,S,A, Publ ishers 1987) , p, 36, 
37, Bamds , n. 19 p, 92 
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The t ang ib le outcome of t h i s opposit ion by leading 
diplomats became d i sce rn ib le when t h i s decision was deferred 
for sometime. However* the advent of Republican administra-
t i o n \inder Pres ident Eisenhower with John Fos ter Dulles as 
Secretairy of S ta te marked the rev iva l of American proposal 
t o supply arms t o Pak is tan , Dulles expressed h i s open h o s t i -
l i t y t o "uncommitted na t ions" and offered f u l l mi l i t a ry 
a s s i s t ance t o those who were wi l l i ng t o acquiesce in US 
s t r a t egy of bui ld ing a "cordon s a n i t a i r e * against communism 
in d i f fe ren t regions of the world. 
India had already expressed i t s opposit ion t o 
American sponsored mi l i t a ry a l l i a n c e s in t he region. The 
then Prime Minis ter of Ind ia , Jawal^arlal Nehru, viewed the 
US pol icy of arming Pakistan as a ca lcu la ted move t o 
contain Ind ia . However he made i t ca t egor i ca l t h a t despi te 
U.S. decision t o supply arms t o Pakis tan , Ind ia would not 
deviate from i t s path of the pol icy of non-alignment. 
Despite domestic c r i t i c i s m , the then U.S. Vice-
Pres iden t , Richard Nixon s trongly recommended mi l i t a ry 
a s s i s t ance t o Pakistan as a counter-weight t o the "confirmed 
38 
neutral ism" of Ind ia . 
38. Shelton Kodikara, S t r a t eg i c Fac tors in Ind ia , S ta te 
Relat ions in South Asia (Canberra: 1979) pp. 38-40. 
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Despite I n d i a ' s apprehensions and strong opposit ion, 
both Washington and Islamabad became a l l i e s by signing the 
Mutual Arms Assistance Treaty on 19 May 1954 xinder which the 
United S ta tes vindertook t o give m i l i t a r y equipment and 
39 t r a i n i n g t o P a k i s t a n ' s armed forces , During 1954 Washington 
a lso succeeded in wooing Pakistan t o Join South-East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO), While spe l l ing out the Inherent 
dangers of the SEATO pac t . Prime Minis ter Nehru saidt 
"But a f t e r reading the SEATO Treaty ca re fu l ly I 
feel t h a t i t s whole approach i s wrong and dan-
gerous from point of view of any Asian c o u n t r y . . . 
count r ies in Asia as well outs ide may have 
ce r t a in j u s t i f i a b l e fears . . . But the approach 
of the Treaty i s wrong and may antagonise a 
grea t pa r t of Asia, Are you going to have 
peace and secu r i t y by c rea t ing more c o n f l i c t s 
and antagonisms and by making people th ink t h a t 
ins tead of br inging s e c u r i t y , you bring insecu-
40 
r i t y in to the region " . 
Prime Minis ter Nehru had expressed h i s apprehension 
t h a t the mi l i t a ry pact would extend i t s nature and scope" 
beyond I t s j u r i s d i c t i o n which proved t r u e when in the 
council meeting of SEATO in Karachi in March 1956, Pakistan 
41 
r a i s ed the issue of Kashmir . I n d i a ' s p ro tes t in t h i s 
39. For t ex t see . Department of s t a t e Bu l l e t i n , 31 May 1954, 
p . 850. 
40. Nehru, n. 29,p. 89, 
41. B,M. J a i n , n, 36, p , 37, 
41 
regard was ignored by Pakis tan . Dan Haendal observed t h a t 
such a behaviour on the par t of Pakis tan c l ea r l y ind ica ted 
t h a t i t had jo ined an a l l i ance with the U.S. pr imari ly in 
order t o arm i t s e l f agains t Ind ia and t o secure i t s support 
over Kashmir^^". In 1955, Pakis tan jo ined the Baghdad pact , 
l a t e r known as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) 
P a k i s t a n ' s b i l a t e r a l t r e a t y with the United S ta tes 
and former 's membership of SEATO and CENTO made i t e l i g i b l e 
t o receive massive arms and economic ass i s tance from 
Washington which poured in to Pakis tan between 1954-65 un-
i n t e r r u p t e d l y . Leadership in New Delhi had expressed 
apprehensions t ha t any aid provided t o Pakistan would 
increase the dangers of war over Kashmir and r e s u l t in an 
arms race in the sub-continent and would have an impact on 
I n d i a ' s pol icy towards Pakistan and the United S t a t e s , In 
s p i t e of Washington's assurance t h a t " i t s a id t o Pakistan 
44 
was not d i rec ted agains t Ind ia ••. New Delhi regarded i t 
42. Dan Haendel, The Process of P r i o r i t y formulations: 
US Foreign Policy in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 (Coloradoi 1977) , p . 29. 
43. For d e t a i l s see, Mohammad Ayub Khan, "The Pakistan-US 
Al l iance , S t r e s s and S t r a ins" Foreign Affairs (New York) 
Vol. 42, NO. 2, January 1964, p . 19 5, 
44. Pres ident Eisenhower's l e t t e r t o Prime Minister Nehru 
on 25 February 1954 in American Foreign Policy 1950-55, 
Basic Documents, Vol. I I (Washingtoni Government 
Pr in t ing Off ice , 1957) , pp, 2192-93. 
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as t he main cause of Indians i n secu r i t y and an i r r i t a n t in 
i t s r e l a t i o n s with Pakis tan . However* India had made i t 
c l e a r t h a t the Mutual Defence Treaty between US and Pakistan 
did not guarantee t h a t Pakistan would not use the weapons 
45 
secured through the United S ta tes agains t India " . 
On having been assured by Washington t h a t i t s 
agreement with Pakis tan was not d i r ec t ed against Ind i a , 
Prime Minis ter Nehru- did not be l i eve tha t the in t en t ion of 
the US mi l i t a ry a id to Pakistan was to cause t rouble t o 
46 Ind ia • However Nehru doubted the Pak is tan i motives as 
spokesmen of the Pakis tan Government had s t a t ed t h a t t h e i r 
Objective in enter ing in to a defence agreement with the 
United S ta tes was t o strengthen Pakistan against Ind ia , 
Prime Minis ter Nehru could foresee t he impending t h r e a t to 
India* s secur i ty in view of induction of soph i s t i ca t ed us 
arms in to Pakis tan , when he saidi "The mi l i t a ry aid t o 
Pakis tan by America i s a s tep towards war, not peace, not 
only towards a world war, but a s t ep which w i l l br ing war 
47 r i g h t t o our f r o n t i e r s . . . I t i s an anti-Asian s tep ", 
45. Eustace, Seligman, What the United S ta tes can do about 
I nd i a (New York* 1956) , p . 37. 
46. Ind i a , Lok Sabha Debates, Vol, I , Par t I I , (March 1954, 
Cal . 968}. Also see S.L. Poplai and P h i l l i p s Talbot , 
Ind ia and Ainericat A Study of t h e i r Relat ions (New Delhi: 
n .d . ) , p .89 . 
47. Lok Sabha Debates, Vol. 27, 13 Marcih 1958, Col. 6153 
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During 1954 and 1962# P a k i s t a n r e c e i v e d generous arms 
a s s i s t a n c e from t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s . Fo r l a c k of b a s i c i n f r a -
s t r u c t u r e t o manufacture s o p h i s t i c a t e d m i l i t a r y weapons and 
equipment and i t s q u e s t f o r armaments prompted P a k i s t a n t o 
a c q u i r e arms from t h e Uni t ed S t a t e s . Between 1956 and 1962, 
Washington p rov ided a l a r g e number of armoured v e h i c l e s 
and a i r c r a f t and some nava l v e s s e l s and m i s s i l e s t o P a k i s t a n , 
as shown in t h e fo l lowing t a b l e j 
Tab le 1.1 
US ARMS AID TO PAKISTAN, 1956-62 
Weapon Year NO. I t em Comment 
Aircraf t 
Naval 
V e s s e l s 
1956 
1956-58 
1957 
1958 
1958-62 
1960-61 
1960-62 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1959 
10 
120 
6 
26 
75 
15 
15 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
Lockhead RT. 33.A 
NAP-86 F Sabre 
Lockheed PT-SSA 
Martin B-57B 
Canberra 
Cessnao-1 Bridding 
B e l l 47 
Sikorsky S-55 
Coastal Minesweeper 
Coastal Minesweeper 
Coastal Minesweeper 
Destroyer OH Class 
Coastal Minesweeper 
Tng 
MAP 
MAP 
\JSA/U, K. 
M i s s i l e s 
Armoured 
F ight ing 
V e h i c l e s 
1959 
1960 
1960 
1962 
1958-64 
1955-65 
1 
2 
1 
1 
400 
300 
Water-Carrier 
Tng 
O i l e r 
c o a s t a l Minesweeper 
NWC Sidewinder 
M-113 
^4 
To arm F-86, 
F-104,Mig-19 
and Mirage. 
SOURCE J Arme Trade-Regis ter t The Arms Trade with the 
Third World (Londoni 1975) pp. 38-40. 
I t i s evident from t h e above t a b l e t h a t Pakistan acquired 
soph i s t i ca t ed a i r c r a f t and miss i l e s from the United Sta tes 
and thus modernised i t s a i r f o r c e . 
The outbreak of Sino-India war in October 1962 
brought a temporary l u l l in US-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s espec ia l ly 
when the United S t a t e s along with U.K. offered Ind ia mi l i ta ry 
and economic a s s i s t ance t o meet the Chinese chal lenge. The 
sympathetic a t t i t u d e of the Kennedy adminis t ra t ion towards 
Ind ia during the Sino-Indian h o s t i l i t i e s was regarded by 
Pakis tan as v i s i b l e s igns of the new Adminis t ra t ion ' s 
spec ia l concern for India*®, 
48. S.M. Burke, P a k i s t a n ' s Foreoin Policvi A H i s t o r i c a l 
Analysis (London 1§73) p . i66. 
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According t o American sources from 1947 t o 1963, 
the United S ta t e s had given Ind ia a id of about $ 4,718 
mi l l ion of which $ 60 mil l ion was mi l i t a ry a id , $ 2,225 million 
food for peace, $ 1,890 mil l ion economic ass i s tance under 
AIP, $ 311 mil l ion export-import loans and $ 232 mil l ion 
miscellanceous and o ther economic a id whereas Pakistan* s 
t o t a l economic a id during t h i s per iod amounted to $ 2,227 
49 
mil l ion and i t s m i l i t a r y aid was about $ 1,500 mil l ion . 
The then US Secretary of S t a t e , Dean Rusk had 
a s se r t ed t h a t the emergency commitment to Ind ia by the 
United S ta tes in response t o India* s c a l l for he lp was 
50 about $ 60 mil l ion . I t was provided only for the purpose 
of defence against comnwnist aggression and not to be used 
51 agains t Pakistan . On 29 January 1963, a commonwealthA'.S. 
Air Defence Mission v i s i t e d Ind ia t o examine with the Indian 
Air Force , the problems and t echn ica l requirements involved 
in organizing an e f f ec t ive defence against the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of any fur ther Chinese aggression^^. A team of American 
defence exper ts a l so v i s i t e d Ind ia in February 1963 to 
49. Congressional Record, Vol. 110, Par t 6, p . 7574, 
50. Department of S t a t e Bul le t in t Vol. XLVIII, No, 1224, 
18 February 1^63, p . 24^, 
51 . Department of S ta te B u l l e t i n , Vol. XLVII, No. 1223, 
3 December 1962, p , 837, 
52. Department of S ta te B u l l e t i n , Vol. XLVIII, No. 1224, 
18 February 1963m p . 2491 
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consul t the Ind ia a u t h o r i t i e s about India* s programme of 
expansion of the defence production c a p a b i l i t i e s t o meet 
53 i t s increased requirements • The governments of United 
S t a t e s and U.K. had a lso agreed on c e r t a i n measures t o 
s t rengthen India* s defence against poss ib le a i r a t t ack on 
Ind ia by China . But in re turn for a id t o Ind ia , Washington 
had t r i e d t o inf luence I n d i a ' s pol icy of non-alignment, 
Ind ia , however, refused t o be influenced by American, the 
American request t o i n s t a l l a high-power t r a n s m i t t e r by 
Voice of America was not f u l f i l l e d and i t a l so did not accept 
the American nuclear umbrella on t he p lea t h a t i t would be 
agains t the pol icy of non-alignment, 
India* s decis ion not t o toe US l i n e as a p r e -
condit ion t o acquire soph is t i ca ted mi l i t a ry equipment had 
irked the Kennedy adminis t ra t ion which became re luc tan t 
t o provide arms a s s i s t ance t o I n d i a . The Indian demand for 
fourteen squadrons of U.S. f i gh t e r planes and th ree squadrons 
of bombers was r e j e c t e d by Washington, Ins tead , United 
S t a t e s offered Jo in t a i r exerc ise as being favourable t o 
both s i d e s . The underlying objec t ive behind t h i s American 
offer was t o reduce U.S. mi l i t a ry burden whereas for India 
53. I b i d . , Vol, XLVIli, NO. 1225, 2S February 1963, p . 283. 
54. Department of s t a t e B u l l e t i n . v o l . XLIX, No. 1259, 
12 August 1963, pp. i4S-4d. 
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i t have been an inexpensive plan requir ing not huge army. 
However I n d i a ' s main object ion t o t h i s offer was t h a t the 
United S ta tes would cont ro l a l l moves and a l l t echnic ians 
55 and p i l o t s would be Americans , 
The volun»e and quantum of mi l i t a ry ass i s tance which 
Ind ia acquired from the United S t a t e s in the wake of Sino-
Indian war was not only nominal but i n su f f i c i en t to cope 
with the defence requirements needed to face the Chinese 
t h r e a t . Even the l i t t l e aid offered t o India by the United 
S t a t e s became an eyesore for Pak is tan i l eade r s . Pakistan 
blamed India and considered i t as an "aggressor" . The 
United S ta tes was a lso c r i t i c i s e d for having not consulted 
Pakis tan p r i o r t o providing American mi l i t a ry ass i s tance 
t o I n d i a . The theP President of Pakis tan , Mohammad Ayub 
Khan, t o l d the Pakis tan National Assembly on 21 November 
19621 "One of our a l l i e s had promised us t h a t we would be 
consul ted before any arms ass i s t ance i s given t o Ind i a , 
I r eg re t t o have t o observe t h a t t h i s was not done. In so 
fa r as the o ther f r i end ly count r ies are concerned t h e i r 
ac t ion in arming Ind i a t o the tfeeth i s bound to have the 
57 e f fec t of encouraging India t o engage in a major c o n f l i c t , " 
55. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keepi My Year in P o l i t i c a l 
L i f e , 1941-1969, (New Delhii 1971) p . 483. 
56. For d e t a i l s see , Khalida Qureishi , "Pakistan and Sino-
Indlan Dispute", Pakistan Horizon, Vol. XXI, No. 1, 
1963, pp. 38-52. 
57. Pakis tan , Nat ior ' i l Assembly Debates, Vol. I I , No. 12, 
4 December 1962, p . 339. 
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However, the United S ta t e s did not take a ser ious 
note of Pakistan c r i t i c i s m and stuck t o i t s policy of 
s trengthening Ind ia agains t China, for i t saw i t as a means 
of stemming the t i d e of Chinese expansionism in south Asia. 
Pakis tan s t a r t e d hobnobbing with Bei j ing t o develop close 
r e l a t i o n s with the l a t t e r . Though Washington disapproved 
t o growing entente corda i l e between Islamabad and Beijing 
but at the same t ime, Washington did not want t o lose i t s 
leverage on Pak is tan , Washington reac ted sharply t o Sino-
Pakis tan a i r agreement by ordering the i nde f in i t e holding-
up of the promised $ 4,3 mil l ion loan t o Pakistan for 
58 
a i r - f i e l d s . However i t did not cut off the supply of 
mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance t o Pakis tan . 
As shown in Table 1,2, Pakis tan received Lockheed 
and S t a r f i gh t e r a i r c r a f t from the United S ta tes between 
1962-65 along with NWs side winder m i s s i l e s . However during 
the 1965 Indo-Pak War, the United S ta t e s placed an embargo 
on the Supply of mi l i t a ry equipment t o both Ind ia and 
Pakis tan , The then US Pres ident Lydon B. Johnson sa id on 
29 November 1965 t h a t ne i the r mi l i t a ry nor economic aid 
would be renewed u n t i l several condi t ion including Ind ia 
and Pakistan t o work out a ba s i s for l iv ing in peace and 
t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s t i e s with Beij ing should be l imi ted , were 
met^ ' . 
58. Pakis tan , Nat ional Assembly Debates, Vol, I I , No. 12, 
4 December 1962, p , 339, 
59, New York Times, 30 August 1963. 
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By 1965, Pakistan had s ix Infantary and two armoured 
d iv is ion of soph i s t i ca t ed pat ton tanks which had been 
supplied t o Pakis tan by American and CBOTO sources , whereas 
Ind ia had t o suffer because of t h i s embargo as s i x shiploads 
of defence mater ia l from the U.S. bound for Ind ia was ordered 
t o return j u s t 15 miles from the Indian shores . However 
t h i s arms embargo did not l a s t long. With in s ix months, a 
p a r t i a l l i f t on ban was ordered t o permit the sa le of non-
l e t h a l items on cash or c r e d i t b a s i s subject t o a case by 
case review and t h a t too only spare p a r t s for previously 
supplied American equipment . The reason given for t h i s 
was t h a t i f United S ta tes did not continue t h i s s a l e , 
Pakis tan would t r y t o get i t from other count r ies and t h i s 
would weaken P a k i s t a n ' s economy whereas the US objec t ives 
was p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and economic (advance ment) of 
63 Pakistan . 
Table 1.^ shows the U.S. arms ass i s tance t o Pakistan 
between 1962 t o 1968 as follows; 
60. Devendra Kaushlk and M.A.S. Khan, "U.S. Arms for Pakistan: 
Exercise in Tension Bui lding", Mainstream, Vol, IX, No.10, 
17 November 1970, p . 16. 
6 1 . Leela Yadav, US Policy in South Asia, (New Delhi: Harman 
Publishing House, 1989), p . 106. 
62. US Senate, Hearings before the subcommittee on Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affa i rs (Washington: 1967), 
p . 53, 
63. I b i d . , p . 57. 
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Table 1.2 
U.S. Arms Assistance t o Pakis tan , 1962-68 
Weapon 
A i r c r a f t 
Naval 
V e s s e l s 
Y e a r 
1960-
1962 
1962 
1963 
1963 
1963 
1963 
1966-
1962 
1963 
1963 
62 
.67 
No. 
15 
2 
12 
4 
4 
4 
25 
2 
1 
1 
1 
I t e m Remarks 
S i k o r s k y S-55 
Lockhead F-104B 
S t a r f i g h t e r 
S t a r f i g h t e r 
Grummon HU-16A 
A l b a t a r o s s 
Lockhead C-103E 
H e r c u l e s 
Kaman HH-43B 
Cessna T-37B 
Lockheed C-130E 
H e r c u l e s 
C o a s t a l Minesweeper 
O i l e r 
C o a s t a l Minesweeper 
SOURCE: Arms Trade Register* The Arms Trade with the 
Third World (Londont 1975), pp. 38-40. 
The United S t a t e s spend eno.mnous amount of money on arming 
Pakis tan . The f i r s t p r i o r i t y was given to Air Force. A 
la rge number of supersonic f i g h t e r s and bombers were supplied 
t o Pakis tan . Before 1965, Pakistan received 30 B-57 bombers. 
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20 F-140 supersonic s t a r f i g h t e r s and 120 F.86 supe: jrsonic 
sabre j e t s . 
i n response t o repeated demands from Pakis tan , 
Washington l i f t e d the embargo on the sa le of non . l e tha l 
i tems. This was followed by a modification in US aid policy 
t o permit the sa l e of ammunition and spare p a r t s for the 
mi l i t a ry equipments, a i r c r a f t and tanks supplied by USA to 
Pakis tan p r i o r t o the 1965 Indo-Pak h o s t i l i t i e s ^ ^ . Further 
modification in i t s pol icy of arms suppl ies t o the Indian 
sub-continent was envisaged in Apri l 1967 when the United 
s t a t e s fur ther announced t h a t i t would resume the sale of 
65 
"non- le tha l" arms t o both Pakistan and India . 
According t o Coughlin, in March 1968, the U.S. Govern-
ment qu i t e ly approved the sa le of "lethal" arms t o Pakis tan. 
The arrangement c a l l e d for severa l I t a l i a n firms t o provide 
Pakistan with 100 refurbished Sherman tanks . The then US. 
Secretary of Defence a lso informed the Foreign Affairs 
Committee t h a t the United S ta t e s was only shipping spare 
p a r t s for l e t h a l as well as non- le tha l i tems, t o both India 
and Pakis tan, "but we do not d i r e c t l y ship l e t h a l items to 
64. Vinod Gupta, Anderson Papersi A Study of Nixon's Blackmail 
of India (Delhi! 1972), p . 206. 
65. New York Tiroes, 13 April 1967. 
66. Congressional Record, Vol. 115, par t 18, 1969, p . 23944. 
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e i t h e r country tinder our present pol icy • This indicated 
the t r a n s f e r of arms through t h i r d covmtries. 
On the b a s i s of above a n a l y s i s , i t may not seen out 
of place t o surmise t h a t because of P a k i s t a n ' s s t r a t e g i c 
loca t ion and i t s own readiness t o accept American arms 
ass i s t ance t o have s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y with Ind ia , t h a t the 
United S ta tes evinced keen i n t e r e s t in Pakis tan , Pakistan 
served as an idea l base for the execution of the American 
foreign pol icy objec t ives of "containing" Soviet Union and 
China as Pakistan lay below Russ ia ' s be l ly and had a 
68 
contiguous boundary with China • Pakistan stands across 
the grea t mountain passes through which a l l land invasions 
of the Indian sub-continent had taken place in the pa s t . 
Hence Pakis tan , the American view, provided a gateway to 
South Asia and Washington deemed i t e s s e n t i a l t o make 
Pakistan strong and s t ab le • Another reason t h a t promoted 
the United S t a t e s t o c u l t i v a t e Pakis tan was the fac t t ha t 
the l a t t e r was s i t u a t e d between South-East Asia and the 
Middle Eas t , thus ac t ing as a br idge between these two 
70 
regions of the world , 
67. UB House of Representat ives Committee of Foireign Affai rs , 
27 June 1968 (Washington 1968) p , 51, 
68. M,L. Gu^ral , U.S. Global Involvement - A study of us 
Expansion (New belhi* 1^75), p . i $ i . 
69. Mohdammad Ayub Khan, No, 43 , p . 192, 
70. Surendra Chopra, "Pakistan Pacts and Kashmir" Indian 
Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science> Voll 26, No. 4, 1965. 
p . 226. ' ' 
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Another f ac to r t h a t prompted Washington t o prefer 
Pakistan in South Asia for s t r a t e g i c reasons was the near 
geographic proxinvity of Pakistan t o Soviet Union where 
from the United S ta te could have a e r i a l surve i l lance over 
Soviet t e r r i t o r y without any fear of being detected 
Pakistan could a l so be used for a i r operat ions because the 
new i n d u s t r i a l cent re of the Soviet Union were only 1,700 
ndles from Quetta in Pakistan whereas 4,000 miles from the 
US bases in Morocco and 2,700 miles from U.S. bases in 
71 I t a l y . S t r a t e g i c planners in Washington a lso wanted to 
ensure continued access t o s t r a t e g i c mineral and raw 
material resources 'through* sea lanes of the Indian Ocean 
72 by keeping Pakis tan within i t s fold . The American 
c a p i t a l i s t - b u r e a u c r a t s combine had whipped up anti-communist 
h y s t e r i a to make defence expenditure psychological ly t o l e r a -
73 ble t o the publ ic and t o ensure regular supply of raw 
74 mater ia l for the production of deadly weapons • And 
Pakistan was regarded by the United S ta tes as a country 
which could be of use for p ro tec t ing access t o raw material 
75 such as o i l , t i n and rubber • 
71 . H.C. Arya, "A Study of Some Aspects of the Relations 
of the United S ta t e s with PaKistan" Unpublished Ph.D« 
Thesis (New Delhii School of In t e rna t i ona l Studies , 
1966} , p . 208. 
7 2. I b i d . , p . 129. 
7 3, Noam Chomsky, n. 22, pp. 22-23. 
74, John Robinson, Freedom and Neccesity (Bombayj 1972),p. 86. 
75. Amitax Acharya, US Mi l i t a ry St ra tegy in the Gulf (London: 
Routledge, 1989)7 p . 1. 
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It Is evident from the above analysis that In the 
South Asia region, the United States perceived Indian sub-
continent as of tremendous strategic significance in its 
policy of containment of Soviet Union and China, India's 
commitment to the policy of non-alignement thwarted American 
manoeuvres to cultivate India as its ally against communism. 
However Pakistan filled up that role because in its antagonism 
against India zmd its quest for having arms parity with the 
latter brought Pakistan closer to the United States, Thus 
Pakistan received massive fiscal and military assistance 
from the United States between 1954 and 1968, During this 
period, Pakistan served the strategic interests of the 
United States in South Asia, 
(B) STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF WEST ASIA FOR UNITED STATESi 
In common partance in international relations, the 
region of West Asia is generally understood In terms of 
Arab^Israel conflict with Israel in major focus and peri-
pheral Arab countries like Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, and 
Lebanon as other countries of importance. For the purpose 
of present study, the countries falling in the Persian Gulf 
are also Included for analysing U, S, strategy in the region, 
special focus will be on Israel, Egypt, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia while Interpreting the developments. However, the 
connotations "West Asia will be used in broader perspective. 
r; 5 
Since the advent of cold war till 1968, West Asia had 
strategic significance for United States mainly on four 
counts* (i) presence of Israel in the region and US, commi-
ttment to it; (ii) presence of petroleum and its immense 
strategic significance for the United States and its Western 
allies, (iii) Vulnerability of the region to Soviet influence 
and geographic contiguity of countries like Turkey, Iran and 
Afghanistan to Soviet Union, and (iv) strategic significance 
of sea lanes of communications (SLOCS) like Suez Canal, 
Straits of Horrmuz and Persian Gulf for the United States 
to counter Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean. 
In proper West Asian region which is generally described 
as the terms of Arab-Israel conflict, the US policy was 
mainly guided by Washington's committment to Israel and the 
presence of Soviet influence in the region, Saudi Arabia and 
Jordan depended on US while Egypt and Syria developed cl4se 
relations with Soviet Union. This aspect is analysed in 
succeeding pages. 
As far as Gulf region is concerned its prominence in 
US global strategy is fairly a phenomenon of recent origin. 
Although Washington recognized the importance of the region 
as part of a landbridge between three continents, its 
proximity to the Soviet Union and its in Increasingly 
significant contribution to the world supply of petroleum. 
Zb 
the Gulf did not become a primary zone in American s t r a t e g i c 
planning u n t i l t he 1970s, 
The ear ly American involvement in the region was in 
t r ade or the a c t i v i t i e s of US Chr i s t i an missions in education 
and hea l th . The f i r s t major element of American i n t e r e s t 
in the region was introduced by the U.S. o i l companies daring 
the in ter -war per iod by 19 39 with half-ownership of a conce-
ss ions in Kuwait and exclusive concessions in Bahrain and 
77 Saudi Arabia . The second world war brought i n to focus the 
s t r a t e g i c importande of petroleum and i t s by-products as 
78 
"foundations of the a b i l i t y t o f igh t a modem war •'. 
Keeping in view the vast petroleum reserves in the 
Gulf region, s t r a t e g i c planners in Washington rea l i zed tha t 
the Gulf o i l , could serve as a "well head" for European 
recovery as well as for U.S. domestic consumption so tha t 
deplet ing indigenous reserves could be saved for future 
79 
requirements • In t he immediate aftermath of the second 
76, For d e t a i l s see , Bernard Reich e t , a l . The Persian Gulf 
(MdLeani VAi Research Analysis Corporation, 1971) . Also 
see Joseph J . Malone, "American and the Arabian 
Peninsula* The F i r s t two hundred Years" Middle East Journal 
(Washington) Supper 1976, pp. 406-424. 
77, J . c . Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle Eastt 
A Documentary Record 1914-1956. Vol. l l (New York: 
Octagon Books, 1972) , p . 238. 
78, William B. Quandt, Saudi Arabia in 1980st Foreign Policy, 
secur i ty and o i l (Washington D.C. The Brooking I n s t i t u t i o n , 
1981) , p . 47. 
79, Michael Stoff, Oil War and American Securi ty (New Haven, 
C T . t Yale Univers i ty P ress , 1980), p . 111. 
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w o r l d war, under t h e Truman d o c t r i n e , conta inment of S o v i e t 
i n f l u e n c e and t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of l o c a l c o n s e r v a t i v e regimes 
a l s o prompted U n i t e d S t a t e s t o a c t i v e l y i n v o l v e i t s e l f i n 
t h e r e g i o n . 
During t h e c o l d war y e a r s , I r a n and Saudi Arabia 
• forged* c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and Under 
t h e Truman d o c t r i n e , I r a n , b e c a u s e of i t s g e o g r a p h i c c o n t i -
g n i t y and Shah of I r a n ' s s o l i c i t i n g American a s s i s t a n c e t o 
t i g h t e n h i s g r i p o v e r power brought I r a n much c l o s e r t o 
Washington . Whi l e b r i e f i n g c o n g r e s s i o n a l l e a d e r s on Truman 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s t o combat t h e communist t h r e a t t o Greece 
and t h e Middle E a s t , t h e t h e n US U.nder S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , 
Dean Acheeon had s a i d i • * . . . . . l i k e a p p l e s i n a b a r r e l I n f e c t e d 
by one r o t t e n o n e , t h e c o r r u p t i o n of Greece would i n f e c t Iran 
80 
and a l l t o t h e e a s t ". On t h e o t h e r hand Saudi Arabia agreed 
t o p r o v i d e b a s e r i g h t s t o t h e U n i t e a S t a t e s a t Dhahran-an 
a i r f i e l d b u i l t by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s t o f a c i l i t a t e redeployment 
81 
of U .S . f o r c e s t o and from t h e Par Eas t • 
OIL FACTORSt 
In t h e p o s t - s e c o n d World War p e r i o d imported o i l 
assumed tremendous s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e economic 
8 0 . George Lenczowki , "U.S . P o l i c y toward Iran" i n Abbas 
A i m i r i e and Hemi l ton T w i t c h e l l ( e d s . ) I r an i n t h e 1980s 
(Tehran* 1978) , p . 357. 
8 1 . Hurewi t z , n , 75 pp. 3 2 3 - 3 2 9 . 
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secur i ty and well being of United S ta tes and o ther western 
coun t r i e s . In 1950, o i l accoxinted for about 30 (per cent) 
of the combined energy requirements of North America, 
Western Europe and Japan, Biy 1973 the f igure was about 
53 (per cent)®^. By 1979, 45 (Per cent) of the United S ta te s , 
55 (per cent) of the EEC's and 70 per cent of J apan ' s 
83 
energy consumption was through Oil • Consequently, the 
world in general and i n d u s t r i a l i z e d coxintries in p a r t i c u l a r , 
became heavi ly dependent as import of o i l from the Gulf 
region t o meet t h e i r energy requirements. The increase in 
o i l consumption in the westeim count r ies led t o t h e i r 
augmented dependence on importa as the domestic o i l produc-
t i o n proved i n su f f i c i en t t o meet the required consumption. 
During 1950, United S ta tes was wor ld ' s l a rges t producer of 
petroleum and in 1960 i t s dependence on o i l import was 16 
per cent which reached t o 35 (per cent) by 1973 when the 
64 f i r s t energy c r i s i s surfaced • Subsequent years witnessed 
increased American dependence on o i l import. 
82, United S t a t e s , Pro lec t Independence! US and World 
Energy outlook tRrough 1990 (Washington Congressional 
Research Service , 1977), p . 677. 
83, U.S. Petroleum Imports from the Gulf: Use of Armed 
Force t o ensure suppl ies (Washington: Congressional 
Research Service , 1982) , p , 2, 
84, Henry Kiss inger , "Energy-the Necessity of Decision" 
in Richard P, S t teb ins and Elaine P, Adam Xeds.) , 
American Foreign Relat ions 1975» A Documentary Record (New York: New York Univers i ty Press , 1977), p . 63. 
r. 9 
Increase in consuraption l e v e l s and import dependence 
prompted both developed and developing count r ies of the 
world t o turn towards Persian Gulf region which had su f f i -
c ien t o i l reserves and which could accomodate any sudden 
85 
r i s e s in the global demand for petroleum . The eight o i l 
producing count r i es of the Pers ian Gulf region hold about 
55 (per cent) of t he wor ld ' s t o t a l proven crude o i l reserves , 
as shown in the following t a b l e 1.3, 
Table 1.3 
Estimates Pers ian Gulf Crude Oil and Natural Gas 
Proven Reserves 
Country Crude Oil ( b i l l i o n ba r r e l s ) 
Natural Gas ( t r i l l i o n 
cubic feet) 
Bahrain 
I r a n 
I r a q 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
U n i t e d Arab 
E m e r i t e s 
0 , 2 
5 5 . 3 
4 1 , 0 
6 7 , 2 
2 .7 
3 , 4 
1 6 5 , 3 
3 2 , 4 
T o t a l , Persian Gulf 367.5 
World Total 670,2 
8 
483 
29 
34 
3 
62 
121 
768 
3,034 
SOURCE» US, Department of Energy, 1982 Annual Energy Review 
(Washington, D.C.j Apri l 1983) 
85, US, world Petroleum A v a i l a b i l i t y , 1980-2000: A Technical 
Memorandum (Washington: Congress Office of Technology, 
1980) , pp. 36-45. 
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The Gulf region has a lso emerged as the wor ld ' s la rges t 
oi l -producing region. During 1950, the count r ies in Gulf 
region produced only about 17 (per cent) of the t o t a l world 
crude output and in 1975 they were accounting for about 
35(per cent) of the same as shown in the following t ab le 1,4. 
Table 1.4 
Percentage of World Crude Oil Production 
by region 1950-1978 
Cont inen t and 
coun t ry 
North America 
South America 
Europe 
A f r i c a 
A s i a , Middle Eas t 
1950 
54.56 
16.94 
8.72 
0.44 
19.34 
1960 
37.24 
16.47 
16.75 
1.37 
28.17 
1970 
24.86 
10.40 
16.87 
13.25 
34.23 
1975 
19.83 
6.70 
20.30 
9.37 
43.02 
1978 
18.50 
5.83 
22.01 
10.08 
42.85 
PERSIAN GULF 
Bahra in 
I r a n 
I r a q 
Kuwait 
Oman 
Qata r 
Saudi Arabia 
Un i t ed Arab 
Emira tes 
0.29 
6.38 
1.31 
3 .31 
-
0.32 
5.25 
-
0,22 
5.02 
4.60 
7 .73 
-
0.82 
5.94 
-
0.17 
8.36 
3.40 
5.97 
0,72 
0,79 
7.75 
1,70 
0 ,11 
10.01 
4 .23 
3.44 
0.64 
0,82 
12,89 
3.17 
0.09 
8.59 
4.33 
3,07 
0.52 
0.80 
14.05 
3.02 
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Aus t ra l i a - - 0.38 0,78 0.73 
Newzealand 
Tota l world 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Production 
SOURCE* U.S. Congress, House of Representa t ives , The Energy 
Factbook, 96th Congress, Second Session, 1980. 
Owing t o low l e v e l s o£ i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and l i t t l e domestic 
consumption, much of the output of crude o i l in the Persian 
86 Gulf region was ava i lab le for exports . By the c lose of 
1970s, the Gulf region had become the suppl ie r of about two-
87 t h i r d of t o t a l world-wide o i l import requirements . Oil 
being c ruc i a l f ac to r in US and western countr ies economy and 
Persian Gulf being the main source of o i l , the region was 
and i s undoubtedly of immense s t r a t e g i c s igni f icance for the 
Unkted S t a t e s , Any disrupt ion in the flow of o i l from the 
Gulf could severely af fect bas i c U.S. economic and s t r a t e g i c 
i n t e r e s t s . P o l i t i c a l l y , o i l s | iortages could cause severe 
s t r a i n s in the Western a l l i a n c e system. I t was a l l too 
evident in the aftermath of 1973-74 o i l c r i s i s , the leading 
exan^le being t h e refusal of almost a l l European a l l i e s t o 
allow over f l igh t r i gh t s to U.S. a i r c r a f t carrying equipment 
86. US, Department of Energy, 1982 Annual Energy Review, (Washington 1983) , p . 77. 
8 7. US, Department of Defence, United S ta tes Mi l i ta ry 
Posture for Fy 1982 (Washington, 1982) , p . 2. 
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and suppl ies t o I s r a e l during the October 1973 war . 
The role of t he count r ies of Persian Gulf region in 
global p o l i t i c s and American pol icy concerns came t o 
acquire commercial and f inanc ia l dimensions. The U.S. o i l 
mul t ina t iona l s operat ing in the Gulf count r ies involved 
combined c a p i t a l investments around $ 3.5 b i l l i o n in 197 4. 
The replacement value of U.S. company investments in the 
Gulf o i l industry was est imated a t some $ 50 b i l l i o n in 
1972 and year ly income from these investment was equal t o 
89 
hal f of the U.S. balance of payment d e f i c i t a t t h a t time . 
Thus the U.S. had high economic staXes in the Gulf. 
The o i l revenues of t he o i l producing Gulf countr ies 
had seen a sudden boom. The combined o i l revenues of I ran , 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq,UAE and Qatar rose from $ 7 b i l l i o n 
in 1971 t o more than $ 72 b i l l i o n in 1974 and $ 185 b i l l i o n 
in 1980^°. This o i l boom boosted domestic consumer spending 
and the governments of these coun t r i e s launched ambitious 
socio-economic programmes. The combined import b i l l s of the 
Gulf s t a t e s including two Yemens rose from $ 8.7 b i l l i o n in 
88. Chris L. J e f f e r i e s , "NATO and Oilj Confl ict and capabi-
l i t i e s " Air Univers i ty Review, January-February 1980, 
pp. 35-4^. 
89. R.M. B u r r e l l , The Persian Gulf, The Washington Papers, 
NO. 1, (Baverley H i l l s ; C.A.i Sage Publ ica t ions 1972), 
p . 9. 
90. The Middle East and North Africa 1982-83 (Londont Europe 
Pub l i ca t ions , 1982) , p . 124. 
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1973 t o $ 13.5 b i l l i o n in 1974 which included arms imports, 
thus making the region the " f a s t e s t growing market for 
U.S. goods and se rv ices in the world^^. In 1973, the U.S. 
s t a t e Department t o l d t he congress: 
M Gulf i s an area which wi l l provide almost 
unl imited oppor tun i t i e s for the sa l e of every kind of U.S. 
goods and s e r v i c e s . This i s an area which i s i dea l ly comple-
mentary to t h e high technology and management serv ices tha t 
92 the United S ta tes provide " . 
Another f ac to r which proved instrumental in augmenting 
the s t r a t e g i c s ign i f icance of Gulf region in U.S. global 
pol icy was t h e increas ing Soviet naval presence in Western 
Indian Ocean in the wake of B r i t i s h withdrawl from the 
region by the c lose of 1960s. The Br i t i sh withdrawl had an 
impact on the p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c elements of t he American 
i n t e r e s t s in the Persian Gulf. These elements, while posse-
ssing an Importance of t h e i r own, became more c e n t r a l to 
U.S. regional concerns given t h e i r bearing on the flow of 
o i l . In March 1968, repor t s regarding Soviet naval excur-
sions in t o the waters of the Indian Ocean and Persian 
9 1 . U.S. Congress, House Committee on I n t e r n a t i o n a l Relat ions, 
The Persian vjulf 1975i The Continuing Debate on Arms sales 
(Washington 1975) , p . 13. 
92. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affa i r s , 
New Perspect ives in the Pers ian Gulf (Washingtoni 197 3), 
pp. 154-155, 
t;4 
Gulf appeared in Western press^^ . In April 1968, the then 
U.S. Ass i s tan t Secretary of State for the Near East, Lucius 
Ba t t l e to ld the House of Representatives,Foreign Affairs 
Committee, "the temptation on the p a r t of the Soviets to f i l l 
a vaccumor a t l e a s t manoeuvre in the troubled waters i s very 
great^"^". The House Committee fturther apprised by the 
commander of the U.S. S t r ike Force tha t the Soviet action 
ref lec ted an age-old s t ra tegy , not new but increasing in 
in tens i ty and ac t i v i t y of penetrat ion of the Middle East , pa r t i -
95 
cular ly the o i l - r i c h areas of the Persian Gulf . The American 
perceptions about Soviet manoeuvres became more entrenched as 
the Soviets gained foothold in Iraq, Ethopia and South Yemen 
prompting fears in the United States of a Soviet geopol i t ica l 
offensive with the Gulf region supposedly a prime t a rge t . 
Ihe growing ro le of oil-producing Gulf countries in 
the Arab-Israel conf l ic t especia l ly a f te r 1973 war had also 
prompted Washington to take note of t h i s new development while 
formulating i t s policy towards West Asia, As Joseph Sisco, an 
93. New York Tiroes, 15 March 1968, 
94. Middle East Record, Vol. 4, 1968, p . 3 , 
95. I b i d , , Vol, 5, 1968-69, p , 463, 
96. Amitava Acharya, n , p . 14. 
b ; J 
official of the U.S. State Department noted in 1975J "The major 
oil producing countties of the Arabian Peninsula have became 
the principal financial support for the Arab states, more 
directly involved in the Middle East conflict,... their 
views (on the Arab-Israeli issue) are very important and they 
are regularly consulted by the Arab parties to the peace 
97 
negotiations as well as by the Palestinians •*, 
THE US AND ISRAELt 
Israel and Iran had been main pawns in chessboard of 
strategy towards West Asia. And the single most significant 
factor complicating American policy towards West Asia has 
been continuing US support to Israel, Washington played a 
crucial role in the establishment of the state of Israel in 
May 1948. The territory known as Palestine was brought under 
the British mandate following the collapse of Ottoman Empire 
after the First world War. During the period of British 
mandate of Palestine, the Jews migrated to Palestine from 
different parts of the world and settled there. The unabated 
inflex of jews into Palestine proved instrumental in upsetting 
the ethnic balance which led to eruption of violence between 
the Jews and the Arab Palestinian. In November 1947, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution envisaging partition of 
of Palestine into (1) Jewish state and (ii) Arab State. 
97. US. Congress House, Committee on Foreign Relations, The 
Persian Gulf 1975: The Continuing Debate On Arms Sali"" 
(Washington: 1976) , p. 8. 
t)6 
However the Jews u n i l a t e r a l l y declared on 14 May 1948, the 
establishment of s t a t e of I s r a e l . United S ta tes was the f i r s t 
country t o accord recognit ion t o t h e Jewish s t a t e . Soon 
h o s t i l i t i e s broke out between I s r a e l and Arab s t a t e s but 
owing t o US r o l e , a c ea se - f i r e was obtained through the 
u n i t e d Nat ions . The na t ive Arab Pa l e s t i n i ans were forced t o 
become refugees who sought s h e l t e r in the neighbouring Jordan, 
Lebanon, I r aq and other coun t r i e s . The continued American 
support to I s r a e l , Arab count r ies h o s t i l i t y towards I s r a e l 
and the p l igh t of Pa l e s t i n i an refugees who formed Pa les t ine 
Libera t ion Organisat ion (PLO) as t h e i r sole represen ta t ive t o 
regain t h e i r homeland were such developments which gave r i s e 
t o Arab-Israe l problem. 
in the wake of Cold War, Washington did not show much 
eagerness t o provide massive mi l i t a ry aid to I s r a e l keeping 
in view the fac t t h a t such a s tep would not only antagonise 
the Arab count r ies but push them t o Soviet o r b i t . During 
ear ly 1950s, t he United S ta tes mooted a plan for t h e defence 
of the Middle Eas t . But Egypt which was considered key to the 
98 proposed secur i ty system re jec ted t he proposal . The then US 
Secretary of S t a t e , John Fos te r Dulles in the Eisenhower 
98, Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , Vol, XXV, 22 October 1951, 
pp. 547-548. Also see John C. Campbell, Defence of the 
Middle Easti Problems of American Policy (New York: 1958), 
pp. 39-48, 
b7 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , emphasised on American i m p a r t i a l i t y in Arab-
I s r a e l i d i s p u t e ^ ^ . Du l l e s s f u r t h e r added: "The Un i t ed S t a t e s 
shou ld seek t o a l l e y t h e deep resentment a g a i n s t i t t h a t has 
r e s u l t e d from t h e c r e a t i o n of I s r a e l . I n t h e p a s t , we had 
good r e l a t i o n w i t h i n t h e Arab p e o p l e s today t h e Arab 
p e o p l e s a r e a f r a i d t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l back t h e new 
s t a t e of I s r a e l i n a g g r e s s i v e expans ionism. We cannot a f ford 
t o be d e s t r u c t e d by m i l l i o n s who could be s t u r d y f r i e n d s of 
f reedom^°°" . 
However t h e r e was s u b s t a n t i a l d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e o r y and 
p r a c t i c e w i t h r e g a r d t o American p o l i c y toward I s r a e l . At 
t h e t h e o r e t i c a l l e v e l Washington pursued t h e p o l i c y of 
appeas ing Arab c o u n t r i e s and on o c c a s i o n s even snubbed 
I s r a e l bu t i n p r a c t i c e o b l i g e d T e l Aviv by p r o v i d i n g massive 
economic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e as shown in t h e t a b l e below: 
T a b l e 1.5 
U.S. A s s i s t a n c e t o I s r a e l , 1951-1967 
($ m i l l i o n s ) 
Yggj. T o t a l Aid Economic Economic M i l i t a r y 
Loans G r a n t s Loans 
1951 0 1 . - 0 .1 
1952 86 .4 - 86 .4 
1953 73 .6 - 73 .6 
5 9 . Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , Vol . XXCIii, 15 June 1953, 
pp . 331-335. ' 
100. I b i d . 
US 
1 9 5 4 
1 9 5 5 
1 9 5 6 
1957 
19 58 
1959 
1 9 6 0 
1 9 6 1 
1 9 6 2 
1 9 6 3 
1964 
1 9 6 5 
1966 
1 9 6 7 
SOURCE! 
7 4 . 7 
5 2 . 7 
5 0 . 8 
4 0 . 9 
6 1 . 2 
5 0 . 3 
5 5 . 7 
4 8 . 1 
8 3 , 9 
7 6 . 7 
3 7 . 0 
6 1 . 7 
1 2 6 . 8 
1 3 . 1 
T h e L i n k 
-
3 0 . 8 
3 5 . 2 
2 1 . 8 
4 9 . 9 
3 9 . 0 
4 1 . 8 
2 9 . 8 
6 3 , 5 
5 7 . 4 
3 2 . 2 
4 3 . 9 
3 5 . 9 
5 . 5 
(Washington) 
4 7 . 7 
21 .9 
15 .6 
1 9 , 1 
1 1 . 3 
10 .9 
1 3 . 4 
1 8 . 3 
7 . 2 
6 . 0 
4 . 8 
4 . 9 
0 . 9 
0 . 6 
December 1982, 
• " 
-
-
-
-
0 . 4 
0 . 5 
-
1 3 . 2 
1 3 . 3 
mm 
1 2 . 9 
9 0 . 0 
7 . 0 
p . 3 . 
With regard to such massive US aid to Israel, Nadavsafran, 
a prominent scholar of Israeli affairs commentedt "On a per 
capital basis of the recipient country, this is probably the 
101 highest rate of American aid given to any country ". It is 
evident from the above table that there was substantial rise 
in American economic assistance to Israel during 1950s and 
1960s. Besides, during 1960-67, United States also provided 
101. Nadav Safran, United States and Israel p. 278. 
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mi l i t a ry loans t o I s r a e l worth $ 137.3 mil l ion t o enable i t 
procure soph i s t i ca t ed weapons from t h e American market. 
During Kennedy and Johnson adminis t ra t ions , Washington 
adopted a pol icy of "special r e l a t ionsh ip" with I s r a e l . 
Abba Eban Wrote of Johnson t h a t "within a few months he had 
e s t ab l i shed with Prime Minis ter Levi Eshkol the kind of 
u l t ima te conf i ^'ence t h a t had never ex is ted between heads of 
102 I s r a e l i and American governments " . Shimon Peres , then 
deputy Defence Minis ter of I s r a e l , wrote t h a t Eshkol reported 
t h a t US President Johnson had t o l d I s r a e l Premier* "The 
United S ta tes stands four square behind I s r a e l " , t h a t 
American would "not be i d l e i f I s r a e l i s a t tacked and tha t 
t h i s pledge given by both h i s predecessor and himself, was 
103 
a solemn and ser ious c nmitment " . 
I t could be evidenced from the above ana lys i s tha t 
I s r a e l was one of the important decis ive f ac to r in making 
West Asia s t r a t e g i c a l l y s ign i f i can t for the United S t a t e s . 
United S ta tes and I ran : 
Because of i t s o i l r e se rves , s t r a t e g i c locat ion of 
sharing over 1000 miles long border with Soviet Union and 
Shah of I r a n ' s dependence on US for h i s survival were the 
102. Abbu Eban, An Autobiography (New York) Random House, 
1977) , p . 355. 
103, Shimon Peres , David's Sling (London Weidenfeld and 
Nichlson, 1970), p . 103. 
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main fac to rs t h a t proved helpful in forging specia l r e l a t ion -
ship between Tehran and Washington. At an ear ly s tage, the 
Shah was forced t o r e a l i z e t h a t h i s own percept ions as t o 
t he s t r a t e g i c importance of I ran t o the United S ta tes and to 
t he West and the means of safeguarding t h i s " sh i e ld of the 
Middle East" were a t odds with US policy^° . Even in 19 47, 
bare ly a year a f t e r t he Soviet "puppet regime had been 
driven out of Azerbaijan, the US Department of S t a t e had 
considered t h a t , for mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance purposes, I ran could 
not be considered amongst those s t a t e s t ha t were v i t a l t o 
105 US secur i ty or under d i r ec t or inwediate danger . The 
r e s to r a t i on of monarchy in August 19 53 in a pro-Shah coup in 
which the government of Mossadeq was overthrown with the 
considerable planning and f inanc ia l a s s i s t ance provided 
by the United S t a t e s , the r e l a t i o n s between I ran and US 
s t a r t e d r e g i s t e r i n g an upward t r e n d . 
According t o CD, Carr , t he Shah of I r a n needed t o 
achieve ce r t a in goals in r e l a t i o n t o the US foreign policy: 
he had to e s t ab l i sh the importance of I r an to t h e United 
S t a t e s , the importance of himself t o I r a n , and t h e importance 
104. C D . Carr , "The United S t a t e s - I ran ian Relat ionship 
1948-1978, A Study in Reverse Influence" in Hossein 
Amir Sadeghi (ed.) The Secur i ty of the Pers ian Gulf (Londonj Croom Hiem 1981) , p . 58. 
105. I b id . 
106. R.K. Ramazani, I r a n ' s Foreign Pol icy , 1941-1973 (Charlottes 
V l l l e , V.A.J Univers i ty Press of Vi rg in ia , 1975), pp. 
154-157. 
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of I r a n i a n s e c u r i t y i n t e r m s of members of armed f o r c e s 
107 p e r s o n n e l and t h e q u a l i t y o f t h e i r equ ipment t o h i m s e l f 
I n view of S h a h ' s r e t u i n i t o power i n Augus t 1953 , Washing ton 
r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e Shoh wou ld n e e d t a n g i b l e s u p p o r t from t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s , i n t e r m s o f b o t h economic and m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e , t o r e t a i n h i s g r i p o v e r power . C o n s e q u e n t l y , 
t h e US m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o I r a n i n c r e a s e d f i v e f o l d from 
1952 t o 1953 w i t h a s i m i l a r i n c r e a s e i n n o n - m i l i t a r y a i d . 
D u r i n g 1 9 5 4 - 5 5 , when U n i t e d S t a t e s a d v o c a t e d t h e f o r m a t i o n 
of r e g i o n a l m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s , e s p e c i a l l y CENTO and SEATO, 
W a s h i n g t o n a d v i s e d T e h r a n t o j o i n CENTO which was e a r l i e r 
c a l l e d t h e Baghdad P a c t which I r a n j o i n e d i n 1955 , As t h e 
t h e n US a m b a s s a d a r i n T e h r a n r e p o r t e d i n 1959: The Baghdad 
P a c t h a s meant n o t h i n g t o t h e p e o p l e o r gove rnmen t of I r a n 
o t h e r t h a n t h e s t r o n g h o p e of m a s s i v e a i d / o r t e r r i t o r i a l 
g u a r a n t e e from t h e US i n r e t u r n f o r I r a n i a n a d h e r e n c e t o 
108 
t h e p a c t " , Be tween 1946-48 t o 1967 , I r a n r e c e i v e d s u b -
s t a n t i a l economic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e from t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s , a s shown i n t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e s 
1 0 7 . C a r r , N, 104, p* 5 9 . 
108. Cited in I b i d , p . 64. 
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Tab le 1.6 
U .S . Economic and M i l i t a r y A s s i s t a n c e t o I r a n 1946-1967 
($ m i l l i o n ) 
Year 
Economic 
A s s i s t a n c e 
1946-
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953-
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
48 
•61 
25.8 
-
-
1.5 
15.0 
617.7 
68.7 
42.7 
26 .3 
40.4 
22.5 
107.1 
M i l i t a r y 
A s s i s t a n c e To t a l 
10.7 
5.9 
410.0 
64 .5 
101.3 
34.7 
82 .4 
152.7 
195.7 
25 .8 
12.2 
20.9 
1027.7 
133.2 
144.0 
61.0 
122.8 
175.2 
302.8 
SOURCE: US Government, US Fore ign A s s i s t a n c e and A s s i s t a n c e 
from I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n s , O b l i g a t i o n s , and 
A u t h o r i z a t i o n s , 1 J u l y 1945-30 Jvme 1971, AID, 24 May 
1972, p . 17. 
I t i s amply c l e a r from t h e above t a b l e t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y 
component of US a s s i s t a n c e fo r I r a n was g r e a t e r e s p e c i a l l y 
from 1962 onwards t han t h e economic a s s i s t a n c e . 
I t was in t h i s backdrop t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s 
and s t a k e s i n West Asian and Gulf r eg ion blossomed. I t i s 
o 
o 
an 
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e v i d e n t from t h e above a n a l y s i s t h a t t h e t a n g i b l e outcome 
f t h e developments r e l a t i n g t o o i l , t r a d e , f i n a n c e , f ea r 
£ s o v i e t expansion and t h e growing r o l e of t h e West Asian 
d t h e Gulf s t a t e s i n t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i C o n f l i c t , t h a t t h e 
r eg ion a c q u i r e d pre-e i rdnent s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e Uni ted 
S t a t e s p o l i t i c a l , economic and s t r a t e g i c t e r m s . I n 1972, 
Joseph S i s c o , t h e A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Near 
E a s t e r n and South Asian a f f i a r s had no ted t h e s p e c t a c u l a r . . . 
t r a n s i t i o n of t h e gu l f from a p o s i t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
s i g n i f i c a n c e p r i m a r i l y as p a r t of t h e B r i t i s h l i f e t i m e t o 
I n d i a t o p o s i t i o n on s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e and economic 
109 
impor tance t o many i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r i e s 
The advent of I s l a m i c r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n i n e a r l y 
1979, se rved a s eve re blow t o US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in 
I r a n . However t h e Sov ie t i n v a s i o n of Afghanis tan in December 
1979 and i t s c o n t i n u e d occupa t ion r ev ived keen American 
i n e r e s t s in South and West Asia and t h e US pre fe red t o c a l l 
i t South West A s i a , With t h e l o s s of I r a n as a s t r a t e g i c 
a l l y , Washington p inned i t s hopes on P a k i s t a n . These develop-
ments v e r e t a k e n n o t e of by t h e US p o l i c y makers . In e a r l y 
1980, t h e then A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e f o r Near Eas te rn 
and South Asian A f f a i r s , Haro ld Saunders , d e s c r i b e d US 
i n t e r e s t s i n t h e Gulf as " l o n g s t a n d i n g , major and i n t e r 
109. Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , 4 September 1972, p . 24. 
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related. While l i s t ing the factors affecting U.S. in teres ts 
in the region, Saunders said: 
(i) The area ' s s t ra tegic location and i t s 
significance to maintaining a global 
s t ra tegic balance; 
( i i ) The significance we place on the sovereignty 
and independence of these countries as part 
of a more stable world; 
( i i i ) The world's v i ta l need for the region's oi l 
and 
(iv) The importance of these s ta tes in in te r -
national finance and development and as 
markets for our goods and technology^•'•^. 
The U.S. in te res t s and policy objectives in the region as 
outlined by Saunders, were also rei terated by the U.S. 
Defence Secretary, Harold Brown in 1980* 
To maintain access to adequate o i l supplies; 
To res i s t Soviet expansion; 
To promote s t ab i l i t y in the region; and 
to advance the middle east peace process and 
indeed inorder to help insure-the continued 
security of Israel^, 
Thus the U.S. policy towards South and West Asia was 
primarily governed by these broad guide lines. 
110, US. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
War in the Gulf (Washington 1984) , p. 35. 
111. Department of State Bulletin. May 1980, p. 63. 
CHAPTER - I I 
US POLICY TOWARDS SOUTH ASIA i POLITICAL, ECONOMIC 
AND hgLlTARY ASSISTANCE (1968-1980) 
The d e v e l o p m e n t s i n Sou th A s i a d u r i n g 1968-1980 
p e r i o d had f a r r e a c h i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e US s t r a -
t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n t h e r e g i o n as w e l l a s t h e o t h e r 
p a r t s o f t h e g l o b e . I n S o u t h A s i a , I n d i a and P a k i s t a n 
were t h e major a c t o r s wh ich became t h e f o c a l p o i n t of 
US s t r a t e g y . The r o l e of P a k i s t a n i n f a c i l i t a t i n g S i n o -
US r a p p r o a c h m e n t , B a n g l a d e s h c r i s i s , I n d o - S o v i e t p e a c e 
t r e a t y i n c r e a s e d US arms a s s i s t a n c e t o P a k i s t a n e s p e c i a l l y 
i n t h e wake of S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n had been 
t h e major e v e n t s t h a t p r o v e d i n s t r u m e n t a l i n d e t e r m i n i n g 
US p o l i c y t o w a r d s t h e r e g i o n . With a view t o have i n d e p t h s 
a s s e s s m e n t of US p o l i c y t o w a r d s t h e r e g i o n t h e c h a p t e r 
i s d i v i d e d i n t o two p a r t s j (A) d e a l i n g w i t h Pak-US r e l a -
t i o n s ; and (B) Indo-US r e l a t i o n s , 
(A) US-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
As analysed in the preceding chapter I , in the 
wake of Indo-Pak war of 1965, the embargo on the s a l e of 
us arms to both India and Pakistan had been imposed but 
was modified l a t e r to provide "non-lethal arms" to Pakistan. 
The new Republican adminis t ra t ions with Richard Nixon as 
new US President did not make any pronounced change in US 
/ u 
pol icy toward the Indian sub-cont inent . However, the 
advent of Nixon adminis t ra t ion had ra i sed hopes in Pakistan 
of increased US economic and mi l i t a ry ass i s tance to be 
given to Pakistan in the near fu ture . This was pa r t ly because 
Nixon's warrr.er a t t i t u d e toward Pakistan as Vice-President 
during 1950s had not completely cooled during the i n t e r -
vening y s a r ' s . ^ According to William J . Barnds, President 
Nixon found i t e a s i e r to e s t a b l i s h a rappor t with General 
Yahya Khan of Pakis tan, than with Indian Prime Minister, 
Mrs. Ind i r a Gandhi, which was an ••important unmeasureable 
2 element in U.S. po l icy . 
During his v i s i t to Pakistan in August 1969, 
Pres ident Nixon was aiven an en thus i a s t i c welcome as "one 
of the a r c h i t e c t of United Sta tes Pakistan a l l i ance of the 
1950s.^ pres ident Nixon assures h is hosts t ha t he would 
4 
again work for f r iendship between Washington and Islamabad. 
I t i s worthmentioning here t ha t p r io r to President Nixon's 
v i s i t , the then US s e c r e t a r y of Sta te had v i s i t ed Pakistan 
during the th i rd week of May 1969. At a meeting of the US 
sec re t a ry of State with Pakis tan ' s Pres ident in Lahore 
on 24 May, 1969, t a l k s about supply of American arms to 
1. rtilliam J . Barnds, Ind i^ , Pakistan and the Great Powers (New ydrkj Praeger, 1972), P. 233. 
2. I b i d . 
3. V.V.Chaturshrenl, Indo-US Relat ions (New Delhi National, 
1980) , p . 237. 
4. Dawn (Karachi) , 3 August 1969, 
11 
Pakistan were held. I t was hinted t h a t Pak is tan ' s arrra 
needs were being studied^.And Pres ident Nixon's v i s i t 
to Pakistan in August 1969 la id a firm foundation for 
r e s to r ing US-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s to the s t a b l e and cord ia l 
bas i s t h a t had exis ted p r io r to the 19 65 war and the sub-
sequent arms embargo. While expressing his des i re to 
resume the old t i e s Pres ident Nixon sa id s 
"There have been s t r a i n s in our r e l a t i ons 
over these years . . . what we intend to do 
on t h i s v i s i t i s to r e s to re a r e l a t i o n s h i p 
of f r iendship based on mutual t r u s t which 
i s so e s s e n t i a l to good r e l a t i o n s between 
two c o u n t r i e s , . , ^ 
During the course of these d iscuss ions , no commitment was 
made regarding the renewal of the arms aid but i t seems 
tha t the US President had decided to back the Yahya regime 
by providing mi l i t a ry aid as could be discerned from the 
e f fo r t s made a f te r t h i s meeting to l i f t the ban on l e tha l 
g 
weapons imposed in 19 65, 
On 8 November 1969, the House of Representatives 
Foreign Affairs Ctommittee advised the Nixon administrat ion 
to reconsider i t s ban on providing l e t h a l material to both 
India and Pakistan as i t had caused both the countr ies 
5. New York Times. 25 May 1969. 
7. U.S. Government, (Public Papers 
of United Stai-es. Richard Wlvnn 
197i; , p . 597. _ — . 
S» New York Tlm^^, 9 November 196« 
7 B 
to turn to the communist world, however, the Senate 
Foreign Relat ions Committee expressed i t s e l f agains t the 
resumption oi. arms supp l i e s . Despite US Senate 's disapproval 
of renewing arms suppl ies to Pakistan, a marked change was 
d i s c e r n i b l e in Pres ident Nixon's arms aid to Pakistan. 
In 19 70, the House Armed Services Committee approved the 
Administration sponsored b i l l tha t extended a long term 
loan of a submarine to Pakistan, which was against the 
9 professed pol icy of the Administrat ion, 
During his v i s i t to the United Sta tes in l a t e 
October 1970 Pak i s t an ' s President Yahya Khan was assured 
t h a t economic a s s i s t ance to Pakistan would be higher than 
so far received, Pakis tani Pres ident t r i e d to procure 
e l e c t r o n i c equipments l i k e radars and even various types 
of miss i les which did not f a l l under the category of offe-
11 
nsive weapons. Pres ident Yahya Khan also made e f for t s 
12 to soften the terms of payment for t he weapons purchased. 
President Yahya Khan's v i s i t to the United s t a t e s 
soon bore f r u i t s because subsequently Washington negotiated 
with Islamabad over the p r i ce of a heavy U.S. arms deal 
9 . Tiroes of India (New Delhi) , 15 March 1970. 
10. Pakistan Observer (Dhaka) 26 October 1970, 
11. Leela Yadav, n, 6 p, n o 
^^' 197^,^^^ ^ " ^ s p i r a l * , Ecpngm^st (London) 21 November 
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involving an exception to the enibargo. Under t h i s , Pakistan 
received seven Canberra B-57 bombers, s i x F-104 j e t f igh ter 
13 
and 300 armoured personnel c a r r i e r s . 
Jus t i fy ing P a k i s t a n ' s acqu i s i t ion of arms from United 
S ta t e s , Agha Shahi, Pakistan. . ' s r ep re sen t a t i ve , told the 
U.N. P o l i t i c a l Gomndttee t h a t h is government hoped to 
" re s to re* a mi l i t a ry equil ibr ium of one to three with India . 
According to Chester Bowles, former US Airtoassador to India , 
i t was announced t h a t pressures had developed within the 
Nixon adn ln i s t r a t i on to approve the s a l e of 100 American 
tanks to Pakistan which had previously been given to Turkey 
under a NATO agreement. He fur ther opined t h a t the benefi-
c i a r i e s would be the m i l i t a r y leaders in Pakistan and the 
15 U.S. firms which manufactured the t anxs . 
In I t s arms package to Pakistan in 1970, Washington 
had offered an a l t e r n a t i v e to the s a l e of s i x F-104 super-
sonic a i r c r a f t under which i t could e i t h e r receive rep lace-
ments for the s i x r-104 f igh te r t h a t i t had l o s t and 
complete i t s ; squa"dron of F-5 a i r c r a f t , ^ 
13. Leela Yadav, "Pakis tan ' s Foreign Policyj An Analysis 
of Pak i s tan ' s Relat ions with the United s t a t e s " in 
Surendra Chopra(ed,) Perspect ives on Pak is tan ' s Foreign 
Pol icy (Amritsar. 1 9 8 3 K p . 2 4 6 , ~ ^ 
14. Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , 15 October 1970. 
15. The Baltimore Sun, 6 June 19 70, 
1^. Hindustan Times, 5 November 19 70, 
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P r i o r t o December 1971 , P a k i s t a n c o m p r i s e d two wings 
_ E a s t i r ' ak i s tan and West P a k i s t a n . The d e v e l o p m e n t s i n 
E a s t P a k i s t a n had s t a r t e d t a k i n g t r a u m a t i c t u r n from 19 68 
onwards w h e r e b y , t h e p e o p l e of E a s t P a k i s t a n demanded 
r e g i o n a l autonomy, economic and s o c i a l j u s t i c e . During 
19 6 9 - 7 0 , t h e p e o p l e t o o k t o a g i t a t i o n t o p r e s s f o r t h e i r 
d e m a n d s . ^ Awami League u n d e r S h e i k h M u j i b u r Rehman r a i s e d 
t h e demand f o r r e g i o n a l autonomy a s a p o l i t i c a l p l a n k 
which c a u g h t w i t h t h e i m a g i n a t i o n of n a t i v e p o i ^ u l a t i o n . 
The i n a b i l i t y of P a k i s t a n i r u l i n g e l i t e t o a s s u a g e 
t h e f e e l i n g s of t h e p e o p l e of E a s t P a k i s t a n l e d t o wide 
s p r e a d d i s c o n t e n t . However , p r e s i d e n t Yahya Khan, i n a 
t e c h t i c a l rrove, d e c l a r e d t h a t he would t r a n s f e r power to 
t h e e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e p e o p l e who would t h e n 
make a new c o n s t i t u t i o n . A f t e r a l o t of c o n f u s i o n , e l e c t i o n s 
w e r e u l t i m a t e l y h e l d on 7 December 19 70 i n which t h e Awami 
League w r e s t e d l60 of t h e i 6 2 s e a t s a l l o t t e d t o E a s t P a k i -
s t a n and P a k i s t a n P e o p l e s P a r t y g o t 81 of t h e 138 s e a t s 
19 
a l l o t t e d to West P a k i s t a n , * D i s a g r e e m e n t be tween Awami 
League and P e o p l e ' s P a r t y o v e r s h a r i n g power prompted t h e 
17 . G.W.Choudhry , " B a n g l a d e s h i Why i t h a p p e n e d " I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (London) V o l . 4 8 , No. 2, 1972, p . 247. 
18 . P r a n Chopra , The C h a l l e n g e pf B a n g l a d e s h (Bombay, i97 i ) , 
PP . 3 7 - 4 0 . )f» 1 xj , 
19. Government of I n d i a , B a n g l a d e s h Documents . Vol I 
V o l . 1 , (New D e l h i , n . d . ) p . 130 . 
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m i l i t a r y of Junta led by Yahya Khan to unleash oppressive 
measures through army in March l97l on the people of E-ast 
Pakistan which led to de te r io raUon in law and order 
s i t u a t i o n , exodus of refugees to Ind ia , and outbreak of 
Indo-Pak h o s t i l i t i e s i r December 19 70 and i t f i n a l l y cul -
minated in to the emergence of Bangladesh as a free country. 
The uni ted S ta tes had adopted an ambivalent a t t i t u d e 
towards Bangladesh c r i s i s . Since the Awami League in i t s 
e lec t ion mainifesto had pledged t h a t a f t e r coirdng to power 
i t would withdraw Pakistan from the m i l i t a r y pacts l ike 
SEATO and CENTO^O, the uni ted Sta tes was l e a s t i n t e res t ed 
in seeing Awami League's r i s e to power. Though in an overt 
show of sympathy towards East Pakis tan, the US warned tha t 
"any summary ac t ion - aga ins t Shaikh Mujibur Rahman could 
lead to diminished American support for the Pakistan 
Government and thereby urged Yahya regime to moderate the 
21 b r u t a l i t y of the m i l i t a r y suppression in the East. 
However the Nixon adminis t ra t ion did not implement t h i s 
t h r e a t , 
president Nixon In his Foreign Policy Report to 
the American congress stated that the united States had 
20. R.C. Gupta, U.S. Policy towards India, and Pakistan 
(Delhi » 1977), pp. 39-40. 
21. US Congress, Congressional Record. Vol, l77, part 25, 
1971, pp. 33017. 
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ne i the r supported nor condoned the military- act ion in 
East Pakis tan. The inunediate s t ep he took was to stop 
issuing and reviewing l icences for n d l i t a r y shipments to 
Pakistan and also ceased new conitdtinents for economic 
development loans.^2 The US President in his repor t to 
the Congress, while taking a defensive fos tu re , said : 
While the US deplored the f ac t t h a t mi l i ta ry 
so lu t ions were resor ted to the 1971. we 
did not d ispute the a sp i r a t ions of the 
people of East Bengal for autonomy.. . . Vve 
opposed not independence but the outbreak 
of In t e rna t iona l war. Throughout the c r i s i s 
war of 1971, the uni ted States provided two 
t h i r d of the wor ld ' s r e l i e f to East Bengal 
and supported the adminis t rat ion of the 
r e l i e f e f fo r t by in t e rna t iona l a u t h o r i t i e s 
our r e l i e f e f fo r t continued even in the 
absence of diplomatic r e l a t i o n s , 2 3 
The Nixon admin i s t r a t ion ' s move of continuing 
supply of arm s^ to Pakistan despi te the dis turbing 
r e t o r t s of c i v i l un re s t in ers twhi le East Pakistan was 
disapproved by the American Senate. On 6 Hay 19 71, 
Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, approved in 
the face of Nixon admin i s t r a t i on ' s opposi t ion , a reso-
lu t ion ca l l i ng for the suspension of a l l American mi l i -
tary aid to Pakistan u n t i l the con f l i c t in East Pakistan 
resolved,^^ I n s p l t e of t h i s reso lu t ion Washington offered 
2 2. Department of S ta te Bulj.etin. vol , 64, No, l64 7 
19 7 2, pp, 38 3-386. 
23. Department of S t a t e Bullein, vo l . 65, No, i650 
19 7 2, p . 791. 
24. New York Times, 7 May, 1971, 
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m i l i t a r y e q u i p m e n t w o r t h a b o u t $ 9 roillion to P a k i s t a n . 
Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n n o t o n l y c o n t i n u e d arms 
s u p p l i e s to P a k i s t a n b u t even m a n i p u l a t e d t h e t r a n s f e r of 
arms t o P a k i s t a n t h r o u g h t h i r d c o u n t r i e s . ^^ Acco rd ing t o 
t h e s e c r e t c o r r e s p o n d e n c e r e l a t i n g t o t h i s p e r i o d wh ich 
was l e a k e d t o t h e p r e s s b y emminent j o u r n a l i s t j a c k 
Anderson and became famous as Anderson P a p e r s , t h e US arms 
were t r a n s f e r r e d t o P a k i s t a n t h r o u g h J o r d a n . While commen-
t i n g on p r e s i d e n t N i x o n ' s d e c i s i o n of s u c h a t r a n s f e r of 
arms t o P a k i s t a n , t h e t h e n US s e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Henry 
K i s s i n g e r had s t a t e d : " t h e p r e s i d e n t may want to honour 
t h o s e r e q u e s t s . The m a t t e r has n o t been b r o u g h t t o t h e 
p r e s i d e n t ' s a t t e n t i o n , b u t i t i s q u i t e o b v i o u s t h a t t h e 
p r e s i d e n t i s n o t i n c l i n e d t o l e t t h e P a k i s t a n be d e f e a t e d " , 
p r e s i d e n t N i x o n ' s s t a t e m e n t a t news c o n f e r e n c e i n Washin-
g t o n on 4 Augus t 19 71 i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e U . S . would b e 
l e a n i n g t o w a r d s a s e l f - p e r p e t u a t i n g a i d r e l a t i o n s h i p t o 
27 
b o l s t e r P a k i s t a n ' s p o s i t i o n v i s - a - v i s I n d i a . 
Between 1969 and 1971 P a k i s t a n r e c e i v e d c o n s i d e r a b l e 
economic and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e from t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s . 
Through t h e Aid f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Deve lopment (AID) of 
2 5 . F o r d e t a i l s s e e , j a c k Anderson and G e o r g e C l i f f o r d 
The Anderson P a p e r s (London j 1974) p p . 205 -269 . 
26 . I b i d . , p . 250. 
2 7 . Weeklv C o m p i l a t i o n of P r e s i d e n t i a l Documents , v o l . 7. 
No. 32, 9 August 1 9 7 l , p p . 1 1 1 8 - 1 1 1 9 . 
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t h e US, P a k i s t a n r e c e i v e d $ 104 m i l l i o n i n 1969 and $ 124 
m i l l i o n i n 1970 and t h e PL-480 a g r e e m e n t s i g n e d amounted 
to $ 127 m i l l i o n . ^ ® Whi le t h e P a k i s t a n army was engaged 
i n r u t h l e s s o p p r e s s i o n of t h e p e o p l e of b a n g l a d e s h , t h e 
Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n c o n t i n u e d t h e c l a n d e s t i n e s u p p l y of 
arms to P a k i s t a n . I n t h i s r e g a r d . S e n a t o r Edward Kennedy 
p r o d u c e d t h e documen t s on 20 J u l y 19 71 i n a h e a r i n g on t h e 
S e n a t e Sub -commi t t ee on R e f u g e e s , Whi l e t h e one document 
a u t h o r i z e d t h e s a l e o f s p a r e p a r t s t o P a k i s t a n f o r v a r i o u s 
t y p e s of f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t , t h e s e c o n d document a u t h o r i z e d 
29 t h e s a l e of ammuni t ion and mine s w e e p e r s . I n view of t h e 
b a r r a g e of a d v e r s e c r i t i c i s m b o t h a t home and a b r o a d , 
Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was f o r c e d to c a n c e l i t s a i d to 
P a k i s t a n on 8 November I 9 7 l and even p l a c e d s t r i c t r e s t r i -
30 
c t i o n s on t h i r d p a r t y d e l i v e r i e s . 
INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT 19 71 » 
A p a r t from t h e announcements of US S t a t e Depa r tmen t 
a b o u t i t s ban on s h i p m e n t s of arms t o P a k i s t a n , t h e r e 
were a t l e a s t t h r e e P a k i s t a n i s h i p s w h i c h c a r r i e d m i l i -
t a r y e q u i p m e n t t o t h a t c o u n t r y . The US C o n g r e s s was i n f o r -
med i n J u l y 1971 t h a t on 8 May i 9 7 i , a s h i p c a l l e d t h e 
28 . US Government , u n i t e d S t a t e s F o r e i g n P o l i c y l96Q-7n 
f^yport of t h e s e c r e t a r y at s t a t e fwa«h^?;r^<-An': M:.>-^C 
29 . Vlnod G u p t a , Anderson P a p e r s . A s t u d y of Nivnn'..^ 
B l a c k m a i l o f I n d i a fr^iK4 , '^n-7o| rjT- 'Tl ?2, 
30. I b i d . , p . 184. 
bb 
Sunderbans, was r e p o r t e d to be c a r r y i n g p a r t a fo r ariroured 
31 
v e h i c l e s and o t h e r p a r t s fo r P a k i s t a n , 
On 22 June 1971. ano the r s h i p g,S,Pad.rna r e p o r t e d l y 
c a r r y i n g - s p a r e p a r t s and a c c e s s o r i e s fo r a i r c r a f t and 
n d l i t a r y v e h i c l e s s a i l e d away from New York to Karach i . 
On 2 J u l y 1971. a t h i r d s h i p s . s .KapPa i a l so l e f t for 
P a k i s t a n . ^2 ^ ^^der to j u s t i f y i t s c l a n d e s t i n e ar«is s h i p -
ments to P a k i s t a n t h e Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n coined the 
excuse t h a t t h e s e sh ipments had been s o l d before 25 March 
^ 33 19 71 and be fore t h e ban had been imposed. 
During t h e o u t b r e a k of Indo-Pak H o s t i l i t i e s on e a r l y 
December i 9 7 l . Uni ted S t a t e s t r i e d to b u i l d up t a c t i c a l 
p r e s s u r e on I n d i a by moving i t s s even th F l e e t i n t h e Bay 
of Bengal on 10 December 1971. The US naval Seventh F l e e t 
c o n s i s t e d of E n t e r p r i s e , t h e nuc l ea r powered a i r c r a f t 
c a r r i e r which c a r r i e s 100 f i g h t e r bombers, h e l i c o p t e r s 
and smal l cargo p l a n e s and a t a s k f o r c e of s e v e r a l amphl-
34 b ious s h i p s and d e s t r o y e r s . According to C.L. Suezberger , 
t he E n t e r p r i s e was despa tched to the; Bay of Bengal as a 
token of American i n t e n t i o n and i t was f e l t t h a t t h e U.S. 
3 1 . Congress iona l Record, Vol .117, P a r t 21,1971, 
P . 27130, 
32. I b i d . 
33. New York Times, 21 J u n e 197l . 
34. V,S ,Budhra j , Sov i e t Russia: and t h e Hindustan Sub-
c o n t i n e n t (Bombayj 1973) , p . 236. 
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c o u l d n o t assume a " n e u t r a l s t a n d * i n t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t , 
f o r i f i t d i d s o , i t was a f r a i d t h a t i t would o f f e n d China 
35 
and l o o k weak b e f o r e S o v i e t Union , 
j a c k Anderson e x p r e s s e d t h e v i e w s t h a t t h e n u c l e a r -
powered American t a s k f o r c e was s e n t a t a c r i t i c a l p h a s e 
of t h e I n d o - P a k war a s a "show of f o r c e . The documents 
made p u b l i c by j a c k Ande r son which h a v e become famous a s 
Ander son P a p e r s show t h a t t h e W a s h i n g t o n ' s m o t i v e b e h i n d 
s e n d i n g t a s k f o r c e i n t h e Bay of Benga l was t h r e e f o l d ; 
i ) To compel I n d i a t o d i v e r t b o t h s h i p s and p l a n e s 
to shadow t h e U , S , Task F o r c e ; 
i i ) To weaken I n d i a ' s b l o c k a d e a g a i n s t E a s t P a k i s t a n 
p o s s i b l y t o d i v e r t t h e I n d i a n a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r 
V i k r a n t from i t s m i l i t a r y m i s s i o n ; 
i i i ) To f o r c e I n d i a t o k e e p p l a n e s on d e f e n c e a l e r t , 
t h u s r e d u c i n g t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n i 
37 g r o u n d g r o u p s . 
The avowed o b j e c t i v e of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s i n rroving i t s 
n a v a l t a s k f o r c e i n t h e Bay of Benga l was t o b u i l d p s y c h o -
l o g i c a l p r e s s u r e on I n d i a so t h a t i t c o u l d n o t g a i n m i l i t a r y 
3 5 . I n t e r n a t i o n a l H e r a l d Tri):;)nnf>, 21 A p r i l 1972. 
36. I b i d , , 3 J a n u a r y 19 72 , 
37. I b i d . 
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leverage aga ins t Pakistan and to prevent the Soviets from 
expanding t h e i r naval power in the Indian ocean. Washington 
bel ived t h a t the Soviets were supporting India and Bangla-
desh not because they were in t e re s t ed in the freedom 
s t r u g g l e of Bangladesh people but to expand the i r power 
in the Indian Ocean, 
However, the United Sta tes t r i e d to j u s t i f y the 
presence of i t s Seventh F l ee t in Bay of Bengal designed 
to evacuate the American na t iona l s . But i t was argued tha t 
the American could be a i r l i f t e d . What appeared in t r iguing 
was the f ac t t ha t even the US ambassador in India , John 
Keating, was not informed about the movement of US naval 
task force .^^ According to jack Anderson, the evaluation 
of American c i t i z e n s was s t r i c t l y a secondary mission, 
adopted iTore as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n than the reason for the 
naval nove,^^ He fu r the r opined t h a t the rrove was to 
scare Ind ia as Washington was convinced t h a t an Indian 
v i c to ry in the war would d i s t rub the balance of power and 
41 s t a b i l i t y in the sub-cont inent . 
Though the US naval task force cruised the waters 
of Bay of Bengal but i t did not p a r t i c i p a t e in the Indo-Pak 
38, New York Times^ 18 December 1971, 
39, The Motherland (New Delhi) l January 1972, 
40. Washington Post, 21 December 1971, 
4 1 . I b id , 
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War, Following the surrender of Pakis tani forces In Bangla-
desh and the r e so lu t ion adopted by the UN Security Council, 
a cease f i r e was observed by 17 December 19 71. The tangible 
outcome of the war was t he l i be ra t i on of Bangladesh. The 
west Pakistan came to be known as Pakis tan. However, washin-
ton s t i l l followed the pol icy of appeasement toward Pakistan 
and withheld i t s recogni t ion of Bangladesh, I t was only 
in April 197 2 t ha t Washington accorded recognit ion to 
Bangladesh. 
with view to pamper Bhutto regimein Pakistan, 
Washington resumed economic aid to Pakistan which had been 
suspended during the Bangladesh c r i s i s . In t h i s regard 
pres ident Nixon not i f ied the US Ctongress in February 1972 
tha t Pakistan was no more in control of Bangladesh and 
4 2 pleaded for resumption of US aid to Pakis tan . Consequently 
between January 1972 to May 1973, Washington not only reschedu 
led the repayment of debt worth $ 50 mil l ion to Pakistan 
but also provided a s s i s t ance worth $ 300 mi l l ion . In terras 
of separa te loan agreements signed during th i s period, the 
US coummited $ 120 mill ion to f a c i l i t a t e the imports for 
Pak is tan ' s Indus t r i a l and ag r i cu l t u r a l growth. Washington 
also offered $ 124 mil l ions in food under PL-480, $ 5 
42. The Dawn (Karachi) 20 February 19 72. 
43. Richard Nixon, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970« .^ 
the Emerging St ruc ture of Peace, A Report to the' 
Congress (Washington, 1974), P. 6. 
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m i l l i o n I n t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , and $ 45 m i l l i o n to s u p p o r t 
44 t h e I n d u s B a s i n d e v e l o p m e n t programme. E q u a l l y c r u c i a l 
a t t h a t J u n c t u r e , was Amer ican f l o o d d i s a s t e r r e l i e f fund 
f o r P a k i s t a n wh ich i n c l u d e d a i d of $ 30 m i l l i o n 16000 
m e t r i c t o n s of w h e a t , 4 0 , 0 0 0 t o n s of e d i b l e o i l and a l o a n 
of $ 18 m i l l i o n on emergency b a s i s t o r a i s e p r o d u c t i o n 
i n t h e c o u n t r y , 
US ARMS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN j 
B h u t t o Government was v e r y e a g e r t o p r o c u r e s o p h i -
s t i c a t e d weapons from B e i j i n g , Wash ing ton and o t h e r s o u r c e s 
w i t h a v iew t o make up f o r l o s s e s P a k i s t a n had i n c u r r e d 
d u r i n g t h e I n d o - P a k i s t a n war i n December 1 9 7 l , However 
i n view of t h e US embargo on arms s u p p l i e s t o P a k i s t a n 
imposed d u r i n g t h e B a n g l a d e s h C r i s i s , I s l a m a b a d t r i e d t o 
b u i l d up t a c t i c a l p r e s s u r e on Washington t o l i f t t h e 
embargo . As a t a c t i c a l n o v e , P a k i s t a n a c c o r d e d r e c o g n i t i o n 
to t h e Communist r e g i m e s i n N o r t h Vie tnam, N o r t h Korea and 
i n May 197 2 B h u t t o i n a l e t t e r a d d r e s s e d t o P r e s i d e n t 
Nixon e x p r e s s e d P a k i s t a n ' s c o n c e r n o v e r t h e Vie tnam War.*^ 
On 7 November 1972, P a k i s t a n s e r v e d a n o t i c e t o t e r m i n a t e 
i t s membersh ip of SEATO, I n view of P a k i s t a n ' s c l o s e 
4 4 . I b i d . 
4 5 . F o r t e x t of B h u t t o ' s l e t t e r t o P r e s i d e n t Nixon 
See Dawn, 25 May 19 7 2. ' 
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r e l a t i o n s with Beijing, i t s irembership of SEATO had lo s t 
much of i t s relevance,'*^ Pak i s t an ' s leaving SEATO did, 
in no way, a f fec t the pa t t e rn of Pakistan US r e l a t i onsh ip . 
In March 1973, Nixon Adndnistration suddnely annou-
nced i t s decision to resume supply of arrns to Pakistan, 
Washington t r i e d to give the impression t h a t i t was not 
revocation of embargo decision but i t was to f u l f i l i t s 
47 commitment undertaken long before the war of 1971, With 
a view to appease India , Washington also announced tha t 
India could also purchase "communication equipment" worth 
$ 91 mil l ion and providing $ 87,6 mill ion in econonlc aid. 
The decision to resume arms supplies to Pakistan was taken 
by Washington in i t s o v e r a l l decision to supply arms to 
I ran and o ther countr ies of the Gulf region . President 
Nixon's s tatement tha t the United States was not "giving" 
but " se l l ing arms espec ia l ly in case of Pakistan had 
48 acquired spec i f i c s ign i f i cance . This showed US readiness 
to continue arms supplies to Pakistan, 
During 1973, Pakistan got 7 Martin B-5 7 Canberra 
bombers, 12 Northrop i-S f ighter planes, 6 Lock-head 
46, B,K, Shrivastava, "U.S. Mil i tary Assis tance to 
Pakistani A Reappraisal" , India Quarterly Vol,XXXII, 
No.l , January-March 1976, p, 33, 
47, New York Times, 21 March 1973. 
48, Text of Pres ident Nixon's statem.ent in Vinod Gupta, 
Anderson Papersi A Study of Nixons Blackmail of ^ndia 
(New Delhis 1972), pp. 189-209, 
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F . 1 0 4 f i g h t e r p l a n e s , 4 C e s s n a T-37 t r a i n e r p l a n e s , 300 
K-113 a rmoured p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r s . A c c o r d i n g t o SIPRI 
Yearbooks t h e o r d e r s were p l a c e d b y P a k i s t a n i n O c t o b e r 
1970 and d e l i v e r i e s w e r e made i n 1973 by t h e U n i t e d 
49 S t a t e s , 
Even t h e avowed o b j e c t i v e of B h u t t o ' s v i s i t t o t h e 
U n i t e d s t a t e s i n Sep tember 1973 was t o a c q u i r e l a t e s t 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons f o r P a k i s t a n , Whi le a d d r e s s i n g a 
p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e i n W a s h i n g t o n on 19 S e p t e m b e r 1973, B h u t t o 
50 
p o i n t e d t o h i s c o u n t r y ' s need f o r modern ••red h o t weapons . 
I n t h e b a c k d r o p of B h u t t o ' s p r o c l a i m e d b e l i e f i n s o c i a l i s m 
and h i s p a s t c r i t i c i s m of U n i t e d S t a t e s , B h u t t o ' s assump-
t i o n of power i n 1972 m i g h t h a v e c r e a t e d some m i s g i v i n g s 
i n t h e W a s h i n g t o n . But B h u t t o ' s v i s i t to US i n September 
1973, a s he h i m s e l f s t a t e d , p r o v e d i n s t r u m e n t a l i n " e r a d i -
51 
e a t i n g t h e d i f t e r e n c e s " t h a t e x i s t e d b e t w e e n t h e c o u n t r i e s . 
P r e s i d e n t Nixon assumed s t r o n g US s u p p o r t f o r " P a k i s t a n ' s 
i n d e p e n d e n c e and t e r r i t o r i a l I n t e g r i t y wh ich i s a c o r n e r 
5 2 
s t o n e of Amer ican f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The j o i n t s t a t e m e n t 
I s s u e d a f t e r B h u t t o ' s v i s i t t o Washing ton r e i t e r a t e d 
"warm s u p p o r t f o r t h e p r o c e s s of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n underwciy 
4 9 . SIPRI Year book 1980 (London, 1 9 8 0 ) , p . 154 . 
5 0 . Morning ^ews ( K a r a c h i ) 20 Sep tember 19 7 3 , 
5 1 . B h u t t o ' s s t a t e m e n t q u o t e d t h e Dawn 26 September 
1 9 7 3 . 
5 2. D e p a r t m e n t of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , 15 O c t o b e r 1973, 
P . 4 8 2 . 
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i n Sou th A s i a and f o r t h e r e s o l u t i o n of o t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g 
5 3 i s s u e s t h r o u g h p e a c e f u l means . 
Thus B h u t t o ' s v i s i t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s p roved 
i n s t r u m e n t a l i n p u t t i n g Pak-US r e l a t i o n s on a s n o o t h l e v e l 
d e s p i t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n I s l a m a b a d and Washington 
o v e r arms s u p p l y and d i v e r g e n t a p p r o a c h e s d u r i n g t h e 
19 73 A r a b - I s r a e l i w a r , P a k i s t a n ' s open s u p p o r t to t h e 
Arabs d i d n o t evoke any o v e r t r e s e n t m e n t f rom Washington 
b u t t h e US C o n g r e s s d i d t a k e a s e r i o u s v iew w h i l e d e l i b e -
r a t i n g on t h e p o l i c y t o w a r d s arms s u p p l i e s t o P a k i s t a n . 
As B h u t t o l a t e r r e m a r k e d , "We a r e a l s o t o l d t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s 
p r o - A r a b p o l i c y h a s made t h e S e n a t e s e n s i t i v e to arms 
54 
a s s i s t a n c e t o P a k i s t a n . P a k i s t a n assumed added s i g n i -
f i c a n c e i n US p o l i c y t o w a r d s M i d d l e E a s t i n view of '^rab 
o i l embargo and P a k i s t a n ' s g rowing e n t e n t e w i t h Arab 
c o u n t r i e s e s p e c i a l l y S a u d i A r a b i a . Dur ing h i s v i s i t t o 
P a k i s t a n i n November 19 7 3 , t h e t h e n US S e c r e t a r y of 
S t a t e , Henry K i s s i n g e r r e m a r k e d t h a t P a k i s t a n cou ld p l a y 
an i m p o r t a n t and u s e f u l r o l e i n t h e t a s k on which we a r e 
55 
engaged - s e t t l e m e n t i n t h e Middle E a s t . D e s p i t e t h e 
d i f f e r e n c e of o p i n i o n , b o t h K i s s i n g e r and B h u t t o a g r e e d 
53. For f u l l t e x t see. I b i d , , p, 483. 
54. Bhut to ' s interview to t he New York Times, 8 July, 
1974, reproduced in Pakistan Horizon, No. 3, 
1974, p . 164. 
55. The Pakistan Times (Lahore) 11 November 1973. 
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to unde r t ake in t h e i r "own way, major e f f o r t s towards 
56 l a s t i n g peace in t h e Middle E a s t . 
The o s t e n s i b l e purpose of K i s s i n g e r ' s v i s i t to 
Pak i s tan could not be a s c e r t a i n e d irrimediately and four 
years l a t e r , Bhut to , however, clairried t h a t K i s s i n g e r had 
t r i e d to d i s s u a d e P a k i s t a n from hos t ing t h e I s l a m i c Summit 
mee t ing .^ ' ' "The p r e s s u r e i f any, was r e s i s t e d as evidenced 
from P a k i s t a n ' s cont inued s o l i d a r i t y wi th the Arabs and 
the ho ld ing of t h e I s l a m i c meeting a t Lahore in 19 74, 
I n d i a ' s peacefu l n u c l e a r explos ion i n hay 1974 
became a handy p l a y to p l e a d i t s case fo r s o l i c i t i n g more 
arms from t h e United S t a t e s . Thus Is lamabad impressed 
upon Washington t h e need to revoke t h e arms embargo o t h e r -
wise t h e former would have to cons ide r developing i t s 
own n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y . The US Defence Depar tment ' s f i r s t 
p u b l i c l i s t i n g of i t s t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e c o n t r a c t wi th 
' ' foreign c o u n t r i e s " , as d i s c l o s e d i n Februa ry 19 75, r evea l ed 
t h a t i n 19 74, the Pentagon had c o n t r a c t e d to render a s s i s -
t ance to P a k i s t a n fo r the mod i f i ca t ion of HH-4 3-B bomber 
i n t o HH-4 3-F f i g h t e r p l a n e s f o r $ 47 ,509 .^^ The United 
S t a t e s had developed s u s p i c i o n of P a k i s t a n ' s nuc l ea r 
5 6. J o i n t Cominunique i s s u e d a f t e r K i s s i n g e r ' s v i s i t s ee . 
I b i d , 14 November 1973. 
5 7. B h u t t o ' s speech in t h e Na t iona l Assembly on 28 Apr i l 
19 77, Na t iona l Assembly Debate 26 A p r i l 19 77, 
pp. 119-120. 
58 . Mehrunisa A l l , n. 55 p . 4 0 . 
59 . New York Times, 20 Feb rua ry 19 75. 
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programme and c o n s e q u e n t l y i t a g r e e d t o mee t P a k i s t a n ' s 
r e q u i r e m e n t of c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons p r o v i d e d P a k i s t a n 
was w i l l i n g t o p l a c e i t s a t o m i c r e a c t o r s u n d e r i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l s u p e r v i s i o n t o p r e v e n t t h e s e c r e t p r o d u c t i o n 
of n u c l e a r weapons . I n e a r l y F e b r u a r y i 9 7 5 , I s l a m a b a d 
w h i l e p l a y i n g on W a s h i n g t o n ' s s u c c e p t i b i l i t i e s , o r a rgued 
t h a t embargo was i n e f f e c t "a d i s c r i n i n a t i o n " a g a i n s t a 
s t e a d f a s t a l l y ^ ^ . During h i s v i s i t t o t h e U n i t e d s t a t e s 
i n t h e e a r l y d a y s of F e b r u a r y 1975, B h u t t o p l e a d e d f o r t h e 
62 l i f t i n g of embargo on s u p p l y of arms to P a k i s t a n , The 
US i r r e s i d e n t , G e r a l d F o r d s a i d t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n of l i f t i n g 
t h e ban would r e c e i v e " a c t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n ! ! However 
t h e j o i n t communique i s s u e d a f t e r B h u t t o ' s v i s i t o m i t t e d 
any men t ion i n t h a t r e g a r d e x c e p t r e a f f i r m i n g t h e US 
s u p p o r t f o r P a k i s t a n ' s i n t e g r i t y and i n d e p e n d e n c e . 
I n t h e wake of W a s h i n g t o n ' s a s s e s s m e n t of i t s own 
s t r a t e g i c r e q u i r e m e n t s and P a k i s t a n ' s p o l i c y of p r e s s u r e 
and p e r s u a s i o n , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f i n a l l y a g r e e d t o l i f t 
ban on s a l e s of arms t o P a k i s t a n on 25 F e b r u a r y 1975, 
Announcing t h e d e c i s i o n , t h e U n d e r - S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e 
f o r P u b l i c a f f a i r s , J o s e p h S i s o o , p r o v i d e d t h e r a t i o n a l e 
60 . B.K. S h r i v a s t a v a , n . 4 6 , p , 34, 
6 1 . New York T imes , 6 F e b r u a r y , 19 7 5 . 
6 2 . I b i d . 
6 3 . Morning ^^ews. 6 F e b r u a r y 19 7 5 . 
9F. 
fcir such a s t e p b e c a u s e I n d i a was r e c e i v i n g weapons t ror r 
t h e S o v i e t Union and had i t s own arms i n d u s t r y ^ w h i l e 
P a k i s t a n "an a l l y of t h e US had been d e n i e d t h i s i n a s 
f a r as t h e US i s c o n c e r n e d " R o b e r t A n d e r s o n , a spokesman 
of t h e s t a t e D e p a r t m e n t s a i d t h a t W a s h i n g t o n ' s d e c i s i o n 
t o l i f t t h e embargo i n c a s e of P a k i s t a n aimed a t b r i n g i n g 
65 
t h e US p o l i c y i n c o n s o n a n c e w i t h t h a t of UK and F r a n c e . 
The US d e c i s i o n t o l i f t embargo on arms s u p p l i e s 
to P a k i s t a n t a k e n i n F e b r u a r y 1975 was t h e r e s u l t of c a l -
c u l a t e d s t r a t e g y t o f u r t h e r US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n t h e 
Gulf r e g i o n and Sou th A s i a by b u i l d i n g up P a k i s t a n as a 
r e l i a b l e and d e p e n d e n t a l l y of U n i t e d S t a t e s . The o n l y 
s a c r i f i c e Wash ing ton had t o make was t o p r o v i d e arrrs to 
P a k i s t a n , The p o l i c y makers i n Washington were a l s o 
a p p r e h e n s i v e t h a t i n c a s e US d i d n o t a c c e d e t o P a k i s t a n ' s 
r e q u e s t f o r arms s u p p l i e s , t h e l a t t e r would s e e k o t h e r 
c h a n n e l s b e c a u s e of i t s q u e s t f o r hav ing d e f e n c e p a r i t y 
w i t h I n d i a . T h i s s t a n c e was e v i d e n c e d from t h e t e s t i i r o n y 
of Vice A d m i r a l Bay P o e t , US Mavy D i r e c t o r , Defence S e c u r i t y 
Agency, b e f o r e t h e c o n g r e s s F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Commit tee 
on 18 J u l y 1974» 
64 , New York T imes , 26 F e b r u a r y 19 7 5 . 
6 5 , I b i d . , 28 F e b r a u r y , 19 7 5 , 
9b 
" a s f a r a s P a k i s t a n i s c o n c e r n e d , s h e i s 
g o i n g t o need t o m o d e r n i z e h e r e q u i p m e n t 
and s h e d o e s n o t h a v e many p l a c e s t o t u r n . 
I f t h e U n i t e d s t a t e s i s n o t r e s p o n s i v e , s h e 
w i l l be d r i v e n t o g o i n g t o some p l a c e s e l s e . 
I t h a s been my e x p e r i e n c e i n t h i s programme 
t h a t i f t h e c o u n t r i e s f e e l t h e y need m i l i t a r y 
e q u i p m e n t i n t h e i r own s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s ^ ^ t h e y 
a r e g o i n g t o g e t i t o n e way o r a n o t h e r . 
A c c o r d i n g t o Mehrun i sa A l l , a P a k i s t a n i s c h o l a r , t h e 
d e v e l o p m e n t s i n A f g h a n i s t a n i n t h e wake of J u l y 1973 
l e a d i n g t o t h e i n c r e a s e i n S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e and t r o u b l e s 
i n B a l u c h i s t a n a l s o ( . c o n t r i b u t e d i n US d e c i s i o n t o l i f t 
arms embargo a g a i n s t P a k i s t a n . Accord ing t o a p r e s s 
r e p o r t , t h e Shah of I r a n had a l s o p e r s u a d e d Washington 
58 to r e n d e r arms a s s i s t a n c e t o B h u t t o G o v e r n m e n t , 
The US d e c i s i o n was acclairr ied i n P a k i s t a n Dawn i n 
an e d i t o r i a l e x p r e s s e d t h e view t h a t t h e d e c i s i o n ••marks 
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a r e t u r n to common s e n s e and r e a l i s m , " P a k i s t a n ' s 
P r e s i d e n t , Z.A, B h u t t o , w h i l e welcoming t h e Us move, 
c a l l e d i t a c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s t a b i l i t y and s e c u r i t y of 
70 t h e r e g i o n . With a v iew t o a l l a y I n d i a ' s m i s a p p r e s e n s i o n s , 
t h e US S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t s a i d t h a t t h e U n i t e d s t a t e s would 
e n s u r e t h a t t h e s a l e s of arms t o P a k i s t a n would n o t c o n t r i -
b u t e t o an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of an arrrs r a c e i n t h e s u b -
6 6 . u s House , 9 3 C o n g r e s s , S e c o n d S e s s i o n , Commit tee on 
F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , H e a r i n g s on F i s c a l Year 1975. F o r e i g n 
A s s i s t a n c e R e q u e s t (Wash ing ton D,C. 1 9 7 4 ) , p , 304. 
6 7 . M e h r u n i s h a A l i , n . 55 p , 4 2, 
6 8 . F a r E a s t e r n Economic Review. (Hong Kong) 28 F e b r u a r y 
19 7 5 , p . 24. ^ 
6 9 . "An Anomaly R e c t i f i e d " ( e d i t o r i a l ) . Daw an 26 F e b . 1975 . 
7 0 . I b i d , , 26 F e b r u a r y 19 7 5 . 
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n t i n a n t . ' ^ ^ However s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e Henry K i s s i n g e r ' s 
remarked, -Maintenance of embargo a g a i n s t a f r i e n d l y 
coun t ry w i t h which we have an a l l i e d r e l a t i o n s h i p whi le i t s 
neighbour ( India) was producing and a c q u i r i n g a b i l l i o n 
d o l l a r worth of arms a year was n o r a l l y p o l i t i c a l l y and 
72 
s y m b o l i c a l l y improper . 
on 2 5 t h F e b r a u r y 1975 P r e s i d e n t Ford was asked a t a 
p r e s s Conference in F l o r i d a as to why the Uni ted S t a t e s 
was - s e l l i n g - arms to I s r a e l as we l l as Arabs , to Pak i s t an 
as wel l as to I n d i a . He was f u r t h e r asked whether such 
s a l e s were prompted by t h e s t a t e of American economy or he 
regarded t h e i r as - i m n o r a l * . ' ' ^ p r e s i d e n t Ford c a t e g o r i c a l l y 
denied any l i n k a g e s between the s a l e s of arirs to o t h e r 
c o u n t r i e s and t h e s t a t e of American economy. He f u r t h e r 
added > 
- . . . W e d o n ' t have a p o l i c y of s e l l i n g arms 
to o t h e r n a t i o n s i f t h a t count ry f e e l s t h a t 
i t has an i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y problem and No.2 
i f i t i s necessa ry fo r one o r any o t h e r coun-
t r i e s to mainta in t h e i r n a t i o n a l i n t e g r i t y 
o r s e c u r i t y . We b e l i e v e t h a t in many a r e a s 
of t h e world, a p r o p e r m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e i s 
e s s e n t i a l for i n t e r n a l as wel l as e x t e r n a l 
s e c u r i t y of t h e v a r i o u s c o u n t r i e s . And where 
o t h e r n a t i o n s , such as Sov ie t Union does s e l l 
o r g i v e arms to one count ry o r a n o t h e r , i f any 
71 . New York Titres. 20 February 1975, 
72. The P a k i s t a n Times. 27 February , 19 75 . 
73. New York Times, 27 F e b r u a r y 19 75, 
s 
other country f e e l s that for I t s own s e c u r i t y 
i t needs addi t iona l equipment and has the cash 
then we f e e l tha t i t i s proper to make a s a l e 
from the US to that oountryr74 
I t i s ev ident from the above statement that even without 
naming India and Pakistan, pres ident Ford was j u s t i f y i n g 
the l i f t i n g of arms embargo aga ins t both the countr i e s . 
However the tioteworthy po int in Pres ident Ford's above 
statement was tha t the arms were to be so ld to Pakistan 
and not provided on a grant b a s i s as in the p a s t , 
pres ident Ford's statement a l so r e f l e c t e d a new 
s h i f t in the American p o l i c y of arms transfer to other 
c o u n t r i e s . On 25th February 1975» Senator Gaylord Nelson 
furnished the fo l lowing s t a t i s t i c s in the Senate : 
Table 2.1 
F i s c a l year Mi l i t ary Ass i s tance Foreign Mi l i tary 
( i n $ b i l l i o n ) sc;a les( in $ b i l l i o n ) 
1970 2.9 0 . 9 
1971 3.5 0 .6 
1972 4,0 3 .2 
1973 3.7 3.8 
1974 2.8 8 . 2 
SOURCE t Conaresflional Record (Washington. D. C,) 
Vol, 125, 26 February 1975, p .S . 265 3. 
74. Ibid, Emphasis added. 
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I t i s evident from the above table that the level of 
US military assistance was gradually declining and in 
1974 i t was the lowest during five years while the 
level of foreign mil i tary sales was on increase reach-
ing $ 8,2 b i l l ion in 1974. 
According to senator Nelson the decision of 
l i f t ing ban on arras sa l -s to Pakistan was taken -without 
sufficient congressional consideration". He further 
added that such a decision would obviously "have a 
great impact on the US-Indian re la t ions , India Pakis-
tan relat ions and the s t a b i l i t y of the area". with-
out delving into the debatable question whether the 
l i f t ing of US embargo would r e su l t in an arms race in 
the region, senator Nelson asked "should not the cong-
ress have an opportunity to discuss the policy in th is 
and similar instances". 
The decision to undo the ban on arms sales to 
Pakistan taken by Ford administration fai led to arouse 
any significant opposition within or without the Cong-
ress . The only notable exception appeared to be 
congressman Fortney S. Stark, who in a speech in San 
Francisco c r i t i c i zed Ford administration's policy 
7 5 . Oonqress iona l Recprd (Washington, D.C.) , 
Vol. 125, 26 Februa ry 1975, p . s . 265 3. 
76. I b id . 
UQ 
towards India and accused i t of assuming the r o l e of a 
"merchant of death s e l l i n g guns and playing super power 
gamesT^^ The American press took no ser ious note and only 
78 
a small nuntoer of newspapers commented on the d e c i s i o n . 
The New York Times reported on 2 March 1975 by quoting 
- the informed o f f i c i a l s " as saying t h a t the US arms s a l e s 
to Pakistan "wil l be l imi ted to modest q u a n t i t i e s of defensive 
weapons and the storm in India w i l l below over as that be-
comes c l e a r , ^^ The new US Anbassador-designate to New Delhi, 
William saxbe, who was then in Bangkok enroute to h i s 
new post , sa id on 26 February 1975." At t h i s time American 
people are saying l e t India worry about herse l f we have 
80 
our problems t o o . He further speculated that the American 
dec i s ion to s e l l arms to Pakistan could have been made in 
order to s o l v e economic and energy problems. 
Following t h e l i f t i n g of arms entoargo on the suppl ies 
of US arms to Pakistan, the l a t t e r t r i e d to procure sophl . 
s t i c a t e d weaponry from Washington, According to press reports 
by ear ly 1976, Pakistan showed i n t e r e s t in buying mi l i tary 
hardware worth $ 90 to 100 mi l l ion ,®^ Apart from an arms 
deal for TOW a n t i - t a n k m i s s i l e s worth $ 28 m i l l i o n , Pakistan 
77, Reported in Hindustan Times (New Delhi) , 25 March 1975. 
78, For d e t a i l s s e c . E d i t o r i a l s on F i l e (New York), for , 19 75. 
79 , New York Times. 2 March 19 75, 
80 , Quoted in Indian Express. 27 February 19 75. 
8 1 , The Chris t ian Science Monitor (Bostpn) , 23 June 1976. 
1 C 1 
a l s o sought to procure n o A.7 f i g h t e r p l a n e s . 
T a b l e 2 . 1 
US AR^ JS ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN 
(19 70-19 79) 
82 
No. Item Description Ordered Delivery and 
number 
(A) 
7 
12 
6 
(B) 
840 
200 
350 
AIRCRAFT 
Martin B-5 7 
Canberra 
Northrop F-5 
Lockheefd F-104 
MlgglfcEg 
AIH.9J 
S idewinder 
BGM.71A TOW 
AIM.9P 
Bomber 
F i g h t e r 
F i g h t e r 
AAM 
ATM 
AAM 
(C) M-113 
M-113-AI 
(D) NAVAL VESSELS 
2 •^ Searing*' 
Armoured 
Carrier 
ICV 
CPB 
D e s t r o y e r 
1970 
1970 
1970 
19 76 
1976 
1978 
19 70 
1978 
1977 
1976 
1973 
1973 
1973 
1977»4 20 
19 78»4 20 
1979* 20 
1980»320 
19 73 
19 77* 2 
SOURCE » SIPRI YEAR BOOK 19 7 0 - 1 9 8 0 , 
8 2 . Dawn, 19 May, 19 76 , 
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I t i s ev ident from the above t a b l e that Pakistan 
acquired s t r a t e g i c weapons during the Nixon Administration. 
During 1973 Pakistan g o t 7 Martian B-57 c l a s s Bommbers, 
12 NQrthrop F-5 flgh!ter planes and 6 Lockhead F.104 
f i g h t e r planes.®^ Bes ides , un i ted S ta te s a l so supplied 
300 M-113 type aritoured v e h i c l e s to Pakistan during 1973. 
During 1976, Pakistan ordered for the supply of 840 
AIM-9J m i s s i l e s which were d e l i v e r e d by 1978. Pakistan 
a l s o asked for 200 BGM.71A TOW m i s s i l e s i n 1976. During 
the same year Pakistan placed order with Washington for 
supply of 2 Gearing c l a s s des troyers which i t acquired in 
1977.®^ Islamabad's request for supplying 350 AIM-9P c l a s s 
m i s s i l e s in 19 78 was acceded to by United s t a t e s and during 
85 1979 i t go t 20 and the r e s t in 1980*. 
The above t a b l e shows the arms a s s i s t a n c e rendered 
by uni ted S t a t e s to Pakistan during 1971-1979 per iod . I t 
i s c l ear from the above tab le t h a t the bulk of arms suppl ies 
which Pakistan acquired from the United Sta tes i n 1973 
was the r e s u l t of orders placed i n October 19 70. In 19 76, 
Pakistan ordered for the supply of 840 AIM.9J Sidewinder 
m i s s i l e s . IXjring 19 77, 4 20 were de l ivered to Pakistan and 
8 3 . SIPRI YEAR BOOK 1978 (Stockholmj 1979), p . 272. 
8 4 . I b i d , 
85 . SIPRI YEAR BOOK( Stockholmi 1981) p. 154. 
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the remaining i n 1978. During 19''6, Pakistan a l s o urged 
the United s t a t e s to supply 200 BGH-71A TOW ant i - tank 
m i s s i l e s . During 1976, Pakistan placed orders with the 
US Navy for t h e supply of 2 "Gearing" des troyers which were 
de l ivered in 1977.®^ In 1978, Pakistan ordered for the 
a c q u i s i t i o n of an unspec i f i ed nuoiber of M-113 AI type 
armoured p e r s o n e l l c a r r i e r s and 350 AIM-9P type m i s s i l e s 
which were d e l i v e r e d by 1980. In November 19 76, the US 
Defence Department had recommended the s a l e of A-7 f i gh ter 
a i r c r a f t to Pakistan but the Carter administrat ion cancel led 
i t owing to P a k i s t a n ' s re fusa l to resc ind the nuclear deal 
with France. 
In the event of Jimmy Carter assuming the American 
Presidency i n 1977, "Pakistan loomed f a i r l y small on the 
p o l i c y horixon"of United States .®^ In the br i e f fore ign 
p o l i c y sec t ion i n h i s campaigrj autobiography, Jimmy Carter 
had lumped Pakistan wi th Chi le , Kampuchea and Vietnam 
where "our government's fore ign p o l i c y has not examplified 
88 any commitment to moral pr inc ip l e s? 
PaKLstan's reques t for the a c q u i s i t i o n of 110 A.7 
86 , Morning News^ 13 September 19 77. 
87 , Thomas Percy Thorton, "Between the Stools? United 
S ta te s P o l i c y Towards Pakistan during the Carter 
Administration" Asian Survey (Berkeli^ , Vol.XXII, 
No. 10, October 198 2, p. 959. 
88 , Jimmy Carter, Whv Not the Best (New Yorkj Bantam 
Books, 1976), pp. 140-141. 
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ground attack a i r c r a f t from the United Sta tes was s t i l l 
pending when Carter entered the White House. The Secretary 
of State during Ford Administration, Henry Kiss inger , had 
o f f ered Pakistan the A-7s as an inducement for the l a t t e r 
to abandon i t s nuclear plan.®^ However the Carter Admini-
s t r a t i o n cance l l ed the deal in e a r l y 1977, 
On 19 May 19 77, Carter Administration announced a 
comprehensive p o l i c y on arms t rans fer to i t s m i l i t a r y 
a l l i e s which contained two b a s i c ingredients* 
( i ) The Administration would view" arms transfer as an 
except ional fore ign p o l i c y i inplement . . , that the 
transfer contr ibutes to our nat ional s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t , 
( i i ) I t would " u t i l i z e arms t rans fer to promote our secur i ty 
and the s e c u r i t y of our c l o s e f r i e n d s . But in the 
future the burden of persuasion w i l l be on those who 
favour a p a r t i c u l a r arms s a l e , rather than those who 
oppose i t . 
I t was evident from the above announcement tha t Carter 
Adminis trat ion's p o l i c y of t rans fer of arms to the a l l i e s 
of the United S t a t e s became an i n t e g r a l part and an i n d i s -
pensable Instrument of i t s g l o b a l s t r a t e g y , 
89 , US Congress, Congress and Foreign Po l i cy 1977 
(Washington, D.C. Government Print ing O f f i c e , 
1978) , p , 75. 
90 , Richards K, Bet t s and Joseph Yager (ed.) Non-.Prolif e^ . 
rat ion and US Foreign P o l i c v (Washington D,C,»Brookings 
i n s t i t u t i o n , 1980) p . 87, 
9C 
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However i n case of Pakistan Carter Administrat ion's 
p o l i c y was not governed by the above mentioned c r i t e r i o n . 
According to Thomas Peary Thorton, the us p o l i c y towards 
Pakistan during the Carter Administration years had three 
main aspects i 
i ) There were few countr ies where as many "new* global 
concerns i n t e r s e c t as i n Pakistan and these concerns 
were a t the f o r e during the e a r l i e r Carter years; 
i i ) Pakistan has always been of some s i g n i f i c a n c e in 
terms of o l d e r g loba l i s s u e s re la t ed to US-Soviet 
s ecur i ty concerns and in the l a t t e r part of the 
Administration, these came to the fore ; 
i i i ) There were severa l important regional i s s u e s 
91 impinging on the US-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
Carter Administration did not adopt l i b e r a l a t t i t u d e 
towards Pakistan as f a r as the s u p p l i e s of US weapons 
to t h a t country i s concerned. The major stumbling block 
i n the process was Pakis tan's reported attempts to acquire 
nuclear c a p a b i l i t y . 
I t emerges from the foregoing a n a l y s i s that Pakistan's 
r e l a t i o n s with United States r e g i s t e r e d new s t r i d e s in the 
9 1 . Thomas Peary Thortan, "Between the Stools? Us Pol icy 
towards Pakistan during t h e Carter Administration", 
Asian Survey. Vol,XXII, No, 10 October 1982, pp.961-962. 
11 t 
beginning of 1970s under the Nixon Administration, During 
the Bangladesh c r i s i s and Indo-Pakistan war of 197ly United 
S ta te s rendered iroral, d ip lomat ic , p o l i t i c a l and weapons 
support to Pakis tan , However t h i s pattern underwent . 
a change in 1977 fo l lowing the advent of Carter Administra-
t i o n . In the wake of reports about Pakis tan's i n t e n t i o n s 
to go nuclear. Carter Administration slowed down the flow 
of US arms to Paki - tan . This f a c t o r i s analysed in d e t a i l s 
i n the succeeding f i f t h chapter. However the developments 
i n Afghanistan took dramatic turn during 1979 culminating 
i n the Soviet armed in tervent ion in December 1979 which 
changed the o ld pattern of Pak-US r e l a t i o n s and Pakistan 
acquired added s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e in "safeguarding" the 
US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in South West Asia, 
(B) UNITED STATES AND INDIA 
The advent of Nixon administrat ion in Washington 
did not augur w e l l for Indo-US r e l a t i o n s . The c landes t ine 
flow of American arms to Pakistan desp i t e the arms embargo 
was seen i n India as a "pro-Pakistan t i l t " in President 
Nixon's po l i cy towards South Asia , 
The uninterrupted supply of American arms to Pakistan 
during 19 69-70 caused consternat ion in India , However, 
the US State Department wanted to a l l e y I n d i a ' s f ears by 
Ml 
saying that American arms deal with Pakistan was an 
exception and was intended only to rep lace some of the worn, 
out equipment. The u«s . Ambassador i n India , John Keating, 
a l so asserted that the recent dec i s i on to s e l l - m i l i t a r y 
equipment "mostly unsophis t icated replacement i tems" to 
Pakistan was an except ion i n order that Pakistan i s not 
92 t o t a l l y dependent for i t s arms on Russia and China. 
India protes ted aga ins t US aid to Pakistan on the 
p lea that t h e s e arms would d i s t u r b the peace and s t a b i l i t y 
of the sub-cont inent as "aggressions committed aga ins t 
India^ in the p a s t by Pakistan^ were made p o s s i b l e by the 
93 US arms. 
There was sharp react ion in the Indian media to the 
US move of arming Pakistan to the t e e t h , 
Amrit Bazar Patr ika , published from Calcutta wrote % 
"The supply was stopped to apply a; break 
on the Pakistan war machine, . .what grounds 
does Pres ident Nixon have to hopei that the 
r u l e r s in Islamabad-with t h e i r "str^-ngth restored 
through the generos i ty of China - The S o v i e t 
arms are e s s e n t i a l l y d e f e n s i v e and none-too-
s i g n i f i c a n t i n q u a l i t y and redoubled by 
America's b a s i c a l l y o f f e n s i v e weapons l i k e 
B-57 bombers w i l l not l e a s h another war on 
l n d i a . 9 4 
9 2. Pakistan Observer, 14 October 19 70. 
9 3 . India , Lok Sabha Debates, Vol.XLV, No. l , 9 November 
19 70, Cols . 26-27. 
94 . Amrit Bazar Patrika (Ca lcut ta ) , 10 October 1970. 
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While point ing to the f r i end ly r e l a t i o n s of Pakistan with 
China and S o v i e t ^Jnion, the news paper wanted to know as to 
aga ins t whom the Americans were to be used. I t further 
addedj "It i s d i f f i c u l t to b e l i e v e that the U.S. Government 
does not comprehend the danger tha t i t s dec i s ion to resume 
arms supply to Pakistan poses for India and how i t i s going 
to g i v e a frejih spurt to the arms race in the Indian sub-
cont inent . I t further added t h a t i^resident Nixon's dec i -
s ion to continue aid to Pakistan was inf luenced by the 
f a c t tha t the Indo-China war was drawing to a c l o s e and the 
armament industry needed fresh markets and Pakistan readi ly 
96 provided one. 
On 20 Ju ly 19 71, Senator Edward Kennedy produced 
two documents in a hearing of the senate sub-committee on 
Refugees, which showed that from 1950 to June 19 65, the 
United s t a t e s gave India $ 82,9 mi l l i on in m i l i t a r y aid and 
Pakistan $ 671.6 m i l l i o n . From Ju ly 1965 to June 1970 India 
g o t $ 10.9 m i l l i o n i n aid and Pakistan only $ 0 ,6 mi l l i on . 
Prom July 1970 to June 1971, India g o t $ 10,9 mi l l i on and 
Pakistan $ 0 , 2 m i l l i g n . ^ ^ 
Besides t h e actual a id , both India and Pakistan were 
95 . I b i d . 
96 , I b i d , 
57 , Hindustan Times. 21 April 1972. 
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allowed to buy d i r e c t l y from the manufacturers. These 
f i g u r e s point toward s a l e s trend which i s reverse of the 
aid trends with India buying more than Pakistan before 
19 65 and l e s s afterwards. Before 1965, India purchased 
$ 5 3.4 mi l l ion worth of arms from the US whi le Pakistan 
brought $ 37.2 mi l l i on worth. From 1965 to June 1971, 
however India procured only $ 118 mi l l ion worth of American 
98 
arms while Pakistan bought arms worth $ 601 m i l l i o n . 
In the l a s t year ending f i v e months before the December 
19 71 war, Pakistan brought $ 16.7 mi l l i on worth of 
American arms whi le India made purchases worth $ 1.1 
99 m i l l i o n . 
As pointed out in part *A'of t h i s chapter, the develop-
ments in East Pakistan had taken ser ious turn by March 
1971 and the use of armed forces by Pakis tan's Pres ident 
Yahya Khan had r e s u l t e d in large s c a l e appres i ion . The 
U.S. Ambassadors in New Delhi , Kenneth B. Keating was 
"burning the wires" , with h i s d e t a i l e d reports to the Us 
Department of S ta te on the tragedy i n East Pakistan. 
A few senators l i k e Edward Kennedy and Fred R, Harris , 
condemned on the f l o o r of the Senate the "genocide •• 
98 . I b i d . 
9 9 . I b i d . 
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perpetrated by the Pakistan army in East Pakistan and 
urged the Nixon adndnistration to express "concern* over 
the happenings there.^°° However on 2 April 19 71, the 
US State Department released a press statement in which 
it expr-essed its concern at the reported loss of life, 
damage and hardship suffered by the people of Pakistan. 
With a view to prop up Yahya regime, in Pakistan, 
United States continued its supplies of arms, knowing 
the fact that American weapon were being used against the 
10 2 
people of East Bengal, In view of the i n f l u x of refu-
gees from Bangladesh into India in large s c a l e and d e t e r i o -
rat ing s e c u r i t y scenario in the region Mrs, Indira Gandhi, 
Prime Minister of India airdashed to Washington to appraise 
Pres ident Mixon and the American publ ic on two ma jor i s sues , 
the v i o l a t i o n of human r i g h t , and the use of American arms 
10 3 
aga ins t the people of Bangladesh, However, Mrs. Gandhi's 
v i s i t to Washington f a i l e d in moving Kixon administrat ion 
to change i t s pro-Pak s tanco . Consequently the Indian Prime 
Minister informed the nat ional Press cluij^ in Mew Yorki 
"Will the World (White House) be concerned o n l y i f people 
d i e because of war between two countr ies and not i f hundreds 
100, New York Times. 31 March 19 71. 
101. New York Times. 3 April 197l , 
10 2. The Hindu (Madras) 26 March 1971, 
10 3. D i l i p Mohite, India and US s i n c e 1970s, Partners 
or Adversaries* in P,M, Kamath(ed) Indo-US Relat ions 
Dvnarrics of Change (New Delhi , Sotith Asian Publ ishers , 
1987, p. 63) , 
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of thousands are butchered and expe l l ed by a m i l i t a r y 
regime waging war aga ins t the people? Who i s more important 
104 to them, one man and h i s machine or a whole nations 
Cbmmenting on Mrs, Gandhi's US v i s i t , the I n d i a ' s external 
Af fa irs Ministry in i t s annual repor t for 1971-72 observed. 
Every strategem of e f f o r t and persuat ion was t r i e d by 
India to make the US administrat ion respond with some human 
f e e l i n g to the epochal carnage in East B e n g a l , , . , ye t these 
words seemed to have no meaning for t h e m . . . . 
The American gunboat diplomacy during the Indo-Pak War of 
December 1971 when the US had ordered i t s seventh F l e e t to 
move in to Bay of Bengal, was c r i t i c i s e d by the Government 
of India and s e v e r a l Members of Indian Parliament c a l l e d 
upon the Indian Government not to be cowed down by the 
reported American threa t . 
The Tangible outcome of the war with the emergence 
of Bangladesh as a sovereign independent country served 
a s e r i o u s blow .to US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in South Asia, 
India emerged as a dominant power in the sub-cont inent under 
the changed g e o p o l i t i c a l s cenar io , Nixon administrat ion 
was now convinced that India was bound to p lay a pre-
104, New York T i n e s . 5 November 1971, 
105, Government of India , Ministry of External Af fa i r s , 
Annual Report for 1971-72 (New Delhi , 197i) , p, 73. 
106, India , Lok Sabha Debates. Vol, X, No, 23, 19 
December 19 71, Cols , 13-17, 
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eminent r o l e in South Asia. Accordingly Pres ident Nixon 
in h i s fore ign p o l i c y report to the congress in February 
1972# referred to India as the s t r o n g e s t power of South 
Asia . ^^  He pointed outs We are prepared now for a ser ious 
dialogue with India on the future of our r e l a t i o n s . This 
w i l l depend not on an i d e n t i t y of p o l i c i e s , but on respect 
for each o t h e r ' s views and concerns. This should go both 
ways. "In another report . Pres ident Nixon stated* The 
United States r e s p e c t s India as a major <. power. We are 
prepared to t r e a t India in accordance with i t s new s tature 
10 9 
and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s on the b a s i s of r e c i p r o c i t y . 
In the post .Bangladesh c r i s i s period, Washington 
t r i e d to normalize r e l a t i o n s with India , In February 1973, 
Daniel P, Mognihan was appointed US Ainbassador to India 
and he played an important r o l e in creat ing an atrrosphere 
of goodwil l and b e t t e r understanding between the two 
c o u n t r i e s , . On a strong recommendation of Ambassador 
Mognihan, the American governrrient wrote of f accumulated 
sum of Rs, 16,640 mi l l i on i t was holding in India in l o c a l 
currency under PL-480 dea l s .^^ 
During the l a s t week of October 1974, the US Secretary 
10 7. Nixon, n. 4 3 pp. 48-51 . 
10 8 . I b i d . 
109. Pres ident ' s report to the Congress. 3 May 1973, p. 79 2. 
110. B,M. j a i n . South Asia, India and US (Jaipur t 1987), 
p . 107. 
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of s t a t e , Henry Kiss inger v i s i t e d Ind ia . In h i s we l l 
published address to the Indian counc i l of world Affairs in 
New Delhi on 28 <(2)ctober 1974, the US Secretary of State 
agreed that there was l i t t l e to be gained from an attempt 
to redress the natural mi l i tary dominance of India over 
Pakistan by supplying Pakistan with m i l i t a r y equipment. 
S t re s s ing t h e need for c l o s e cooperat ion and c o r r e c t under-
standing between the two countr i e s , Henry Kiss inger sa id; 
"We can now bui ld our r e l a t i o n s h i p f r e e of pas t d i s t o r t i o n 
112 
and conscious of the i n t e r e s t s and values we share . 
The v i s i t of U.S. s e c r e t a r y of State was ava i led 
to s e t up an Indo-US j o i n t commission for s c i e n t i f i c , cu l tu -
r a l and economic-cooperation. An agreement to t h i s e f f e c t 
113 
was signed in New Delhi on 28 October 1974.-^^ J o i n t 
Communique i s sued in New Delhi on 29 October 1974 noted 
agreement between New Delhi and Washington t h a t peace and 
harmony would be in the i n t e r e s t of a l l the countr ies of 
114 the reg ion . 
The advent of Carter adminis trat ion i n 1977 had ra i sed 
some hopes both in Washington as we l l as in New Delhi 
for envisaging a period of e n t e n t e - c p r d i a l e in India US 
111.US Embassy, Press Release . 28 October 1974. 
112. I b i d . 
113. Titres of Ind ia , 29 October 19 74. 
114. Hindustan Times, 30 ^ctober 19 74. 
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r e l a t i o n s . During the p r e s i d e n t i a l compaign of Jimmy Carter, 
the Denocratic platform contained a subs tant ia l s ec t i on 
on South Asia with the fo l lowing major points t 
India has now achieved a cons iderable degree 
of hegemony over the sub-cont inent , , , f u t u r e 
American p o l i c y should accept t h i s f a c t . The 
United s t a t e s has every reason to hope that 
India i s s u c c e s s f u l i n i t s s t rugg le for 
economic improvement and p o l i t i c a l u n i t y , 
Our i n t e r e s t s , indeed, w i l l not be served by 
the weakening or d i s i n t e g r a t i n g of any of the 
major South Asian S t a t e s , , . In General, the 
US should pursue a low-posture p o l i c y in south 
Asia, We should p a r t i c i p a t e as a mediator in 
l oca l d i s p u t e s on ly when a l l p a r t i e s are agreed 
on the u s e f u l n e s s of our presence and we our-
s e l v e s see some p o s s i b i l i t y of p o s i t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e , 1 1 5 
Carter 's v i c t o r y in the American Pres ident ia l e l e c t i o n 
in November 1976 was greeted with apprehension in Pakistan 
and expectat ion i n India.^^ Paki s tan ' s apprehensions were 
accentuated by some of Carter's statements during the 
campaign, e s p e c i a l l y h i s open oppos i t i on to the proposed 
s a l e of 110 A-7 f i g h t e r bombers to Pakistan and h i s 
pledge to do what he could to persuade France not to go 
ahead with i t s announced deal to provide Pakistan with a 
117 
nuclear reprocess ing p l a n t , * 
115, Quoted in TKhes of India . 21 J u l y 1976, 
116, Norman D,Palmer, "The Carter Administration and 
South Asia", in Lawrence Zlr ing , The Subcontinent in 
in World i^o l l t l c s (New Yorkj Praeger, 1978), p, 200. 
117, William Borders, "Pakistan wonders whether t i e s to 
US w i l l erode under Carter". New York 26 December 1976. 
115 
The year 1977 was s i g n i f i c a n t because i t witnessed 
emergence of Janta Party ' s ru le i n New Delhi with Morarjl 
Desai as Prime Minister of India and Carter as US President, 
By J u l y 1977 i t was reported t h a t Prime Minister Desai 
and Presi- i^resident Carter had entered in to an extens ive 
p r i v a t e correspondence, in which they exchanged views 
on a v a r i e t y of matters of s p e c i a l concern to t h e i r two 
118 
c o u n t r i e s . 
Many Indian leaders v i s i t e d United s t a t e s in 1977 
on good w i l l miss ion . The US-India j o i n t Commission which 
had been qu i t e i n a c t i v e during 1975-76, was g iven a new 
impetus. In May 1977, the sub-commission on Education and 
119 
cu l ture met i n New Delhi , During a v i s i t to New Delhi 
in J u l y 19 77, Warren M, Christopher, US under s e c r e t a r y 
of s t a t e sa id t h a t the United S t a t e s had decided "to look 
1 20 to India as the leader of South Asia . The exchange of 
v i s i t s a t h i g h e s t l e v e l took p lace in the beginning of 
^January 1978 when President Carter v i s i t e d India from 1 to 
3 January 1978 and Prime Minister Desai v i s i t e d Washington 
in J u l y 1978, The v i s i t s were marked by goodwil l and 
warmth but main i r r i t a n t about the American supply of 
nuclear fue l to Tarapur atomic p lant remained unresolved, 
118. M.V.Kamath, "Indo-US Accord, Times of India , 6 July 
1976. 
119. Palmer, n, H 6 , p, 202. 
120. Cited in Shahram Chubin, "The p lace of India in US 
Foreign Po l i cy" in Timothy George e t , a l . (eds . ) 
India and the Great Powers (Londonj Gower, 1984) , 
p. 161. 
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This aspect i s analysed in d e t a i l i n the th ird chapter. 
Following the Soviet invas ion of Afghanistan in 
Decernber 1979# Pakistan again became the f o c a l po int of 
US Strategy in South Asia. 
Thus i t emerges from the above ana lys i s t h a t US 
s t ra tegy in terms of p o l i t i c a l , economic and m i l i t a r y , 
remained s t e a d f a s t l y committed to Pakistan as the bulwork 
of serving US i n t e r e s t s in the reg ion . Though US maintained 
r e l a t i o n s with India but a t a very low key, Nixon adminis-
t r a t i o n p o l i c y towards South Asia had pre-eminent pro-
Pakistan t i l t . However, the Carter administrat ion had raised 
some hopes of res tor ing balanced approach but such hopes 
remained u n f u l f i l l e d . The Afghanistan c r i s i s again revived 
Pakis tan ' s pre eminence in US s t r a t e g y towards South Asia. 
* * * * * * * 
CHAPTER - I I I 
THE US APPROACH TO ARKiS PROLIFERATIONS AND NUCLEARIZATION 
IN SOUTH ASIA« 
U n i n t e r r u p t e d supply of s o p h i s t i c a t e d American arms 
t o P a k i s t a n dur ing t h e p e r i o d under rev i ew had c r e a t e d a 
s t r a t e g i c imbalance i n the I n d i a n s u b c o n t i n e n t . The United 
S t a t e s w h i l e f o r m u l a t i n g i t s p o l i c y of arms s u p p l i e s 
towards South A s i a had • •pro-Pakis tan t i l t * and I n d i a was 
d e n i e d equal s h a r e . Thus, i n o r d e r t o mainta in s t r a t e g i c 
p a r i t y w i t h P a k i s t a n , I n d i a s o u g h t arms a s s i s t a n c e fronr, 
S o v i e t Union, F r a n c e and e l s e w h e r e to meet i t s d e f e n c e 
r e q u i r e m e n t s . T h i s t rend had e n v i s a g e d p r o l i f e r a t i o n of 
arms i n t h e s u b c o n t i n e n t , P a k i s t a n has a l s o sought arms 
procurement from P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c o f China, In t h e p r e -
c e d i n g second c h a p t e r , P a k i s t a n ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of arms fron 
t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s has been a n a l y s e d . Hence i n t h e p r e s e n t 
c h a p t e r , I n d i a ' s procurement o f arms from S o v i e t Union, 
France e t c . and C h i n a ' s arms a s s i s t a n c e t o P a k i s t a n and 
US a t t i t u d e t o t h i s arms r a c e i n the s u b - c o n t i n e n t w i l l 
be a n a l y s e d . T h e r e a f t e r u s appraoch to t h e problem of 
n u c l e a r i z a t i o n i n South As ia w i l l be d e a l t w i t h . 
SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDIA » 
By the t ime Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n was i n s t a l l e d In the 
White House and i t s "pro-Pak i s tan t i l t * had become known. 
1 1 8 
the r e l a t i o n s between India and Sov ie t Union had becotne fe 
f r i e n d l y and c o r d i a l . M08C»w had emerged as the s i n g l e 
l a r g e s t source for supplying s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons to India. 
The growing sino-US rapproachment, induct ion of sophis t i ca ted 
US arms into Pakistan and growing Sino-Pak entente cordia le 
during 1970-71, were the major developinents which portended 
ser ious impl i ca t ions for the Sov ie t Union on the one hand 
and the emergence of US-Pakistan-China ax i s as a matter of 
grave concern for Ind ia . The growing c i v i l unres t in e a s t 
Pakistan portended ser ious g e o p o l i t i c a l impl i ca t ions for 
Ind ia , And the Chinese open support for Pakistan as well as 
United States uninterrupted supply of arms to Pakistan 
were the developments s e r i o u s l y viewed by Hew Delh i . 
In the e v e n t u a l i t y of a war with Pakistan, India could 
meet the t h r e a t s emanating from any US or Chinese i n t e r -
vent ions only wi th the tang ib le support of the Soviet Union. 
Consequently a f t e r prel iminary n e g o t i a t i o n s , India and 
Soviet union s igned a t r e a t y of peace, f r i endsh ip and 
cooperation on 9 August 1971. Both in i t s substance and 
t iming, the t r e a t y was viewed by New Delhi and Moscow as 
serving t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e fore ign p o l i c y o b j e c t i v e s . For the 
Soviet Union, i t appeared to l e g i t i m i s e further the Soviet 
1. For f u l l t e x t of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship and cooperation, s e e Survival (London) , Vol. 
XIII, No. 10, October 1971, pp. 351-353. 
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s e c u r i t y ro l e in South Asia a t low p o l i t i c a l c o s t . And 
from the Indian s e c u r i t y p e r s p e c t i v e , the Treaty provided 
a checkmate on what was held to be the nascent p o l i t i c a l 
a x i s between Washington, Beij ing and Islamabad. The 
c o n s u l t a t i v e mechanisms de l ineated in A r t i c l e IX of the 
Treaty were not viewed as an impediment to I n d i a ' s un i la -
t e r a l m i l i t a r y opt ion against Pakistan, 
There was no immediate sharp or adverse reac t ion 
by the United S t a t e s towards Indo-Sovie t t r e a t y . The US 
Secretary of S t a t e , William Rogers said in the-New York 6n 
10 August/ 1971 that i t was hoped that Treaty would help 
avoid war between India and Pakis tan. The o f f i c i a l s of 
the S ta te Department sa id that the statement of Secretary 
Rogers did not "const i tuted an endorsement of the Treaty. 
However i t was f e l t in India that t h e Treaty* symbolises a 
s e r i o u s diplomatic de feat for the United S ta tes* in South 
Asia, 
The then Indian Ambassador t o Washington, L.K. Jha 
during his-, meeting with US Secretary of State on 12 
August 1971 assured t h a t "the Treaty contains nothing in 
l e t t e r or s p i r i t which may adverse ly a f f e c t i t s r e l a t i o n s 
2. Hindustan Times. 11 August 19 71. 
3 . Hindustan Standard (Calcutta) , 11 August 19 71, 
4 . A.G, Noorani in Sunday Standard (New Delhi) 
22 Ai:^ust 1971, 
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with Arnerica,^ The State Department o f f i c i a l s i n Wasing. 
ton f e e l tha t conclus ion of the treaty* a t t h i s p a r t i -
cular juncture was a somewhat panicky reac t ions to s igns 
of an impending Sino.US thaw and Pakis tan ' s aggress ive 
posture over Bangaldeshl' 
I t was reported in fanous news weekly time : 
The Sovie t - Indian fr iendsh ip t r e a t y 
caught the Nixon administrat ion f l a t f oo ted . 
Indian o f f i c i a l s i n New Delhi and Washington 
hastened to assure American p o l i c y makers 
that t h e document was i n no way d irected 
against the United S t a t e s , But there was no 
d isguishing that Washington was wounded 
and that the wound was l a r g e l y s e l f i n f l i c -
ted. In i t s overriding pre-ocpupation with 
I n d i a ' s two g r e a t e s t enemies, Pakistan and 
China, the United S ta te s simply l e f t New Delhi 
nowhere to go but Moscow. 7 
The Treaty stood in I n d i a ' s good stead during the 
Indo-Pak War. Though United S ta te s t r i e d to bui ld psycho-
l o g i c a l pressure on India by moving i t s Seventh F l e e t in 
Bay of Bengal and China expressed verbal support for 
Pakistan, but ne i ther wanted to i n v o l v e in the c o n f l i c t . 
In the aftermath of Indo-Pak War, I n d i a ' s defence 
requirements had augmented. The U.S. embargo on s a l e s of 
5. Hindustan Tiroes. 13 August, 1971, 
6. I b i d . , 19 August 1971, 
7. Time (New York), 23 August 1971. 
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arms to India and Pakistan but continued c l a n d e s t i n e 
suppl i e s of weapons to Islamabad d e s p i t e I n d i a ' s repeated 
p r o t e s t s , had enhanced I n d i a ' s concern for acquiring 
v#eapons to have n d l i t a r y p a r i t y with i t s Iroiredlate adver. 
sary . India had not on ly to recoup i t s defence l o s s e s 
suffered during the war but match Pakis tan's growing 
m i l i t a r y arsena l . Thus "a sharpened sense of reg ional 
s e c u r i t y led to a greav.er w i l l i n g n e s s to a l l o c a t e funds 
for that purpose", 
I n d i a ' s ques t for s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms to match 
American arms acquired by Pakistan was met by Sov ie t 
Union. During the^^^cow v i s i t of Indian Defence Minis-
t e r , j ag j ivan Ram in J u l y 1972# Sov ie t Union agreed to 
q 
provide one "petya c l a s s f r i g a t e , I n d i a ' s Defence 
Minister in h i s t a l k s with the Sov ie t l eaders , a l so 
d i scussed the ques t ion of Pakistan g e t t i n g arms from 
Washington and China and i t s adverse Impact on I n d i a ' s 
s e c u r i t y . 
In 1970, India acquired one F! c l a s s submarine frorr. 
Sov ie t union, the orders for which had been placed in 
1965, During 1970-71, Moscow a l so provided *K)sa'* c l a s s 
torpedoboat to Ind ia , During t h i s period India a lso 
8 , S u r j l t Man Singh, p. 162. 
9 . The M i l i t a r y Balance 1974-75 (London j IISS, 1974) 
p . 81 , 
10, Statesmans (New Delhi) 23 J u l y 1973. 
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acquired unspec i f i ed number of SA-2 type m i s s i l e s . By 
1971, India had acquired 50 SU-7 Sukhov f i g h t e r planes 
from the Soviet Union. The arms a c q u i s i t i o n by India from 
Sov ie t Union during the decade of 1970s i s shown in 
the t a b l e below : 
Table 3.1 
Soviet Arms Ass i s tant to India 1970-1979 
No. 
(A) 
50 
5 
150 
100 
-
-
(B) 
-
^^ 
I tem 
AIRCRAFT 
Sukhov 
SU-7 
Ka-25 
Hormone 
MIG-21 B i s 
MIG-21M 
MIG-8-HIP 
MIG-25R 
MISSILES 
SA-2 
G u i d e l i n e 
SS-N-9 
D e s c r i p t i o n 
F i g h t e r / 
Bomber 
H e l i c o p t e r 
F i g h t e r 
F i g h t e r 
H e l i c o p t e r 
Recce 
SA 
M i s s i l e 
Sh-Sh-M 
o r d e r 
September 
1969 
1976 
1972 
1972 
1979 
1979 
MB 
1975 
D e l i v e r y 
and Number 
1971 
19 78 
1973j5 
1974»10 
19751 20 
1977x12 
1978: 12 
1976, 20 
19 77» 20 
1978»15 
19 79 » 10 
1970 
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SS-N-2 Sh-Sh-M 1975 
Styx 
600 
92 
84 
144 
(C) 
150 
-
70 
(D) 
1 
1 
6 
7 
8 
-
4 
K-13A 
A t o l l 
SSN-11 
SSN-2 
SSN.9 
AAM 
Sh-Sh-M 
Sh-Sh-H 
Sh-Sh-W 
ARMDURED VEHICLES 
p r - 7 6 
BMP-76 
T-72 
NAVAL VESSELS 
Submarine 
F C l a s s 
F r i g a t e "Pet ya 
C l a s s 
Torpedo Boat 
"Osa" c l a s s 
I l l y u s h l n I I -
"May" 
Nanutenka 
C l a s s 
Osa c l a s s 
"F-CI ass'* 
An\phlblous 
Tanks 
APC 
MBT 
M 
38 Maritime 
Recce/bomber 
F a s t M i s s i l e 
boat 
M i s s i l e Boat 
Submarine 
1972 
19 76 
1976 
1974 
-
1975 
1978 
1965 
1968 
-
1975 
1975 
1975 
s 
1973i30 
1974x60 
1975t 120 
I9 7 6 j l 2 0 
1977»120 
I978 j90 
1979*60 
1978 
1976»24 
1977j24 
l'^77»54 
1971 
-
1979 
1970 
1971 
1970 
1977 
1 9 7 5 j l 
19781 1 
1979*1 
1973*75 
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1 Polnocny 
C l a s s 
2 "Kashin" 
8 "Osa 65" 
-Krivak" 
SOURCE t §IPRI N ^ 
Landlngsh ip 
ASW D e s t r o y e r 
M i s s i l e 
P a t r o l boat 
F r i g a t e 
"• 
1976 
1975 
1979 
York, 1 9 7 0 - 1 9 8 0 . 
1975 
1978 
19771 2 
The above t a b l e shows t h a t Soviet union provided sophi-
s t i c a t e d arms s u p p l i e s t o India during 1970s. In 1972, 
India has asked for 150 MIG-21 Bis and lOO MIG-21M 
f i g h t e r p lanes . In 1973, Moscow supplied 5 MIG-.21 
Bis planes and by 1978 India had acquired 59 such 
p l a n e s . Sov ie t union allowed the l incensed production 
of MIG-21M f i g h t e r planes in India a t Hindustan Aero-
naut ics Ltd. a t Nasik (Bombay) . By 1979, India had 
acquired 55 MIG-.21M f i g h t e r planes from Moscow, 
IXiring 1972, Moscow agreed t o provide 600 K-13A 
c l a s s Ato l l m i s s i l e s to India . By 1979, India had 
acquired a l l t h e s e m i s s i l e s . In 1976, Soviet union 
agreed to supply SSH--11, SSN-2 and SSN-9 type of miss-
i l e s . PT-76 and T-72 type of tanks were a l so provided 
to India . In 1973, India got seven IL 11-38 bomber 
p lanes for maritime reconnaiscance. Between 1973-75, 
India acquired 4-F c l a s s sub-marines, one polnocny 
c l a s s landing sh ip from Soviet union. Between 1976-79 
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India signed agreements with Soviet union for the supply 
of two "Kashin" ASW destroyers, 8 "OSA-es* type missile 
patrol boats, Krivak Frigate, etc. 
Besides, during 1970s, India also acquired arms 
France and U.K. as shown in the tables below » 
Table 3.2 
India's Acquisition of Weapons from France 
1970-79 
No. Item Description No. of year of No. pro-
Licence produc- duced 
tion 
140 SA-315B Helicopter 197 2 
Lama 
SA-316B Helicopter 1977 
Chetak 
3000 SS-11 ATM 1970 
Missiles 
1973 6 
onwar- 40 Assembled 
ds in 1974 
1972 250 each 
year 
SOURCE » SIPRI Year Book 1980 (London 1980), p. 170. 
France provided SA_315B lama type and SA-316B Chetak 
type helicopters to India with a licence to produce 
the same in the country, in 1970, India and France 
signed an agreement for s s - l l type antitank missiles 
and India started i t s licensed production in 1972. 
12b 
Table 3.3 
I n d i a ' s Acquisi t ion of Weapons from U.K. 
1970-1979 
No. Item Descript ion No, of Year of No. pro-
Licence produc- duced 
t ion 
Gnat A-2 
A j e e t 
80 Gnat -2 
Aj eiet 
20 H,S,T48M 
110 j a g u a r 
T r a i n e r 
F i g h t e r 
T r a n s p o r t 
F i g h t e r 
SOURCE 1 ^IPRY YEAR BOOK 1980 
1978 
197 3 
1972 
1979 
(London % 
1976 
19 75-79 Two each 
year 
1980) , p . 1 7 0 . 
During 1970-79, India also acquired weapons from united 
Kingdom as sbown in t a b l e 3,3 above. In 1978, an agree-
ment was signed between U.K, and India under which the 
former provided some Gnat.A2 type t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t to 
Ind ia to t r a i n the p i l o t s of Indian Air Force, In 1973, 
under an agrement U.K. had agreed t o provide 80 Gnat-2 
type f igh te r planes to India and in 1973 India had 
s t a r t e d i t s production within the country under l i cence . 
I t was named as "Ajeef , The United Kingdom also agreed 
to provide 20 HS-T48M type t r anspor t planes to India in 
19 72 and by 1979 India had received 10 such planes . 
Ind ia and U.K. signed an agreement on 6 October 1979 
for t h e supply of iiO jaguar f i gh t e r bombers, of t h i s 
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t h e U.K. had d e l i v e r e d 40 a i r c r a f t i n 1979 and I n d i a 
was t o s t a r t t h e i r l i c e n c e d p r o d u c t i o n from 1981. 
ARMS ACQUISITION BY PAKISTAN j 
u n i t e d S t a t e s had been t h e s i n g l e l a r g e s t arms 
s u p p l i e r t o P a k i s t a n s i n c e e a r l y 1 9 5 0 s , However i n t h e 
wake o f outbreak o f S i n o - l n d i a n h o s t i l i t i e s i n 1962, 
when U.K. and u n i t e d S t a t e s s u p p l i e d aritiament t o I n d i a , 
P a k i s t a n e x p r e s s e d i t s d i s a p p r o v a l and took s t e p s to 
n o r m a l i s e i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h China. Again i n t h e a f t e r -
math o f Indo-Fak war of 1965, when u n i t e d S t a t e s iiT>posed 
embargo on s a l e s o f arms to I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , t h e 
l e a d e r s h i p i n I s lamabad looked towards Moscow and 
B e i j i n g f o r arms s u p p l i e s . S o v i e t un ion made l i m i t e d 
s u p p l i e s t o P a k i s t a n w h i l e China emerged as t h e second 
l a r g e s t s u p p l i e r a f t e r USA, of arms t o P a k i s t a n , 
ARMS ASSISTANCES FROM SOVIET UNION i 
In t h e a f t e r m a t h o f Tashkent agreement f a c i l i -
t a t e d under t h e a u s p i c o u s of S o v i e t u n i o n , both I n d i a 
and P a k i s t a n had a g r e e d t o s o l v e t h e i r problenas ami-
c a b l y and i t had h e l p e d In c r e a t i n g S o v i e t g o o d w i l l 
i n P a k i s t a n . Moscow s e i z e d t h i s o p p o r t u n i t y to c u l t i v a t e 
P a k i s t a n and t r i e s t o wean i t away from American and 
1 1 . SIPRI YEAR BOOK 1980 (London , 1 9 8 0 ) , p . 170, 
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Chinese f o l d . However, in 1968, when Sov i e t Union agreed 
t o s u p p l y SU-7 f i g h t e r bombers t o I n d i a , Pak i s t an r a i s e d 
a hue and c r y over t h e dea l . 
Consequent ly when in Apr i l 1968, t h e Sovie t 
p remie r , Kosygin v i s i t e d Pak i s t an and f i r s t ever v i s i t 
by a Sov ie t head of t h e government he was g r e e t e d w i th 
s l o g a n s l i k e - ^ i v e us t a n k s , not t r a c t o r s " . ^ ^ While 
K o s ^ i n o f f e r e d l i b e r a l economic a id t o Pak i s t an e s p e c i -
a l l y f o r s e t t i n g up a s t e e l m i l l w i th a view t o s i d e t r a c k 
P a k i s t a n ' s demand f o r Sovie t arms, but P a k i s t a n i l e a d e r -
s h i p i n s i s t e d on p rocur ing Sovie t arms. Consequent ly 
Moscow was compelled t o o b l i g e Is lamabad by supp ly a very 
l i n i i t e d q u a n t i t y of arms. The Sov ie t m i l i t a r y a id to 
P a k i s t a n anounted t o $ 5 m i l l i o n to $ 10 m i l l i o n o n l y 
13 
a g a i n s t $ 600-700 m i l l i o n to I n d i a . 
p r e s i d e n t yahya Khan's v i s i t t o hJoscow in June 
19 70 d i d no t b r ing s u c c e s s t o P a k i s t a n , s ea r ch f o r Sovie t 
ariT«5. i n s t e a d , t h e Sov ie t union agreed t o i n c r e a s e i t s 
a s s i s t a n c e f o r a s t e e l p l a n t . In subsequen t y e a r s , Moscow 
d i d not o b l i g e Is lamabad by g iv ing arms a i d . 
ARMS FROM CHINA t 
In t h e a f t e rma th of S ino - Ind ian h o s t i l i t i e s i n 
12. Devendra Kaushik, "Sovie t u n i o n ' s Pak i s t an P o l i c y " 
i n su rendra Chopra (ed.) P e r s p e c t i v e s on P a k i s t a n ' s 
F o r e i g n P o l i c v (Amri t sar 1983) , p . 259, 
13 , Wyufred Joshua and Stephen P. G i l b e r t , Armp fyr t h e 
T h i r d World i Sov ie t M i l i t a r y and Diplomacy (London 
1969) p . 10 2. 
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October 196 2, r e l a t i o n s between Islamabad and Beijing 
s t a r t e d iirproving. By signing a border agreement with 
China on 2 Karch 196 3, Pakistan succeeded in removing 
an " i r r i t a n t " from the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s ^ ^ and s t r e n -
gthened i t s pos i t ion agains t Ind ia . The US embargo, on 
suppl ies of arms to both India and Pakistan, which imposed 
in the wake of Indo-Pak war of 1965, prompted Pakistan 
to seek arms a s s i s t a n c e from China, 
China also p o s i t i v e l y responded to Pakis tani 
ges tu res and expressed i t s readiness to meet Islamabad's 
defence requirements. By May 1966, China had supplied to 
Pakistan large number of tanks , 40 to 60 Klg-19 f i gh t e r 
bombers and ten Id-28 bombers. ^^ According to another 
es t imate by January 1968, China had supplied to Pakistan 
30 Mig-I7s and 60 Mig-I9s. An equal number of planes of 
undisclosed kind were to be del ivered by t h e end of 
1968. Besides, 7000 assau l t guns and about f i v e hundred 
60 mrri mortars were also supplied to Pakis tan. 
Between 1970 and 1979, China supplied f igh te r 
a i r c ra f t and tanks to Pakistan as shown in Table 3.4. 
14. The Dawn (Karachi) 3 March 1963. 
15. s .B. Guha, "Pak i s tan ' s Air Power••, The jpt^rnal of 
t h e I n s t i t u t e of Defence s tud ies and Anaj,v8e^ 
JNew Delhi) , vo l . 2, 1969, pp. 129-130. 
16. p .L. Bhola, Pakistan-China Rela t ions ( ja ipur 1986) 
P. 165. 
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T a b l e 3 .4 
C h i n a ' s Arms A s s i s t a n c e to P a k i s t a n 1970-1979 
No. I t em 
(A) AIRCRAFT 
Mig-19 
60 F-.6 Shenyang 
65 F-6 B i s 
(B) ARhiOURED VEHICLES 
100 T-59 
110 T - 5 4 / 5 5 
T-59 
(C) NAVAL VESSELS 
2-3 "W C l a s s 
9 Gunboat 
Description order Delivery 
Numbers 
Fighter 
F i g h t e r 1976 
F i g h t e r 1979 
Tank 
Tank 
MEfT 1975 
Submarine 1970 
1971 
1976t 30 
1977» 30 
19B0j40 
1981» 25 
1970 
1971 
50 per year 
1971 
SOURCE J SIPRI YEAR BOOK t 1970-1980 
During t h e ind o -Pak war o f December I 9 7 i , P a k i s t a n 
s u f f e r e d heavy l o s s e s i n terjris of m i l i t a r y hardware and 
ammunit ion. Apart from procur ing arms s u p p l i e s from t h e 
u n i t e d S t a t e s , P a k i s t a n acquired arms and ammunition 
from B e i j i n g , i n February 1972, P a k i s t a n ' s Prime M i n i s -
t e r , Z.A, Bhutto , proceeded t o China t o d i s c u s s P a k i s t a n ' s 
d e f e n c e requ irements w i t h t h e Chinese l e a d e r s and t o 
I ^ 1 
procure arms. The Chinese premier Zhou-fcn-Lai was 
reported to have t o l d Bhutto i "We are not amnunition 
merchants. Whatever your defence requirements are, they 
w i l l be met g r a t i s " . "^^  During t h i s v i s i t . Prime Minister 
Bhutto ra ised the i s s u e of s igning a defence pact with 
China, but he was t o l d by the Chinese leader that they 
were not in favour of formal a l l i a n c e s and what r e a l l y 
18 
mattered was a cornrton i n t e r e s t and not defence pact . 
During 1970s, China supplied massive arms to Pakis-
tan . The Chinese s u p p l i e s including Mig-19, F-65 Shenyang 
and i ' -6 . Bis f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t , tanks and submarines. By 
1976, Bhutto was able to persuade China to include 
Pak i s tan ' s defence requirements in Beijing's long term 
19 defence production p l a n s . * 
In 1972, China supplied 6 Shanghai-II motor gun 
bo a t s , lOOT-59 tanks , 4 Hu Chwan-fast at tack hydrofo i l . 
In 1973, Pakistan hed placed order with China for t h e 
supply of Klg-19 f i g h t e r p lanes , unspec i f ied number of 
SAW_6 m i s s i l e s and T-59 t a n k s . ^ By 1977, Pakistan had 
rece ived 2 Hainan large patrol c r a f t s and 60 F-6 Shenyang 
f i g h t e r s . 
17. New York Times, 2 February 1972. 
18. Z.A. Bhutto's in terv iew with C . L . Suezberger, in 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l Herald Tribune, 14 Feb. 1972. 
19. salamat A l i , "Close Mi l i tary Cooperation "For Eastern 
Economic Review (Hong Kong) , October 1977, p . 88 . 
20. Yaacov Vertzberger, ""The P o l i t i c a l Economy of Sino-
Pakistan Re la t ions" , Asian Survey (Berkeley) , v o l . 
XXIII, No. 5, May 1983, p . 647. 
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I t ernerges from t h e f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s i s t h a t because 
t h i e c mutual antagoni sm, which l e d t o t h r e e wars i n 1947-48 , 
1965 and 1971, both I n d i a and P a k i s t a n wanted to have 
weapon's s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r each o t h e r . In t h i s r e g a r d , 
u n i t e d S t a t e s f u e l e d P a k i s t a n ' s a p p e t i t e f o r arms by 
s u p p l y i n g s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons. In v iew of Us embargo, 
P a k i s t a n acqu ired weapons from China, S i m i l a r l y I n d i a 
a c q u i r e d weapons from S o v i e t u n i o n , U.K. and France , 
Thus an arms r a c e had e n v i s a g e d i n South Asia which p r o -
ved i n s t r u m e n t a l i n c r e a t i n g i n s t a b i l i t y because of l o c a l 
f a c t o r s and t h a t making t h e r e g i o n v u l n e r a b l e t o super 
power r i v a l r y , 
UNITED gTATES AND NUCLEARIFATION OF SOUTH ASIA x 
The debate on n u c l e a r i z a t i o n i n South As ia embraces 
m a i n l y two c o u n t r i e s - I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , which have 
t h e n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y t o manufacture n u c l e a r weapons. 
S i n c e I n d i a conducted i t s p e a c e f u l n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n 
(PNE) i n May 1974, t h e r e have been d o u b t f u l r e p o r t s i n 
t h e w e s t e r n media about I n d i a having n u c l e a r weapons. 
S i m i l a r l y doubts have been c a s t o v e r P a k i s t a n ' s c a p a c i t y 
t o manufacture n u c l e a r weapons. However a d e t a i l e d a n a l y -
s i s about the n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t i e s o f both I n d i a and 
P a k i s t a n i s bejond t h e s c o p e of t h e p r e s e n t s t u d y . Hence 
t h e main t h r u s t o f a n a l y s i s i n t h i s c h a p t e r v e e r s round 
US p e r c e p t i o n s and p o l i c y a s se s sment o f n u c l e a r p o l i c i e s 
of I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , 
'^1 
^ 0 
U^S. AND INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY » 
p r i o r t o I n d i a ' s p e a c e f u l n u c l e a r e x p l o s i o n a t 
P o k h a r a n i n mid May 1974 , t h e r e had b e e n no " n u c l e a r 
i r r i t a n t " l e a d i n g t o s t r a i n s i n Indo-US r e l a t i o n s . 
However t h e u n i t e d s t a t e s had been i m p r e s s i n g upon 
I n d i a t h e need f o r s i g n i n g t h e M o n - R r o l i f e r a t i o n 
T r e a t y (NPT) d e s p i t e I n d i a ' s o p p o s i t i o n t o some of t h e 
c l a u s e s of t h e NPT, I n d i a embarked upon i t s n u c l e a r 
programme a l m o s t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y w i t h t h e m u l t i f a c e t e d 
i n d u s t r i a l programme t o w a r d s t h e e a r l y 1950s , I n d i a 
u n d e r l y i n g o b j e c t i v e of d e v e l o p i n g and b u i l d i n g a d e p e n -
d a b l e know how i n t h e f i e l d of n u c l e a r e n e r g y h a s been 
of c o u r s e , economic , f o r i t p r o m i s e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of 
21 
a new " indus t r i a l revo lu t ion" , -^  
I n d i a ' s d e s i r e to harness the atomic energy for peace-
ful purposes and to a t t a i n s e l f - su f f i c i ency in various 
f i e l d s of technology l e t i t s f i r s t Prime Minister, jawa-
h a r l a l Nehru to se t up Atomic Energy Commission in 1948. 
Since then India had spent considerable amount of money 
on research in the f i e l d . About I n d i a ' s s teadfas t commi-
tment to harness nuclear energy exc lus ive ly for peaceful 
purposes, jawahar la l Nehzru, while inaugurating t he Swimmlrg 
Pool Reactor (APSARA) a t Trombay on 20 January 1957 had 
u n i l a t e r a l l y declared even "on behalf of any future 
21. James S, Allen, Atomic Enerav and Society (New York 
1949), p . 15. ^-^ 
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Government of Ind ia" agains t using atomic energy "for 
ev i l purposes".^^ Although India b u i l t much of i t s 
i n f r a s t r u t u r e for nuclear power with Canadian and Bri-
t i s h co l labora t ion , i t s f i r s t nuclear p lan t was ordered 
in 1963 on a turn-key bas i s from an American company -
General E l e c t r i c . Under a cooperat ive agreement signed 
by t h e American end Indian governments during 196 3 the 
US agreed to supply low enriched uranium for the proposed 
Tarapur Atomic Power s t a t i on (TAPS) near Bombay. In 
exchange for a US commitment to supply the fuel upto 
199 3, t he Government of India agree to t he American moni-
to r ing of t he two r e a c t o r s to be i n s t a l l e d at TAPS, and 
to ope ra t e the r e a c t o r s only on fuel supplied by the US 
or produced a t TAPS i t self .^^ I t appeared as if Washin-
gton was s a t i s f i ed wi*-h the safeguards as envisaged under 
the agreemert: su f f i c i en t enough to meet i t s non-prol i fera-
t i on ob jec t ives . 
However i t was in 1954 t h a t American concerns about 
I n d i a ' s p r o l i f e r a t i o n po t en t i a l began to grow as a sequel 
to the indigenous const ruct ion of a chemical separat ion 
p l a n t . I n d i a ' s purchase of a Canadian CANDU reactor for 
the Rajasthan Atomic Power Project (RAPP) en ta i led 
22. Government of Ind ia , jawahar la l Nehru'.g speeches. 195 3-57 (New Delhi j Publ ica t ions Division, 1958) 
p. 507, I J. -J i , 
23. «aje5h M. Basrur, -whether Non-Prolif erat ion? indo-US 
v r ^ j ; " " . S\^^^°"^ ^"^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 3"^ Reagon" in P M 
(New Delhi , South Asian Publ i shers , 1987) p 115 
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minimal safeguards svibsequently indigenous designs were 
to be used for new p l a n t s to be s e t up a t Kalpakkam 
and Narora, I n d i a ' s re fusa l to sign the Ni^ had also 
given cause for US concern. In an a ide roemoire del ivered 
to the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, Washington t r i e d 
to plug the loophole regarding PNEs by now in te rp re t ing 
them as non-peaceful i 
The united s t a t e s i n t e r p r e t s t h e safeguards 
and guarantees provis ions of the Tarapur 
agreement as prohib i t ing t he use of Ameri-
can mater ia ls '^ nd equipment or mater ia l s 
produced from such mater ia ls o r equipment, 
for research on or development of any 
nuclear explosive devices regarding (sic) 
of s ta ted a p p l i c a t i o n s . , , . The united s t a t e s 
would not consider t he use of plutonium 
produced in CIRUS peaceful nuclear explo-
s ives intended for any purpose to be resea-
rched in to and use of atomic energy for 
peaceful purposes,24 
•f 
I n d i a ' s PNE of 1974 was not denounced by Washington 
as being in v io l a t ion of the 1963 agreement. Nor was 
an immediate attempt made to backtrack on the matter of 
supplying fuel for TAPS. Nevertheless , response of the 
Nixon adminis t ra t ion was so cautious t h a t an t i - p ro l i f e r a -
t ion c r i t i c i s m came centred increas ingly on the US 
congress . 
The advent of Carter adminis t ra t ion witnessed 
l ightening of screws of American non-pro l i fe ra t ion 
24, Quoted in A.G. Noorani, "Indo-US nuclear Rela t ions" 
Asian Survey, vo l , XXI, No, 4, April 1981, pp. 
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t r e a t y . C a r t e r ' s e a r ly atatements envisioned concerted 
e f f o r t s , both through i n t e r n a l b i p a r t i s a n col labora t ion 
and through cooperation among the nuclear countr ies to 
prevent the closing of t he nuclear fuel cycle by the non-
nuclear weapon s t a t e s (NNWS) . ^^ In view of President 
c a r t e r ' s pronounced stand on non-pro l i f e ra t ion , the us 
adminis t ra t ion had taXen a number of s ign i f i can t s t e p s . 
Fuel shipments had been delayed and a pol icy review 
undertaken. The review 16d, among o ther th ings , to the 
developrrent of a n t i - p i o l i f e r a t i o n gu ide l ines for exporters 
by t h e Nuclear supp l i e r s Group (NSG) and the e s t a b l i s h -
ment of t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation 
(INFCE), and the f i r s t step towards t h e enactment of t he 
Nuclear Non-prol i ferat ion Act of 1978 (NNPA) ?^ 
However, India had cons i s t en t ly maintained tha t the 
United Sta tes was bound under i n t e r n a t i o n a l law to continue 
t h e supply of nuclear fue l . The a n t i - p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s t s 
within t he US congress had s t a r t ed bui lding pressure on 
pres ident Carter on t h e issue< of American nuclear fuel 
supply. In t he summer of 1977, d i scuss ions commenced with 
regard to the repurchase of spent fuel from TAPS by the 
25. Jimmy Carter , "Three s teps toward Nuclear Respon-
s i b i l i t y " in Reader on Nuclear Nonproliferat ion (Washington D.C,, Congressional Research Service, 
December 1978) , pp. 71-79. 
26. Paul F. Power, "TThe Indo-American Nuclear Controversy", 
Asian survev. Vol.XIX, No. 6, June 1979, P. 581. 
27. For t ex t of t h e NNPA, see. Congressional Research 
se rv i ce . Nuclear P ro l i f e ra t ion Factbook (Washington 
D.C. 1980), pp. 71-84. 
m 
uni ted S ta tes in accordance with the 1963 agreement. 
This would have foreclosed the p o s s i b i l i t y of the spent 
fuel being reprocessed for the ex t rac t ion of plutonium 
by Ind i a , However the idea was shelved because under the 
r e l evan t provision, India would then have acquired the 
r i g h t to inspec t US f a c i l i t i e s where TAPS spent fuel was 
sent , "a prospect with p o l i t i c a l impl ica t ions tha t the 
28 US did not wish to address . Two fuel shipments for India 
were approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
in Ju ly 1977. However I n d i a ' s appl ia t ion for the supply of 
a t h i r d shipment Wv^s disapproved by the NRC in April 
19 78 for lack of quorum among i t s members. Consequently 
within a week. Pres ident Carter overrodethe NRC, and 
the US congress endorsed p r e s i d e n t i a l decision by a vote 
29 
of 227 to 181.^^ 
With coming i n t o force of the Nuclear Non p r o l i f e r a -
t ion Act (NNPA) , i t was enjoined upon American nuclear 
customers to accept ful lscope safeguards on a l l t h e i r 
nuclear f a c i l i t i e s . Nuclear t r ans fe r s were subject to 
NRC approval which could only be overridden by the 
Pres iden t , However the Act vested power in the Us 
Congress to veto the P re s iden t ' s order by a majority 
28 , Power , N, 26 p . 58 3 , 
29 , B a s r u r , n . 23 , p . 117 . 
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vote i n both Houses w i t h i n s i x t y days . Grace p e r i o d s were 
provided for* f u l l s c » p e s a f e g u a r d 8 would be mandatory on ly 
fo r a p p l i c a t i o n s f i l e d a f t e r 10 September 1979, and shipments 
wi thou t accep tance of sa feguardswere a l lowed upto 10 March 
1980. unde r t h i s p r o v i s i o n of t h e Act t h e NRC approved y e t 
ano the r I n d i a n a p p l i c a t i o n fo r fue l i n March 1979. 
In May 1980, t h e PRC gave i t s d i s a p p r o v a l to 
shipment of 38 tonnes of n u c l e a r fue l to I n d i a on t h e p l e a 
t h a t t h e d e a d l i n e f o r accep tance of f u l l s c o p e sa feguards 
had p a s s e d . Following P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s o v e r r i d i n g t h e 
31 NRC in J u n e 1980, t h e i s s u e came up b e f o r e t h e Congress . 
In view of t h i s development , t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
t iu r sed the apprehension t h a t American f a i l u r e to meet I n d i a ' s 
r e q u e s t might r e s u l t i n t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e 19 63 a g r e e -
ment by India^ Leave i t f r e e of e x i s t i n g sa feguards and 
32 I n d i a might t u r n t o S o v i e t Union f o r f u r t h e r s u p p l i e s . 
Mc George Bundy, i n an a r t i c l e i n Washington P o s t , 
came o u t s t r o n g l y in suppo r t of C a r t e r ' s p o l i c y , saying t h a t 
f a i l u r e to al low t h e s e shipments w i l l p r e d i c t a b l y s e r v e a l l 
t h e f o r c e s a l r e a d y working a g a i n s t n u c l e a r r e s t r a i n t i n 
I n d i a - i t w i l l be a s e l f - i n f l i c t e d wound fo r t h e g e n e r a l 
30. I b i d . 
31. For details see, Edward j, Markey, Nuclear Peri^; 
The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, 
MA» Balllnger, 198 2), pp. 47-63. 
32. Basrur, n. 23, p. 118. 
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c a u s e of n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n , ^ " ^ T h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
t o o k p a i n s t o push i t s c a s e i n t h e S e n a t e and House of 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . Deputy S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Warren C h r i s -
t o p h e r t o l d t h e s e n a t e F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s Comndt tee t h a t 
10 March 1980 dead l i n e s h o u l d no t a p p l y t o I n d i a s i n c e 
i t s a p p l i c a t i o n s had been f i l e d i n Sep ten toer 1978 and 
Augus t 19 79 and t h e s h i p m e n t s had been d e l a y e d by t h e 
34 American Governmen t , E v e n t u a l l y t h e S e n a t e F o r e i g n 
R e l a t i o n s Commi t t ee , House F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Comrrl t tee and 
t h e House of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a s a w h o l e v o t e d t o d i s a p p r o v e 
t h e s h i p m e n t , t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n managed t o win t h e 
S e n a t e f l o o r v o t e by t h e n a r r o w e s t m a r g i n - 48 t o 4 6 . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y on 5 O c t o b e r 1980, t h e f i r s t 19 t o n n e s of low 
e n r i c h e d u r a n i u m r e a c h e d I n d i a . 
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAMME i 
P a k i s t a n ' s n u c l e a r programme h a s d e v e l o p e d i n r e s p o n s e 
t o I n d i a ' s n u c l e a r programme and t h e s u c c e s s f u l d e t o n a t i o n 
of PNE by t h e l a t t e r i n 1974 p r o v i d e d i m p e t u s t o P a k i s t a n ' s 
p e n c h a n t of a t t a i n i n g n u c l e a r p a r i t y w i t h I n d i a , T h e l a t e 
Z.A, B h u t t o i s g e n e r a l l y a c c r e d i t e d f o r h a v i n g p i o n e e r e d 
t h e programme of d e v e l o p i n g n u c l e a r e n e r g y i n P a k i s t a n . 
3 3 . McGeorge Bundy, " S h i p F u e l t o I n d i a * Washington P o s t 
13 J u n e 1980, ' 
3 4 . Markey, n . 3 1 p , 5 1 . 
3 5 . I b i d . 
3 6 . T i m e s of I n ^ i l a . 6 O c t o b e r 1980. 
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He was ac t ive ly associa ted with the nulcear programme of 
Pakistan from October 1958 to July 1977 . . . While 
r e a l i z i n g the s ign i f i cance of nuclear capab i l i t y for Pakistan, 
Bhutto wrote in h i s l a s t testament, -we know tha t I s r a e l 
and south Africa have fuel nuclear c a p a b i l i t y . The Chris t ian , 
Jewish and Hindu c i v i l i z a t i o n s have t h i s capab i l i t y . The 
communist powers also possess i t . Only Is lamic c i v i l i z a t i o n 
was without i t , but t h a t pos i t ion was about to change. 
38 
Throughout I960 's and espec ia l ly a f t e r the Indo-Pak 
war of 1965, Bhutto continued to nurse apprehensions about 
I n d i a ' s nuclear c a p a b i l i t y . In h is book. The Myth 9^ Indepen-
dence which was published in 1969, Bhutto wrotesj 
All wars of aur age have become t o t a l w a r s . . . 
and i t wi l l have to be assumed t h a t a war waged 
agains t Pakistan i s capable of becoming a t o t a l 
war. I t would be dangerous to plan for l e s s and 
our plans should, therefore , inc lude nuclear 
d e t e r r e n t . . . . I f Pakistan r e s t r i c t s or suspends 
her nuclear programme, i t would not only enable 
Ind ia to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear 
advantage, b u t . . . our problem, in i t s essence, 
i s how to obtain such a weapon in time before 
t he c r i s i s begins .^^ 
In i n t e r n a t i o n a l disarmanent measures l i k e non p r o l i f e -
r a t i o n t r e a t y (NPT) , Pakistan followed I n d i a ' s eiiample 
and did not sign the NPT. 
37. Z.A. Bhutto, "If I am Assassinated ."(New Delhi, 
19 79) , p . 137. 
38. I b i d . , p . 138. 
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I n t h e a f t ermath o f Indo-Pak war o f 1971 which 
c u l m i n a t e d i n t h e dismemberment of P a k i s t a n w i t h Bangla-
desh emerging a s a s o v e r e i g n independent country , P a k i s t a n 
was reduced t o t h e s t a t u s of a smal l r e g i o n a l power. And 
Z,A. Bhutto was a t t h e helm of a f f a i r s of new P a k i s t a n , 
B h u t t o ' s penchant f o r a c q u i r i n g n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y f o r 
P a k i s t a n was f u r t h e r propped up as a s e q u e l t o I n d i a ' s 
PNE i n May 19 74 , 
PAKISTAN AND INDIA'S PNE » 
I n d i a d e t o n a t e d i t s n u c l e a r d e v i c e on 18 May 1974 
and i t immedia te ly s e n t shock waves i n P a k i s t a n and s e t 
a c h a i n r e a c t i o n , on 19 May 1974 Prime M i n i s t e r of P a k i s -
tan w h i l e condemning I n d i a ' s PNE, d e c l a r e d i t a t h r e a t 
not o n l y t o P a k i s t a n b u t to a l l n a t i o n s o f East and West 
As ia and t h e c o u n t r i e s of A f r i c a , He f u r t h e r s ta tedx 
Given t h e b r u t a l f a c t of y e s t e r d a y ' s (18 May) 
e x p l o s i o n , P a k i s t a n cannot be e x p e c t e d t o r e s t o r e 
t e c h n i c a l i t i e s and p r o t o c o l . I t would be u n f a i r 
indeed immoral t h a t I n d i a ' s f l a g r a n t v i o l a t i o n 
of the n o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n a s s u r a n c e s should make 
t h e n u c l e a r weapon powers r e s o r t t o double of 
p e r v e r s i t y o f not o n l y condoning i t but a l s o 
g i v i n g i t a b l e s s i n g by p u t t i n g an e s t o p p e l or 
imposing r e s t r i c t i o n s on t h e normal n u c l e a r 
programmes o f o t h e r s t a t e s . * ^ 
4 0 , For f u l l t e x t o f B h u t t o ' s s p e e c h , s e e P a k i s t a n 
Horizon (Karachi) V o l . 2 7 , No. 2, 1974, pp. 1 3 1 - 1 3 4 . 
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P a k i s t a n viewed exp los ion as enhancement i n I n d i a ' s 
p r e s t i g e , s t r e n g t h and independence . According to a 
P a k i s t a n oonunentator, I n d i a wanted s m a l l e r ne ighbours , 
o t h e r w i s e i n equal s t a g e of dependence and underdevelopment, 
to remain - impressed- by I n d i a i f n o t - b e in c o n s t a n t awe" 
from i t / ^ P a k i s t a n ' s media was h i g h l y c r i t i c a l of I n d i a ' s 
PNE.'*^ A s e c t i o n of t h e ^rdu p r e s s went t o t h e e x t e n t of 
warning t h e United s t a t e s t h a t t h e b a l a n c e of power which 
had t i l t e d in favour of I n d i a had r e s u l t e d in I n d i a ' s 
supremacy and h^e t rony which i n o t h e r words meant "Sovie t 
hegenony" over South Asia and " i t would be i n US's own 
43 i n t e r e s t to s t r e n g t h e n t h e m i l i t a r y power of P a k i s t a n . 
With a view to a l l y P a k i s t a n ' s f e a r s and apprehen-
s ions about I n d i a ' s PNE, Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a Mrs. 
Gandhi i n a l e t t e r t o her P a k i s t a n i c o u n t e r p a r t wrotej 
"I am so r ry t h a t you should have assumed in s p i t e 
of our c a t e g o r i c a l d e c l a r a t i o n s t h a t t h e n u c l e a r t e s t 
which our s c i e n t i s t s have conducted e n t i r e l y fo r developing 
n u c l e a r technology fo r peacefu l pu rposes somehow poses 
4 1 , Hamid S. Rajput / " Ind ian Nuclear T e s t j Th rea t to 
peace" Dawn, 30 May 19 74, 
4 2. Both Engl ish and Urdu p r e s s i n P a k i s t a n took a v a r i o u s 
view of I n d i a ' s exp los ion as a c o n s t a n t t h r e a t f o r 
P a k i s t a n see Wholly u n a c c e p t a b l e " ( e d i t ) , Morning News 
23 May 1974. Muneer Ahmad Khan", our Nuclear Problem", 
P a k i s t a n Times, 30 September 19 74, "Atomic P r o l i f e r a t i o n 
and P a k i s t a n ' s S tand" ( e d i t . ) Jung , 22 May 1974. 
4 3 . "India* Atomic Programme and American Foreign P g l i c y " , 
( e d i t , ) / Mussawat, 17 September 1974. 
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t h r e a t t o P a k i s t a n ' s s e c u r i t y . 
R e i t e r a t i n g I n d i a ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o s e t t l e a l l 
t h e i s s u e s w i t h P a k i s t a n i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e Simla 
Agreement Mrs . Gandh i f u r t h e r wro te* " T h e r e a r e no p o l i -
t i c a l o r f o r e i g n p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s t e s t . We 
r e m a i n commi t t ed t o s e t t l i n g a l l o u r d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h 
P a k i s t a n p e a c e f u l l y t h r o u g h b i l a t e r a l n e g o t i a t i o n s i n 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e S i m l a agreement". u« 45 
T h e B h u t t o g o v e r n m e n t r e f u s e d t o a c c e p t I n d i a ' s 
l o g i c and r a t h e r r a i s e d t h e bogey o f n u c l e a r I n d i a a s 
p o r t e n d i n g t h r e a t t o n o n - n u c l e a r P a k i s t a n , Whi le s p e a k i n g 
i n t h e P a k i s t a n N a t i o n a l Assembly , B h u t t o d e c l a r e d t h a t 
a l l r o a d s l e a d t o t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t I n d i a w a s " b r a n d i -
s h i n g t h e n u c l e a r sword" t o e x t r a c t p o l i t i c a l c o n c e s s i o n s 
46 from P a k i s t a n . T h u s I n d i a ' s PNE p r o v i d e d a p r e l u d e t o 
P a k i s t a n t o embark on i t s n u c l e a r p rogramme, 
PAKISTAN'S QUEST FOR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY » 
While e x p r e s s i n g P a k i s t a n ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n , p r i m e 
M i n i s t e r Bhu t t o s a i d : " I f I n d i a b u i l d s t h e bomb, we w i l l 
e a t l e a v e s anS g r a s s , even go h u n g r y , b u t w e w i l l h a v e t o 
4 4 . F o r f u l l t e x t s e e F o r e i g n A f f a i r s Record (New Delh i ) , 
V o l . 20, n o . 6, J u n e 1974, p , 194 . 
4 5 . . I b i d . 
4 6 . P a k i s t a n , N a t i o n a l Assembly D e b a t e s , V o l . 3 , No. 7, 
6 J u n e 1974, p . 300 . 
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g e t one:*"^^ According t o an informed o b s e r v e r , t h e Uni ted 
S t a t e s r e l u c t a n c e to r e c o g n i z e t h e e f f e c t of t h e I n d i a n 
n u c l e a r explos ion on P a k i s t a n ' s s e c u t i t y and r e f u s a l to 
c u t off a l l nuc l ea r coope ra t i on wi th I n d i a might have 
i n c r e a s e d the l a t t e r ' s i n c e n t i v e s fo r ach iev ing a weapons 
48 
c a p a b i l i t y , 
P a k i s t a n ' s d e s i r e t o a t t a i n n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y might 
have a l s o been prompted by t h e b e l i e f t h a t a c q u i s i t i o n of 
even a rudimentary nuclear-weapon c a p a b i l i t y might al low 
a coun t ry t o d e t e r a n u c l e a r r i v a l - an impor tan t s e c u r i t y 
49 
r e l a t e d reason for going n u c l e a r . T h e r e might have a l s o 
been a p o l i t i c a l i n c e n t i v e f o r acqu i r ing nuc l ea r weapons 
because of i t s a b i l i t y t o enhance n a t i o n a l power. 
I n t h e immediate a f t e rma th of I n d i a ' s PNE in May 
19 74 t h a t t h e then P a k i s t a n i lPj:em€i.r._, z.A. Bhut to , 
i n i t i a t e d a n u c l e a r weapon programme and planned to acqu i r e 
n u c l e a r exp los ive m a t e r i a l by d i v e r t i n g i t from a r e p r o -
ces s ing p l a n t which was to be s e t up by a French company, 
Sau r t Gobain Techniques N a i v e l l e s , a t Chasma, P a k i s t a n , 
5 1 
under an agreement w i t h P a k i s t a n ' s government , 
47. P a k i s t a n A f f a i r s . Vol .27 , June l , 1974, p . l . 
48. B u l l e t i n of Atomic S c i e n t i s t s , J a n u a r y 1980, p . 5 . 
49. Jphn K, King, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c a l E f f ec t s of t h e 
sp read of t juclear Weapons (Washington; 1979) , p . 168. 
50 . Ted, Greenwood, H.A.Feiveson and Theodore B, T a y l o r , 
Nuclear P r o l i f e r a t i o n (New Yorkj 19 77) , p . 4 9 
5 1 . T.C.Bose "Nuclear P r o l i f e r a t i o n ? A case s tudy of 
P a k i s t a n " in Surendra Chopra (ed . ) P e r s p e c t i v e s 
as P a k i s t a n ' s Fo re ign P o l i c v (Amri t sa r j 198 3) , p . 397. 
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The f i s s i l e m a t e r i a l s g e n e r a l l y used fo r inaking 
n u c l e a r e x p l o s i v e s a r e plutoniunw239 and uranium-235, The 
government of P a k i s t a n planned to a c q u i r e t h e spent fue l 
of bo th heavy water r e a c t o r s and l i g h t wa te r r e a c t o r s con-
t a i n i n g Plutonium, I n o r d e r t o s e p a r a t e t h i s p la tonium 
from o t h e r e lements , t h e s p e n t fue l has t o be r e p r o c e s s e d . 
And i t was for t h i s purpose t h a t I s lamabad n e g o t i a t e d 
wi th t h e French company fo r t h e purchase of a r e p r o c e s s i n g 
p l a n t . Repor t s appear ing i n t h e Western media in e a r l y 
19 78 s t a t e d t h a t "more than 95 per c e n t of t h e p lans for 
a r e p r o c e s s i n g p l a n t " had been d e l i v e r e d t o Pak i s t an by 
5 2 t h e French company. 
Though t h e SIPRI b e l i e v e d t h a t P a k i s t a n had chosen 
t h e "Plutonium r o u t e " to a t t a i n weapon c a p a b i l i t y but 
s i n c e m a t t e r s a t t h a t j u n c t u r e were s t i l l in the embargonic 
s t a g e , t h e r e was no immediate cause fo r a larm. However 
t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of P a k i s t a n a r r i v i n g a t t he "nuc lear t h r e -
sho ld" i n a few yea r s th rough Plutonium e x t r a c t e d from 
t h e s p e n t fue l could no t be r u l e d o u t . 
However, P a k i s t a n ' s agreement to purchase t h e 
Plutonium r e p r o c e s s i n g p l a n t from F rance was e v e n t u a l l y 
52 , SIPRI YEARBOOK ^980 (London, 1980), p , 270, 
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cancel led in mid 1978, l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of pressure 
from the United s t a t e s as well as independent French 
5 3 assessment of the agreement l a t e r on. Subsequently 
Pakistan s t a r t ed making c landest ine arrangements for the 
purchase of mater ia ls for the centr i fuge uranium enrich-
ment f a c i l i t y which i t needed for obtaining weapons grade 
mater ia l s for nuclear explos ives . Reports appearing in the 
Indian and i n t e rna t i ona l media in the l a t e r half of 1980 
ind ica ted t h a t Pakistan had succeeded in obtaining from 
Dutch, Br i t i sh and o the r sources the equipment tha t could 
be used for enriching uranium to weapons grade, Pakis tani 
s c i e n t i s t s , A , Q , Khan played a notable r o l e in t he e n t i r e 
a f f a i r s . 
A,QiKhan brought to Pakistan gas centr ifuge techno-
logy for enriching uranium. He had got t he opportunity 
of famiiar is ing himself with the s ec re t Dutch-Brit ish-
54 
West German Plant in Almelo on the Dutch-German border. 
On h i s re turn to Pakistan in 1975, A,Q,Khan made avai lab le 
to Pakis tan valuable URENCO design information and the 
t echn ica l experience, 
China also extended as s i s t ance to Pakistan in 
53. T.C, Bose, n, 51 , p . 398. 
54. The Statesman, 7 November, 1980, 
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b u i l d i n g l e t t e r ' s n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y . I n Way 1976,prime 
M i n i s t e r Bhutto dur ing h i s v i s i t t o China s t r u c k a dea l 
wi th t h e Chinese l e a d e r s which involved B e i j i n g ' s he lp in 
55 P a k i s t a n ' g nuc l ea r weapons. In June 1976, a high l e v e l 
d e l e g a t i o n of Chinese s c i e n t i s t s v i s i t e d P a k i s t a n . on 
29 J a n u a r y 19 77, P a k i s t a n and China s igned a p r o t o c o l on 
s c i e n t i f i c and t e c h n i c a l coopera t ion and t h e Chinese 
a s s i s t a n c e fo r development of n u c l e a r energy in P a k i s t a n 
57 
was i m p l i c i t i n t h e p r o t o c o l , Z,A, Bhutto i n h i s l a s t 
t e s t a m e n t had claimed t h a t h i s " s i n g l e most impor tan t 
achievement was an agreement which he a r r i v e d a t a f t e r 
an a s s iduous and t e n a c i o u s endeavour spanning over e leven 
yea r s of n e g o t a t i o n s . , . , t h e agreement of mine, concluded 
wi th China in June 19 76 wi l l perhaps be my g r e a t e s t 
c o n t r i b u t i o n , ^ ® Thus by 1980 Pak i s t an had acqui red capa-
b i l i t y of e x t r a c t i n g p lu tonium from t h e spen t fue l as 
wel l as gas c e n t r e f u g e p roces s of e n r i c h i n g uranium and 
i t had become •• threshold n u c l e a r power,'* 
U . S . ATTITUDE » 
By 1979, a s e r i o u s deba t e had been genera ted 
5 5 . S h l r i n Tahe r i K h e l i , "The Fore ign f o l i c y of New 
P a k i s t a n " Orbis ( P h i l a d e l p h i a ) , F a l l 1976, p , 7 3 7 . 
56 . R.G.Sawhney, Z i a ' s P a k i s t a n (New Delh i ; 1985) ,p . 135. 
57, Sta tesman. 3i J a n u a r y 1977, 
5 8 , Bhut to , n. 37, p , 233, 
4 8 I ' { 
w i t h i n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s about P a k i s t a n * s emergence as 
a t h r e s h o l d n u c l e a r power. I s l a m a b a d ' s r e p e a t e d a s s e r t i o n s 
t h a t i t s n u c l e a r programme was " s o l e l y d i r e c t e d towards 
59 p e a c e f u l p u r p o s e s and had .no o t h e r d i m e n s i o n s . However, 
f a i l e d t o c o n v i n c e Washington about P a k i s t a n ' s r e a l i n t e n -
t i o n s . The s u s p i c i o n was e v i d e n t in a s t a t e m e n t made by t h e 
U .S . A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Thomas R. P i c k e r i n g b e f o r e 
a Sena te sub-commit tee t h a t , P a k i s t a n ' s n u c l e a r programme. . . 
(which) c o n s i s t s e s s e n t i a l l y of one r e s e a r c h r e a c t o r s u p p l i e d 
by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and o n e s m a l l h e a v y - w a t e r power r e a c t o r 
60 
s u p p l i e d by Canada does not r e q u i r e e n r i c h e d uranium. 
Senator John Glenn, Chairman o f S e n a t e sub-commit tee on 
Energy went a s t e p f u r t h e r when he s a i d * "With no requirement 
f o r f u e l enrichment f o r n u c l e a r e l e c t r i c a l g e n e r a t i n g 
p l a n t s , I can s e e very l i t t l e r e a s o n f o r t h e i r wanting t h i s 
equipment ( c e n t r i f u g e enr ichment f a c i l i t y ) except f o r bomb 
manufacture . The A s s i s t a n t S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e even e x p r e s s e d 
American h e l p l e s s n e s s i n p r e v e n t i n g P a k i s t a n from go ing ahead 
w i t h t h e manufacturing o f n u c l e a r d e v i c e s . 
A c q u i s i t i o n of g a s c e n t r i f u g e enrichment f a c i l i t y by 
P a k i s t a n posed a c h a l l e n g e t o n u c l e a r expor t c o n t r o l s e s t a -
5 9 . The Economist (London) , 15 September 1979, p . 6 2 , 
60 . U . S . Congress , S e n a t e , sub-commit t e e on Energy g e a r i n g s as 
N u c l e a r P r o l i f e r a t i o n t The S i t u a t i o n i n I n d i a and 
P a k i s t a n (Washington, D.C. 19 7 9 ) , p . 6, 
6 1 . I b i d . , p . 17. 
62 . I b i d . , p . 16. 
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b l i s h e d by t h e London Nuj l ea r S u p p l i e r ' s Group In 1975 
and t h e U.S. Nuclear N o n - p r o l i f e r a t i o n Act of 1978 because 
63 
of P a k i s t a n ' s r e f u s a l t o accep t f u l l - s c o p e s a f g u a r d s . 
By A p r i l 1979, t h e i n t e l l i g e n c e r e p o r t s r e c e i v e d by Ca r t e r 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n d i c a t e d t h a t P a k i s t a n was ga in ing t h e 
64 
c a p a b i l i t y to b u i l d n u c l e a r weapons. Though Ca r t e r 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had no d i r e c t a n t i p r o l i f e r a t i o n l e v e r a g e to 
d i suade t h e P a k i s t a n i government from con t inu ing i t s nuc lea r 
programme ye t I t t ook some s t e p s in t h i s r e g a r d . 
I n March 19 79, Washington, wi th a view to show i t s 
d i s p l e a s u r e over P a k i s t a n ' s s u s p i c i o u s n u c l e a r ambi t ions 
w i t h h e l d an o f f e r made l a t e i n 1978 t o s e l l 100 F_5E 
f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t and suspended $ 40 m i l l i o n i n development 
65 
aid* The irove t o suspend American a i d to Pak i s t an came in 
t h e wake of a U,S, l e g i s l a t i o n p r o h i b i t i n g t h e U.S. economic 
and m i l i t a r y a id t o any coun t ry t h a t op ted fo r nuc l ea r 
enrichment f a c i l i t i e s w i thou t i n t e r n a t i o n a l s a f e g u a r d s . 
Though P a k i s t a n was a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t e d by t h i s move but 
i t r e fu sed t o g i v e up i t s nuc l ea r programme. 
During t h e l a t e r ha l f of 1979, t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
was r e p o r t e d l y c o n s i d e r i n g some p o l i c y a l t e r n a t i v e s with a 
63, Comment i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c u r i t y , V o l . 3 , No, 2. 
F a l l 19 78, pp, 4 4 - 4 5 . 
64, C h r i s t i a n Science ^ionito^^ 9 Apr i l 19 79, 
65 . Arms Control Today, Vo l ,9 , No,9, October 1979, p , 2. 
66 . C h r i s t i a n Sc ience Mpnitor , 9 Apr i l 19 79, 
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view t o , s t o p p i n g o r s lowing down P a k i s t a n ' s nuc lea r 
progranune. These r e p o r t e d l y Inc luded an o f f e r of conven-
t i o n a l arms to P a k i s t a n , Keeping In view t h e P a k i s t a n ' s 
psyche of having an upper hand over I n d i a by acqu i r ing 
s o p h i s t i c a t e d conven t iona l weapons, some o f f i c i a l s in t h e 
s t a t e Department sugges ted t h a t an o f f e r of s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
U.S. arms could prove I n s t r u m e n t a l In d i suad ing Pak i s t an 
from I t s ambi t ious n u c l e a r programme. The arms package 
I t was sugges t ed , could I n c l u d e about 80 F - i 6 f i g h t e r 
bombers, 300 M-60 t a n k s , s i x f r i g a t e s and s i x small 
p a t r o l b o a t s to modernise Pak navy. The c o s t of t h e 
68 package was e s t ima ted a t more than $ 2 b i l l i o n . 
While t h e o f f i c i a l s In C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n were 
s t i l l f i n a l i s i n g t h e proposed package dea l t o be o f f e r e d 
to P a k i s t a n , t h e Sov ie t i nvas ion of Afghanis tan in December 
19 79 changed the s t r a t e g i c s cena r io In South West Asia 
and l ed t o r e t h i n k i n g i n t h e White House about t h e p r o s -
p e c t i v e American s t r a t e g y towards P a k i s t a n . As a conse-
quence of t h i s . P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r , l i f t e d t h e ban on a id 
to P a k i s t a n so as to r e g a i n i t s i n f l u e n c e on t h e excuse 
t h a t he had decided to l i f t t h e ban so t h a t Pak i s t an 
67. New York Times, 12 August 1979. 
68, Bostan Globe, i6 October 1979. 
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which was a f ront l i n e s t a t e and next t a r g e t of Soviet 
Union,^^ could p ro tec t i t s e l f agains t any Soviet onslaught . 
In keeping with t h i s po l icy President Carter in January 
1980 approved a package of $ 400 mil l ion in the U.S. 
economic and m i l i t a r y aid to Pakis tan. The mi l i t a ry aid was 
to cons i s t of a n t i - a i r c r a f t equipment and C-130 cargo 
t r anspor t planes ,^° P a k i s t a n ' s then Pres ident , 2ia-ul-Haq, 
re jec ted American offer of aid package as "peanuts" as 
he regarded i t to be too small for t h e purpose for which i t 
was being provided and ins tead demanded aid worth $ 2 
7l b i l l i o n t o rebui ld P a k i s t a n ' s armed f o r c e s . 
The Carter adminis t ra t ion was yet to take f ina l 
decision in t h i s regard when p re s iden t i a l e lec t ions came. 
pres ident Reagan in ea r ly 1981 announced a package deal 
for Pakistan worth over $ 2 b i l l i o n which included, the 
supply of sophis t ica ted bomber f igh te r l i k e ^"-16 and other 
equipment. 
I t emerges from the above ana lys i s tha t between 
1968 and 1980, arms race exacerbated in t h e x e g i o n . 
The American moves of imposing embargo on supply of arms 
69, "U.S. Aid Package* (edi t) Dawn overseas Weekly, Vol, 
5, No. 3, 19-25 January 1980. 
70, The Tribune (Chandigarh) 22 January 1980. 
71, Pakistan Times, 27 March 1980, 
152 
to both India and Pakistan fa i l ed to curb the arms race . 
Because Pakistan acquired arms from China and India got 
from Soviet Union and U,K,.The question of nuclear p r o l i -
f e r a t i on in South Asia was also beyond the competence of 
the uni ted S ta t e s . After conducting i t s PNE in May 1974, 
India had convinced the world In general and United s t a t e s 
in p a r t i c u l a r about i t s s teadfas t commitment to harness 
nuclear energy exclus ive ly for peaceful purposes. However 
Pakistan embarked on i t s programme of a t t a in ing nuclear 
c a p a b i l i t y as a sequel to I n d i a ' s PNE, Pakistan c l andes t i -
naly managed to acquire equipment and knowhsow for ext rac t ing 
Plutonium from the spent fuel and gaseous centr ifuge 
enrichment f a c i l i t i e s , China also helped Pakistan t o building 
i t s nuclear c a p a b i l i t y . United States had no nonproiife-
r a t ion leverage agains t Pak i s t an ' s nuclear programme. 
Even U.S. th rea t of suspending aid f a i l e d to deter Pakistan 
from i t s nuclear programme. 
IS>l^!^iS>%i^ 
Chapter IV 
US POLICY TOWARDS WEST ASIA ^ POl.ITICAT.. ECONOMIC, A^D 
MILITARY ASSISTANCE (1968>80) 
west Asia i n c l u d i n g t h e P e r s i a n Gulf r e g i o n had 
remained a n e r v e c e n t r e of i n t r a - r e g i o n a l c o n f l i c t t h u s 
po r t end ing a c o n s t a n t cha l l enge t o American diplomacy and 
i t s s t r a t e g i c s t a k e s during 1968 and 1980. In t h e imme-
d i a t e a f te rmath of A r a b - I s r a e l c o n f l i c t of j u n e 1967 and 
US suppor t f o r I s r a e l , some of t h e Arab c o u n t r i e s i n c l u d -
ing t h e Gulf c o u n t r i e s had g o t d i senchan ted w i t h Washington. 
During t h e June 1967 war, I s r a e l had occupied Je rusa lem, 
t h e West Bank of Jo rdan , t h e Gaza s t r i p , t h e S i n a i Pen insu la , 
Sharni-el«sh4ik and t h e Golan H e i g h t s . Po l i cy makers i n 
Washington were caught i n a dilemma once I s r a e l had i n i t i a -
t e d war, because b a r e l y a few weeks ago Washington had 
warned I s r a e l a g a i n s t use of f o r c e . 
i n t h e wake of p r e v a i l i n g c r i s i s , Johson adminis-
t r a t i o n was c a l l e d upon t o e v o l v e i t s p o l i c y t o defuse 
t h e brewing c r i s i s i n t h e r e g i o n . On 6 j u n e 19 67, u s 
s e c r e t a r y of s t a t e sa id t h a t t h e Uni ted S t a t e s would not 
make a judgement about vho waa t h e a g g r e s s o r . ^ some l e a -
ding p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s i n u n i t e d s t a t e s were opposed t o 
any d i r e c t US involvement i n t h e c o n f l i c t . Former American 
p r e s i d e n t , Eisenhower, opposed any " u n i l a t e r a l " i n t e r -
1. New York Timey. 7 June 1967. 
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ventlon on the p lea tha t i t would be a serious mistake 
for any nation to play a lone hand in t rying to resolve 
the Arab- Is rae l i con f l i c t , Richard Nixon, t he probable 
candidate for the 1968 p r e s i d e n t i a l e l e c t i o n s , while r e s i s -
t ing the use of force e i the r by I s r a e l or Arabs in the 
Arab-Israel c r i s i s , asser ted t h a t "the pas t record of the 
uni ted Sta tes should give pause to any po t en t i a l aggre-
2 
ssor in the Near East", 
Though pres ident Johnson, in h i s memoirs, t r i e d to 
e x t r i c a t e United S ta tes from I s r a e l i ac t ions when he 
wrote } "I have never concealed my regre t t h a t I s r ae l 
decided to move when i t did" ; but a t the actual time he 
declined to c r i t i c i s e I s r a e l i aggression. I t was widely 
believed in the Arab world t h a t un i ted S ta tes acted in 
col lus ion with I s r a e l during May-June 1967 c r i s i s . As t he 
then Egyptian Foreign Minis ter , Mahmond Raid, wrote j 
The crux of the problem was t h a t we had 
received, an o f f i c i a l communication, 
assurances from pres ident johnson t h a t 
I s r a e l would hot i n i t i a t e h o s t i l i t i e s if 
we re f ra ined , which we had; He had pled-
ged t h a t the uni ted S t a t e s would main-
t a in firm opposit ion t o aggression in t h e 
area. Now tha t I s r a e l had s t a r t ed t h e 
war, by a t tacking us , t h e l e a s t we could 
expect was t h a t pres ident Johnson would 
demand the iirmediate withdrawl of I s r a e l i 
forces t o t h e i r o r ig ina l pos i t i on , then 
perhaps we could move to a debate of the 
Pa l e s t i ne ques t ion . • • and of the basic 
causes of the s t r i f e in the area, 4 
2. New York Times# 26 May 1967. 
3. Lydon B. johnson. The Vantage Point , Persgect ives of the 
presidency, 1963-1969, (New York : Holt Rinhart , 1971) , 
P . 297. 
4. Mahmoud Riad, The struggle for peace in t h e Middle East 
(New York : Quartet Books, 1981), pp, 25-26. 
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And the Johnson administrat ion did not c a l l for the with-
drawl of I s r a e l i f o r c e s from occupied Arab t e r r i t o r i e s . 
The Egyptian pres ident , Nasser was equal ly c r i t i c a l of 
American p o l i c y j "The problem now i s that whi le the U.S. 
o b j e c t i v e i s t o pressure us to minimize our d e a l i n g s with 
the s o v i e t Union, i t w i l l dr ive us in the oppos i te d irec-
t i o n a l toge ther . The United S ta te s l eaves us no choice". 
The f a i l u r e of Johnson administrat ion t o assuage the Arab 
sentiments and i t s open supports for I s r a e l not only drived 
some of the Arab countr ie s i n t o Soviet orbi t in the June 
1967 war, rather i t s e r i o u s l y increased Soviet-American 
6 
r i v a l r y in t h e region". 
The r e s o l u t i o n 242 (1967) adopted by the UN secur i ty 
Council c a l l e d upon I srae l t o vacate the occupied Arab 
7 
t e r r i t o r i e s . Thus the UN s e c u r i t y Council had succeeded 
in ending the h o s t i l i t i e s and ensure c e a s e f i r e , on 19 
June 1967, Pres ident Johnson proposed f i v e p r i n c i p l e s as 
means t o so lve the Arab-Israel c r i s i s . These p r i n c i p l e s 
included withdrawl of troops , recognized r i g h t s of national 
l i f e , progress in solving t h e re fugees problem, l i m i t a t i o n 
of the arms race and respect for p o l i t i c a l independence 
5. I b i d . , p, 25. 
6. cherge A. Rubenberg, I s r a e l and the American National 
I n t e r e s t (Urbana; I I , » U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i o n i s Press 
1986) , p . 125. 
7. UN, O f f i c i a l Records of the Secur i ty Council (hereafter 
SCOR) Sess ion 22, Meeting 1349, 7 June 1967, p, 2. 
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and terrotirial integrity,^ President Johnson further 
added that since the countries of the region had, "had 
only fragile and violated truce time for twenty years, 
what they now need are recognized boundaries and other 
arrangements that will give security against terror, dest-
9 
ruction and war". 
Despite verbal pronouncements through pol icy s t a t e -
ments regarding expression of concern for Arab-Israel 
c o n f l i c t , un i ted S ta tes had a t i l t towards I s r a e l . The 
in t r ans igen t a t t i t u d e of I s r a e l was manifest in i t s non-
compliance of r e so lu t ion 242 (1967). 
The pos t - june 1967 period was marked with s i g n i f i -
cant changes in the i n t e rna t i ona l arena which wielded 
inf luence in shaping us pol icy towards West Asia. The 
important changes in American Foreign Policy marked a move 
away from a t i g h t , b ipolar s t r u c t u r a l arrangement and the 
s h i f t from "Ideal p o l i t i k " to " Reaipoli t ik", The advent 
of Nixon adminis t ra t ion in January 1969 added new dimen-
sions to US po l icy towards West Asia. 
While in West Asia, the US pol icy during 1970s was 
"even handed" mainly influenced by Nixon-Kissinger duo 
with I s r a e l given p r i o r i t y as t he bulwark of American 
8. Department of S t a t e Bul le t in , Vol. 57, 10 Ju ly 1967, 
pp. 31-34. 
9 . Ib id . 
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stratigic stakes, the US policy towards the Persian Gulf 
was focussed on its efforts to promote Iran as the prime 
regional actor defending security and Western interests in 
the area. If the shape of Us global strategic posture in 
the Vietnam war was the main determinant of US policy 
towards Gulf region then its dilemma over replacing the 
British with Us forces was also a contributory factor for 
shaping Us policy towa~ds West Asia as well as Gulf region. 
Apart from the fear of Congress rejection and adverse 
American public opinion, no additional forces were available 
for assignment to the west Asia - Gulf region due to contin-
uing operation in southeast Asia, 
In the wake of British withdrawl, there was fear 
of power vacumm in which Soviet union could creep in and 
the united States was not in a position to immediately 
get in mainly because of its involvement in the Vietnam 
war and domestic compulsions. Consequently the Nixon admini-
stration sought to respond within the framework of its new 
geopolitical doctrine announced by President Nixon at Guam 
in 1969, which came to known as Nixon Doctrine, it in 
corporated the following principles ; 
10, Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London Weiden-
teld and Nicolson, 1979), p. 1264, 
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The u n i t e d S t a t e s w i l l keep a l l i t s t r e a t y 
commitments we s h a l l p r o v i d e a s h i e l d of a 
n u c l e a r power t h r e a t i n g t h e freedom of a 
n a t i o n a l l i e d w i t h u s , or of a n a t i o n whose 
s u r v i v a l we c o n s i d e r v i t a l t o our s e c u r i t y 
and t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e r e g i o n as a whole; 
In c a s e s i n v o l v i n g o t h e r t y p e s of a g g r e s s i o n . 
We s h a l l f u r n i s h m i l i t a r y and economic a s s i s -
t a n c e when r e q u e s t e d and a s a p p r o p r i a t e . But 
we s h a l l l o o k t o t h e n a t i o n d i r e c t l y t h r e a -
t e n e d t o assume t h e primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
p r o v i d i n g the man power f o r i t s d e f e n c e , 11 
Though a t t h e i n i t i a l s*"age, t h e N.'xon D o c t r i n e had l i t t l e 
t o do w i t h s e c u r i t y i s s u e s i n t h e r e g i o n , but i t was soon 
e v i d e n t t h a t t h e r e g i o n would become t h e f i r s t and as i t 
of 
t u r n e d o u t , t h e most s e r i o u s t e s t / A m e r i c a n s t r a t e g y . I s r a e l 
i n w e s t As ia and I r a n i n t h e Gulf became t h e main f o c a l 
p o i n t s of American p o l i c y toward t h e r e g i o n t o s u s t a i n i t s 
p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t . Hence d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of 
t h e i r r e l a t i o n s w i t h US during 1968 t o 1980 i s c a l l e d f o r 
t o h a v e an i n d e p t h a s se s sment of US p o l i c y toward t h e 
r e g i o n , 
(A) US AND ISRAEL 
In t h e p o s t June-1967 war, t h e American i n t e r e s t i n 
a s s u r i n g I s r a e l ' s s e c u r i t y and s u r v i v a l was transformed 
i n t o a de f a c t o a l l i a n c e between t h e two s t a t e s p r e d i c a t e d 
on t h e p e r c e p t i o n t h a t I s r a e l was a v a r i a b l e s t r a t e g i c 
a s s e t t o t h e r e a l i z a t i o n of American i n t e r e s t s . The advent 
1 1 . Nixon D o c t r i n e c i t e d i n I b i d , p p . 2 2 4 - 2 2 5 , 
159 
of the Nixon acaminlstration had given r i s e to ques t ions 
about the nature of American policy* especia l ly i t s appro-
ach to the Arab-Israel peace process and i t s r e l a t i o n s with 
I s r a e l . The per iod of t r a n s i t i o n in post-June 1967 war and 
1968 had been marked by a number of events t h a t suggested a 
need to reconsider the West Asian s i t ua t i on and the region 
was high on the admin i s t r a t i on ' s agenda, 
Nixon adminis t ra t ion intended more to involve Soviet 
union in the nego t i a t ions designed to solve the Arab-Israel 
quest ion was t o the d i s l ik ing of I s r a e l i government. In 
ear ly 1969, I s r a e l i Foreign Minis ter Abba Eban v i s i t e d the 
un i ted S ta tes to a r t i c u l a t e I s r a e l ' s case and t o assess the 
s i t u a t i o n . While recognising US needs, however, I s r a e l ' s 
u l t i m a t e concern was whether the approach would serve I t s 
i n t e r e s t in peace and secu r i ty , and i t was uHclear whether 
the new approach would serve I s r a e l i i n t e r e s t s as well as 
•J 2 i t might serve U.S. goa ls . 
I s r ae l a lso nursed apprehensions against any Four-
power sett lement of Arab-Israel d i spute on the ground t h a t 
such a proposal would be imposed on I s r ae l and i t would be 
d i f f i c u l t for the l a t t e r t o r e s i s t such a proposal put 
forward by grea t powers. Further more I s r a e l was convinced 
t h a t such a proposal would favour the Arabs. Explaining 
12. Bernard Reich, The uni ted S t a t e s and I s r a e l t Influence 
in the specia l Relat ions (New York t Praeoer. 1984) , 
p , 20. 
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I s r a e l ' s pos i t ion In t h i s regard , the then I s r a e l i Foreign 
Minis te r , GoldaMelr, in an Interview In the summer of 1969, 
s t a t ed ; 
Supposing the uni ted s t a t e s reached an agree> 
tnent with Russia and a l l s o r t s of other nat -
ions on a peace set t lement - we say, so what? 
where do we come i n , , . The Russians a re not j u s t Egypt ' s f r iends in the way America i s 
our f r i end . But they are Egypt 's lawyer and 
wi l l not compromise t h e i r c l i e n t s demands. 
There i s no doubt t h a t the Soviets wi l l not 
agree t o anything without Nasser ' s consent,13 
By t h e f a l l of 1969, the mood seemed to have changed and when 
pres ident Nixon addressed the United Nations in September 
1969, few new ideas were mooted. The American pres ident 
r e i t e r a t e d t h a t a set t lement had t o be based "on respect 
for the sovereign r i g h t s of each nation In t he area t o 
ex i s t within secure and recognized boundaries" and t h a t , 
"the peace cannot be achieved on the bas i s of subs tan t ia l 
a l t e r a t i o n s in the map of the Middle E a s t . , . , peace cannot 
be achieved on the bas i s of anything l e s s than a binding, 
i r revocable commitment by the p a r t i e s t o l i v e together in 
peace", '^* While Arabs found Nixon's statement as disapproved 
whereas I s r a e l welcomed I t with i t s apparent re tu rn to 
t he onus for nego t ia t ions being placed on the p a r t i e s , and 
not the grea t powers. 
13. Washington Post , 7 August 1969. 
14. Department of ^ t a t e Bul le t in , (Washington, 6 October 
1969, pp. 299-300. 
16 
During September 1969, I s r a e l i Prime Minis ter , Golda 
Mel r ,v i s i t ed Washington.During her meeting with President 
Nixon, she ra i sed I s r a e l ' s skepticism concerning t h e b i l a t e r a l 
super power t a l k s and i t s preference for d i r e c t negot ia t ions 
between I s r a e l and the Arabs.^^ While out l in ing US policy 
for West Asia, Secretary of s t a t e , William Rogers, on 9 
December 1969. a r t i c u l a t e d spec i f i c proposal f o r peace 
between Egypt and I s r a e l , Asserting t h a t an agreement among 
the g rea t powers could not be subs t i t u t ed for an agreement 
among the p a r t i e s . Secretary Rogers suggested t h a t the 
proposed agreement should be within the frame work of 
Securi ty Counci l ' s Resolution 242(1967)^ . 
Roger's proposal supported the concept of I s r a e l i 
withdrawl from occupied Arab t e r r i t o r i e s and s t a t ed that 
while there should be changes in boundaries, they "should 
not r e f l e c t the weight of conquest and should be confined 
1 7 
t o in subs t an t i a l a l t e r a t i o n s required for mutual secur i ty" . 
With regard to the holy c i t y of Jerusalem, Rogers suggested 
t h a t i t should be a unif ied c i t y "where there should be 
r o l e s for both I s r a e l and Jordan in the c i v i l , economic 
and r e l i g i o u s l i f e of the c i t y " , ^ 
15 , Reich, n. 12, p . 23, 
16, Department of State Press Release, No. 371, 9 December 
1969, 
17. Ibid, 
18. Ibid. 
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I s r a e l ' s r e s p o n s e t o R o g e r ' s was n e g a t i v e , and c r i -
t i c a l t o b o t h t h e p r o c e d u r a l and t h e s u b s t a n t i v e a s p e c t s 
of t h e p l a n . I s r a e l seemed t o d i f f e r w i t h R o g e r ' s p l a n . 
I s r a e l seemed t o p r e f e r an Ainerican r o l e d e s i g n e d t o b r i n g 
t h e p a r t i e s t o g e t h e r w h e r e a s Roger b e l i e v e d i n t h e u t i l i t y 
of a b r o a d e r U . S . r o l e and a more d e t a i l e d p o s t u r e . I s r a e l 
f o c u s s e d on t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s t o 
a c h i e v e a d u r a b l e p e a c e , b a s e d on a t r e a t y a r r i v e d a t 
w i t h o u t p r i o r c o n d i t i o n s , w h i l e s e c r e t a r y Roger saw t h e 
u n i t e d S t a t e s p l a y i n g a r o l e b e c a u s e of i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ; and w h i l e i t would n o t imposed a s e t t l e -
men t , " I t would s e e k t o a c h i e v e p e a c e , b e c a u s e t h a t would be 
19 i n t h e n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t of t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s " . 
The I s r a e l i government n o t o n l y opposed t h e p r o -
p o s a l s mooted by US s e c r e t a r y of S t a t e W i l l i a m Roger , b u t 
r e j e c t e d . I n t h i s r e g a r d , t h e I s r a e l i c a b i n e t d e c l a r e d i 
"The C a b i n e t r e j e c t s t h e s e American p r o p o s a l s i n t h a t t h e y : 
p r e j u d i c e t h e c h a n c e s of e s t a b l i s h i n g p e a c e , d i s r e g a r d 
t h e e s s e n t i a l need t o d e t e r m i n e and s e c u r e a g r e e d b o r d e r s 
t h r o u g h " t h e s i g n i n g of p e a c e t r e a t i e s by d i r e c t n e g o t i a -
20 t i o n s , a f f e c t I s r a e l ' s s o v e r e i g n r i g h t s and s e c u r i t y , . . . " 
19. Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , 12 January 1970, p . 23. 
20. Je rusa lem P o s t , 23 December 19 69. 
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Explaining I s r a e l i opposition t o t he proposal, I s r a e l ' s 
premier Golda Mier, t o ld the I s r a e l i Parl iament, (Knesset) , 
on 29 December 1969 t 
"The proposals do not ob l iga te the Arab 
S ta t e s expressly to recognise I s r a e l ' s 
sovereignty, they do not advocate the 
de l inea t ion of secure, recognized, and 
agreed borders by free nego t ia t ions be t -
ween the p a r t i e s , they do not ob l iga te 
t he Arab s t a t e s e f fec t ive ly t o put an 
end t o t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y , , , , on the 
other hand, they involve a v io l a t i on of 
I s r a e l ' s sovereign r i g h t s in regard to jerusalum and a danger to I s r a e l ' s secu-
r i t y in the proposed arrangement about 
the Arab refugeesi'Sl 
This led to a cool off s t a t e in U,s. I s r a e l r e l a t i o n s as 
r e f l ec t ed in I s r a e l i p remier ' s speech before the Knesset: 
"we have never demanded of t h e U.S. t h a t the 
f r i end ly r e l a t i o n s ex is t ing between us be 
exc lus ive . We have never expected t h a t 
power, which has i n t e r e s t s throughout the 
world, to r e f r a i n from maintaining f r iendly 
r e l a t i o n s with our neighbours. Nevertheless, 
we have the r i g h t t o demand t h a t the pol icy 
of the u.S, should not be conducted at the 
expense of our e s sen t i a l i n t e r e s t s " . 2 2 
in view of the expressed I s r a e l i opposi t ion to Rogers plan, 
pres ident Nixon t r i e d to influence I s r a e l i thinking by 
reassur ing i t concerning American po l icy . In l a t e January, 
pres ident Nixon sent a message t o t he National Emergency 
Conference on t h e Peace in the Middle East , which could be 
based only "on agreement between the p a r t i e s and tha t agree-
21. Jerusalem Post, 30 December 1969, 
2 2 . I b i d . 
1^^ 
23 
ment can be achieved on ly through n e g o t i a t i o n s between them. 
While a f f i rming US W i l l i n g n e s s t o supply arms t o I s r a e l , 
p r e s i d e n t Nixon f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t t h e u n i t e d s t a t e s would 
ma in ta in a c a r e f u l watch on the s i t u a t i o n i n the r e g i o n . 
On t h e o the r hand, r e g i o n a l developments i n West Asia 
had been t ak ing a d i f f e r e n t shape with esca i la t ion in 
I s r a e l i war of a t t r i t i o n and argumenta t ion i n s o v i e t arms 
s u p p l i e s t o Egypt. According t o Seymour Hersh , in t h e summer 
of 1969, " I s r a e l i a i r f o r c e began f l y i n g a c r o s s t h e S i n a i 
t o bombV and s t r a f e Egyp t i an f o r t s . . . a i r t o a i r b a t t l e s were 
fought withJtheEgyptian a i r f o r c e , and a dozen s o v i e t supp l i ed 
Egypt ian p l a n e s were sho t down,*^ There had been a big arms 
deal between Egypt and t h e s o v i e t u n i o n . Thus t h e arms s u p p l i e s 
and t h e e s c a l a t i n g w a r , b o t h c o n t r i b u t e d to .g rowing s o v i e t 
i n f l u e n c e in t h e a r e a . 
In Washington, I s r a e l i p rovoca t ion for t h e i n c r e a s e d 
Sovie t p re sence in West Asia was ignored and on t h e c o n t r a r y , 
argument was advanced t h a t I s r a e l should r e c e i v e more American 
27 
weapons so t h a t I t could b e t t e r con t a in s o v i e t expansionism. 
i n view of i n c r e a s i n g p r o s p e c t s of Sov i e t involvement i n 
23 . New York Times, 29 J anua ry 1970. 
24. I b i d . 
25. Seymour M. Hersh, The p r i c e of Power : K i s s i n g e r in t h e 
Nixon White House (New York « Summit Books, 1983) , p . 217. 
26. Rubenberg, n . 6 , p . 149. 
27. I b i d . 
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west Asia, en ta i l ing growing po ten t i a l for superpower conf l i c t 
us s ec re t a ry cf S ta te came out with a revised version of h i s 
plan for west Asia on 25 June 1970. The revised plan, i n t e r -
ali# l i s t e d four p r i n c i p l e s i 
(1) That an agreement among outs ide powers not be a 
s u b s t i t u t e for agreement among t h e p a r t i e s themselves; 
( i i ) That a durable peace meet the l eg i t ima te concerns of 
both s ides ; 
( i i i ) That the framework for a negot iated settlement be in 
accordance with t h e e n t i r e t e x t of Resolution 24 2; and 
(iv) That t he re not be a pro t rac ted period of no war/no 
peace, since r ecu r ren t Violence and spreading chaos 
would serve the i n t e r e s t s of no nation in or out of the 
no 
Middle East. ° 
This was widely publ ic i sed as new US p o l i t i c a l i n i t i a t i v e . 
The growing po ten t i a l for superpower confrontat ion was high-
l igh ted by president Nixon in h i s t e l ev i s ed interview on 1 July 
1970. "I th ink the Middle Bast how i s t e r r i b l e dangerous. 
I t i s l i k e the Balkans before the Woirld War-i where the two 
superpowers, t he united S ta tes and Soviet Union, could be 
drawn in to a confrontation t h a t ne i ther of them wants because 
29 
of the dif ferences t h e r e " . 
28. US S ta te Department, A l a s t i n g Peace in the Middle East » 
An American View (Washington, D.C, Government Pr int ing 
Office, 1970) . 
29. Weekly Compilation of p res iden t i a l Documents (Washington, 
6 July 1970, p , 869) . 
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w h i l e Egypt a c c e p t e d t h e "new i n i t i a t i v e " , I s r a e l 
e x p r e s s e d r e l u c t a n c e i n i t i a l l y b u t owing t o Us p r e s s u r e and 
r e a s s u r a n c e s , t h e I s r a e l i c a b i n e t , on 31 J u l y 1970, a c c e p t e d 
t h e i n i t i a t i v e . S u b s e q u e n t l y t h e i n d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s be tween 
Egypt and I s r a e l commenced t h r o u g h t h e good o f f i c e s of j a r r i n g 
M i s s i o n wh ich c o n t i n u e d t i l l t h e end of 1971 w i t h o u t any 
t a n g i b l e o u t c o m e . The US e f f o r t s i n i n i t i a t i n g i n d i r e c t n e g o -
t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n I s r a e l and Arabs u n d e r t h e a u s p i c e s of 
J a r r i n g M i s s i o n i n 1970-71 a r d s h u t t l e d i p l o m a c y f o r p r o x i -
m i t y t a l k s i n 1972 f a i l e d t o r i p e n i n t o f r u i t i o n . Though 
a t t e m p t s made by u n i t e ^ S t a t e s d u r i n g 1970-72 d i d n o t y i e l d 
t a n g i b l e r e s u l t s b e i n g c o n t r i b u t a r y t o d e f u s e t h e wes t A s i a n 
c r i s i s b u t i t d i d k e e p U S - I s r a e l r e l a t i o n s c o r d i a l . 
US ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE i 
B e f o r e a n a l y s i n g t h e d e v e l o p m e n t s l e a d i n g t o A r a b - I s r a e l 
c o n f l i c t i n O c t o b e r 1973 and US p o l i c y t o w a r d s t h e c o n f l i c t 
and t h e p a t t e r n of U S - I s r a e l r e l a t i o n s i n t h e p o s t - O c t o b e r 
1973 war p e r i o d , i t i s w o r t h w h i l e t o a n a l y s e US economic 
a s s i s t a n c e g i v e n t o I s r a e l be tween 1968 and 1980. American 
arms s u p p l i e s t o I s r a e l w i l l b e a n a l y s e d i n s e q u e n c e of e v e n t s 
a s t h e y o b t a i n e d i n t h e r e g i o n t o a s c e r t a i n s t r a t e g i c 
p e r s p e c t i v e . 
3 0 . Gunnar j a r r i n g was e n t r u s t e d t h e t a s k of f a c i l i t a t i n g 
i n d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s b e t w e e n I s r a e l and A r a b s . He was 
t h e S p e c i a l Envoy of UN S e c r e t a r y G e n e r a l . 
1b7 
The U.S. economic and military assistance made available 
to Israel during 1968 to 1980 is shown in table 4.1. 
Tab, c; 4.1 
US ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL 
1 9 6 8 t o 1980 
Y e a r 
1 9 6 8 
1969 
1970 
1 9 7 1 
1972 
1 9 7 3 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
SOURC 
T o t a l 
A i d 
7 6 . 8 
1 2 1 . 7 
7 1 . 5 
6 0 0 . 8 
4 0 4 . 2 
4 6 7 . 3 
2 5 7 0 . 7 
6 9 3 . 1 
2 29 9 . 4 
1 7 5 7 . 0 
1 8 1 1 . 8 
4 8 1 5 . 1 
1 8 1 1 . 0 
E t T h e I 
E c o n o m i c 
L o a n s 
5 1 . 3 
3 6 . 1 
4 0 . 1 
5 5 . 5 
5 3 . 8 
5 9 . 4 
-
8 . 6 
2 3 9 . 4 
2 5 2 . 0 
2 6 6 . 8 
2 6 5 . 1 
2 6 1 . 0 
i n k ( W a s h i n g 
E c o n o m i c 
G r a n t s 
0 . 5 
0 . 6 
0 . 4 
r>.3 
5 0 . 4 
5 0 . 4 
5 0 . 4 
3 4 4 . 5 
4 7 5 . 0 
4 9 0 . 0 
5 2 5 . 0 
5 2 5 . 0 
5 2 5 . 0 
t o n ) Decetr 
($ mini 
M i l i t a r y 
Loans 
25 .0 
8 5 . 0 
3 0 . 0 
5 4 5 . 0 
300 .0 
307 .5 
9 « 2 . 7 
200 .0 
750 .0 
5 0 0 . 0 
5 0 0 . 0 
2700.0 
500 .0 
b e r 198 2, 
on) 
M i l i t a r y 
G r a n t s 
-
-
-
-
-
-
1500.0 
100.0 
750 .0 
500 .0 
500 .0 
1300.0 
500 .0 
p . 3 . 
s o v i e t 
j e w s Rese -
t t l e m e n t 
Funds (a ) 
^m 
^m 
" 
-
^ 
50 ,0 
36 .5 
4 0 . 0 
15 .0 
15 .0 
20 ,0 
25 .0 
25 .0 
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I t i s evident from the above t ab l e t ha t American economic 
and m i l i t a r y ass i s tance t o I s r a e l was in t h e form of loans 
and g r a n t s . In 1968, Washington provided $ 76,8 mil l ion worth 
of aid to I s r a e l . Mi l i t a ry component of t h i s aid was $ 25.0 
mi l l ion , almost one t h i r d of t h e t o t a l a id . After the October 
1973 war, the US ass i s t ance to I s r a e l rose to $ 2,570.7 mil l ion 
thus r e g i s t e r i n g subs t an t i a l increase as compared to 1968. Of 
the t o t a l aid received by I s r a e l from the United S ta tes in 
1979, more than 90 per cent was m i l i t a r y aid which was to 
the tune of $ 2482.7 mi l l i on . From then onward, t he mi l i t a ry 
ass i s tance cons t i tu t ed t h e major Chunk of t o t a l aid provided 
by Washington to I s r a e l . During 1979, I s r a e l eeceived an a l l 
time high aid t o the tune of $ 4815.1 m-^llion of which m i l i -
t a ry a s s i s t ance was $ 4,000 mil l ion and the economic ass i s tance 
was $ 815.1 mi l l ion . 
Apart from these o f f i c i a l amounts, the General Accounting 
Office, in a study e n t i t l e d 'United S ta tes Economic Assistance 
for I s r a e l ' l i s t e d t he addi t iona l aid : A $ 55 mil l ion Ashdod-
based desplination p ro jec t , $ 125 mil l ion in loan guarantees 
from 1974 t o 1975 for p r i v a t e U.S. financing of mortgages for 
low cost housing in I s r a e l , more than $ 10 mil l ion in g ran ts 
to the inter-governinental committee for European migration 
to help t r anspo r t refugees to ^s rae l ; about $ 100 mil l ion to 
set up US-Is rae l i b ina t lona l research foundations for indus t ry , 
science and ag r i cu l t u r e , e t c . ^ 
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Apar t froKi t h e o f f i c i a l a i d r e c e i v e d by I s r a e l from US, 
a s shown i n t h e t a b l e a b o v e , t h e r e w e r e a l s o p r i v a t e , t a x 
exempt t r a n s f e r s of money made b y American c i t i z e n s t o I s r a e l , 
32 
e s t i m a t e d t o b e a p p r o x i m a t e l y $ 1.4 m i l l i o n a n n u a l l y . 
B e s i d e s , t h e r e w e r e n o n - a i d a c c o u n t s which i n c l u d e d e x p o r t -
I m p o r t bank l o a n s , g r a n t s and c o n t r a c t s from t h e Depar tmen t 
of E n e r g y and M i l i t a r y C o n t r a c t s ; which d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e 
t h e p a r t of o f f i c i a l a i d a s shown i n t h e above t a b l e . 
i ^ r o - I s r a e l i l o b b y i n t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s a t t e m p t e d t o 
p r o j e c t I s r a e l a s a v a l u a b l e s t r a t e g i c a s s e t f o r s a f e g u a r d i n g 
American i n t e r e s t s i n West A s i a . The m i l i t a r y l e v e r a g e g a i n e d 
b y I s r a e l d u r i n g t h e j u n e 1967 war was s k i l l f u l l y m a n i p u l a t e d 
b y t h i s l o b b y i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s i n g t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l wisdom 
and p o l i t i c a l o r t h o d o x y of t h e i d e a s t h a t I s r a e l c o u l d c o n t a i n 
S o v i e t e x p a n s i o n i n t h e West A s i a , p r o t e c t " m o d e r a t e " Arab 
Regimes from t h r e a t s by " r a d i c a l " f o r c e s , and m a i n t a i n r e g i o n a l 
33 
s t a b i l i t y . A c c o r d i n g t o R u b e n b e r g , " t h e s e m i s t a k e n a s s e s s -
m e n t s l e d t h e Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n t o s u p p l y I s r a e l w i t h a l l 
t h e s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons i t d e s i r e d and t o p r o v i d e f u l l 
s u p p o r t f o r I s r a e l ' s r e g i o n a l p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s , w i t h o u t 
any e v a l u a t i o n r e g a r d i n g t h e c o m p a t a b i l i t y of I s r a e l i and 
34 American i n t e r e s t s " . 
3 2 . Rubenbe rg , n . 6, p . 213 . 
3 3 . I b i d . , p . 142 . 
34. Ib id . 
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Fred J . Khouri^ an eminent expert on West Asia, also 
support Rubenberg's assessment, when he says : "The united 
S ta tes created such a strong m i l i t a r y force in I s r a e l t h a t 
the re was l i t t l e incent ive t o make those major concessions 
considered in Washington t o be necessary for peace with the 
Arabs. In addi t ion , the more I s r a e l was armed by the united 
S ta t e s , the more dependent Arab s t a t e s became on Soviet mi l i -
t a r y and economic a id . In Short , I s r e a l ' s superior mi l i t a ry 
power, and i t s r e su l t i ng unwil l ingness t o make the concessions 
needed for peace, made I s r a e l more of a l i a b i l i t y than an 
asse t in preventing the spread of Soviet power and influence 
35 in the Middle Eas t" , In t h e wake of Soviet arms suppl ies to 
Egypt since e a r l y 1970, p r o - I s r a e l i lobby in United States 
mounted pressure on Nixon adminis t ra t ion to make addi t ional 
arms supplies ava i l ab le to I s r a e l , On 4 June 1970, eightyfive 
senators , responding to p r o - I s r a e l i pressure , handed over a 
p e t i t i o n t o Secre tary of State Rogers demanding tha t Washington 
supply I s r ae l with 125 addi t iona l f igh te r a i r c r a f t l i k e 
Skyhawks and Phantoms. In t h i s regard, the I s r a e l i prime 
Minister , Golda Meir hedged in a speech before t h e Knesset 
wherein she repeatedly s t ressed t h a t i t was only on the bas i s 
of c l a r i f i c a t i o n s received from the uni ted S ta tes regarding 
American "guarantees to maintain m i l i t a r y balance" t ha t 
35. Fred J , Khouri, The Challenge to United S ta tes Security 
and Kiddle East Policy" American-Arab Affai rs , vol . 5, 
Summer, 1983, p , 13, 
3 6 . New York T i m e s . 5 J u n e 1970 . 
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17 I s r a e l a g r e e d t o r e s u m e n e g o t i a t i o n s u n d e r j a r r i n g M i s s i o n . 
The I s r a e l i p r e m i e r d i s c l o s e d t h a t s h e had r e c e i v e d 
two s i g n i f i c a n t p l e d g e s from u n i t e d S t a t e s : f i r s t , t h e a s s u -
r a n c e t h a t t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s had o b t a i n e d an a g r e e m e n t from 
Egyp t and t h e s o v i e t u n i o n t o r e f o r m from c h a n g i n g t h e m i l i t a r y 
s t a t u s quo by e m p l a c i n g SAMs o r o t h e r i n s t a l l a t i o n s i n an 
a g r e e d zone w e s t of t h e Sue;^- C a n a l c e a s f i r e l i n e ; "second 
Wash ing ton a g r e e d t o s u p p l y I s r a e l w i t h m i l i t a r y a i d i n a l l 
t h a t c o n c e r n s t h e m a i n t e n a n c e of h e r s e c u r i t y and b a l a n c e of 
38 f o r c e s i n t h e r e g i o n " . 
In Augus t 1970, I s r a e l a c q u i r e d a $ 7 m i l l i o n package 
of arms e q u i p m e n t i n c l u d i n g ant i -SAM e l e c t r o n i c d e v i c e s , 
s t r i k e m i s s i l e s and c l u s t e r bomb u n i t s which w e r e h i g h l y soj^his-
t i c a t e d and had n o t p r e v i o u s l y been p r o v i d e d t o any f o r e i g n 
39 
c o u n t r y , i n c l u d i n g t h e NATO a l l i e s . On i S e p t e m b e r 1970, 
p r e s i d e n t Nixon a g r e e d t o s e l l I s r a e l a t l e a s t e i g h t e e n a d d i -
t i o n a l F -4 P h a n t o n J e t s , j u s t i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e S e n a t e 
had approved a m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i z a t i o n b i l l t h a t g a v e t h e 
P r e s i d e n t V i r t u a l l y u n l i m i t e d a u t h o r i t y t o p r o v i d e arms t o 
I s r a e l w i t h US f i n a n . c i n g , 
i n t h e b a c k d r o p of c i v i l s t r i f e i n J o r d a n i n j u l y -
August 1970 i n v o l v i n g P a l e s t i n i a n s and J o r d a n i a n f o r c e s . 
37 . J e r u s a l e m P o s t , 24 J u l y 1970 . 
38 . I b i d . , 2 Augus t 197C. 
3 9 . Rubenbe rg , n . 6 , p . 152 . 
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I s r a e l e x t r a c t e d m i l i t a r y c o n c e s s i o n s from Washington on t h e 
p r e t e x t of r e s c u i n g King Hussain of j o d r a n a g a i n s t Syrian or 
Sovie t a t t a c k . Consequent ly on 17 September 1970, P r e s i d e n t 
Nixon a u t h o r i z e d $ 500 m i l l i o n i n m i l i t a r y a id f o r I s r a e l and 
a l s o agreed t o a c c e l e r a t e t h e d e l i v e r y of p r e v i o u s l y promised 
F-4 Phantom a i r c r a f t . The p e r i o d between September 1970 and 
September 197 3 was "unremarkable" from d i p l o m a t i c s tand p o i n t 
of view with r e g a r d t o U S - I s r a e l r e l a t i o n s . In Washington ' s 
view, t h e i n d u c t i o n of s o p h i s t i c a t e d American arms i n t o I s r a e l 
had made i t " u n c h a l l e n g e a b l e m i l i t a r y might" i n t h e r eg ion , in 
t h e l a t e r p a r t of October 1970 when I s r a e l i pr ime M i n i s t e r 
v i s i t e d Washington in search of more a i r c r a f t and arms, she 
was assured of a s s i s t a n c e worth $ 500 m i l l i o n and a f avourab l e 
40 
response t o h e r arras r e q u e s t f o r 1971. And i n Apr i l 1971, 
t h e Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n announced t h a t t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s was 
supplying I s r a e l wi th a d d i t i o n a l Phantoms and c o n s i d e r i n g a 
41 new r e q u e s t fo r more. 
OCTOBER 197 3 HOSTILITIES j 
The ou tb reak of h o s t i l i t i e s on 6 October 197 3 in which 
Syr ia and Egypt launched a m i l i t a r y o f f ens ive a g a i n s t I s r a e l , 
took both t h e American and I s r a e l i governments by s u p e r i s e . 
Even t h e I s r a e l i defence and i n t e l l i g e n c e sources had no 
p r i o r in fo rmat ion about Sy r i an -Egyp t i an p lan t o launch an armed 
40. New xox:\ Times^ 28 October 1970. 
4 1 . Nadawsafran, I s r a e l - The Embat t led AlJ.v (Cambridge \ Mass 
Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1978) , p . 456. 
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a t t ack . By the t ime, h o s t i l i t i e s broke out, President Nixon 
was badly mauled in Watergate Scandal and Henry Kissinger who 
was e a r l i e r Nixon's National Secur i ty Advisor had now became 
us Secretary of S t a t e . Because of President Nixon's pre-
occupation with Watergate a f f a i r s , i t was Kissinger who v i r tu -
a l l y d i rec ted admin i s t r a t i on ' s po l icy towards the Arab-Israel 
war of October 1973, At the ou tse t of the war, Kissinger envi-
saged American concerns » (i) assuring the survival and 
secur i ty of I s r a e l ; ( i i ) maintaining r e l a t i o n s with moderate 
Arab countr ies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia; ( i i i ) preventing 
Europe and japan from pursuing a d i f ferent cause than tha t 
of t he uni ted S t a t e s ; and (iv) preserving US-Soviet detente 
and avoiding confrontat ion with the Soviets , 
As t h e war entered the second day, I s r a e l had made 
two separate reques t s - one for hardware and one for specia-
l i z ed equipment, i n view of I s r a e l i reques ts , t h e US o f f i c i a l s 
in s t a t e and Defence departments were divided over the i s sue . 
Basing t h e i r assumptions on the June 1967 war, they did 
consider t ha t t h e h o s t i l i t i e s would not l a s t long hence they 
bel ieved t h a t by t h e time American resuppl ies reached I s r ae l 
war would have ended. According t o Bernard Heich, the re were 
two important p o l i t i c a l ca l cu la t ions which a lso made Washing-
ton a b i t h e s i t a n t t o immediately comply with I s r a e l i request 
4 2. Henry Kiss inger , Years of Upheaval (Londonj Michael 
Joseph, 198 2) , p , 487. 
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for resupply. The f i r s t considera t ion was tha t a U.S. 
resupply might spur the Sov ie t ' s to s imilar ac t ion thereby 
esca la t ing and prolonging the h o s t i l i t i e s and r i sk ing a 
po t en t i a l US-soviet confrontat ion. And second a major r e -
supply in the preva i l ing s i t u a t i o n would negate any attempt 
by united S ta tes to projec t i t s e l f as "impart ial ••. ^ ^ At the 
same time Kissinger f e l t the necess i ty of acceding to I s r a e l i 
reques t for "phychological" reasons so t h a t I s r a e l i s would 
not feel t h a t they were standing alone in t h a t hour of cr is i -s . 
consequently on 7 October 197 3, Kissinger asked Secretary of 
Defence, James Schlesinger, to make arrangement for ammunition 
and other high technology equipment espec ia l ly sidewinder 
mi s s i l e s , to be picked up at a naval base in v^^Qinia by 
45 
I s r a e l , "^  On 9 October 1973, p res iden t Nixon pub l i c ly commi-
t t e d h is adminis t ra t ion to provide a l l the armaments I s r ae l 
had asked for . 
From 14 to 25 October 197 3, the resupply e f for t 
del ivered approximately 11,000 tonnes of m i l i t a r y equipment 
to I s r a e l which included 40 F-4 Phantoms, 36 A-4 Skyhawks, 
12 C-130 t r anspor t planes and 20 tanks . From 26 October un t i l 
15 November 1973 another 11,000 tonnes of equipments were 
43. Bernard Reich, The united S t a t e s and I s r a e l (New yorkj 
praeger, 1984) p . 18, 
44. Kissinger, n, 40, p , 480, 
45. Ib id . 
46. I b i d , , P. 496, 
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47 de l i vered t o I s r a e l by the United S t a t e s . On 19 October 
197 3, t h e US Congress passed emergency l e g i s l a t i o n making 
a v a i l a b l e t o I s r a e l $ 2.2 b i l l i o n t o pay the new weapons, 
i n t h i s way. United S t a t e s had p-ovided massive m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e t o I s r a e l in the wake of October 197 3 war. 
The resupply of US arms to I s r a e l had profound con-
sequence, reverberat ing for beyond West Asia. The o i l 
producing Arab countr i e s e s p e c i a l l y Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
were contemplating t o use "oil weapon" against the United 
S ta te s and western c o u n t r i e s . At that t ime western Europe 
obtained over 70 per cent of i t s o i l from the Arab S t a t e s . 
Led by Saudi Arabia, t h e Organization of Petroleum exporting 
countr i e s (OPEC), imposed an o i l embargo on the west , accom-
panied by a p r i c e h ike for what o i l was so ld , that plunged 
the western world i n t o economic turmoi l . 
On 22 October 1973, Secur i ty i;iouncil adopted r e s o l u t i o n 
338 which envisaged c e a s e f i r e and r e i t e r a t e d the s o l u t i o n 
of the Arab-Israel c o n f l i c t within the framework of ithe UN 
r e s o l u t i o n 242 (1967) . From I s r a e l i p e r s p e c t i v e , the most 
noteworthy aspect of r e s o l u t i o n 338 was t h e c a l l tor d i rec t 
n e g o t i a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s , a major element of I s r a e l i 
p o l i c y t h a t h i t h e r t o had not been a requirement of the 
peace p r o c e s s . On the other hand the Arabs focused on the 
47, Aviation week and space Technology, v o l . 99 , No. 24, 
10 December 1973, pp. 16-19, 
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r e i t e r a t i o n of r e s o l u t i o n 2nd with i t s c a l l f o r I s r a e l i 
wi thdrawal from t h e occupied t e r r i t o r i e s . 
Af te r t h e t e r m i n a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s , t h e s t age was 
s e t f o r an e f f o r t t o a c h i e v e s e t t l e m e n t . The American 
o b j e c t i v e was t o h e l p ach ieve peace wi th I s r a e l ' s secu-
48 
r i t y and t h u s keep t h e S o v i e t s "informed bu t not i nvo lved" . 
According t o Rubenberg, t h e US p o l i c y focused on " f a c i l i -
t a t i n g a disengagement between I s r a e l and Egypt and between 
I s r a e l and Sy r i a ; l a y i n g t h e ground work f o r a s e p a r a t e , 
b i l a t e r a l £ g y p i t i a n » I s r a e l i peace ; pe r suad ing Saudi Arabia 
and o t h e r OPEC c o u n t r i e s t o l i f t t h e o i l embargo; and p r e . 
p a r i n g f o r a peace con fe r ence t o f ind comprehensive, j u s t 
and l a s t i n g peace t o t h e Middle East p rob lems" .^^ 
An agreement between I s r a e l and Egypt was reached on 
17 J a n u a r y 1974 with t h e good oCfices of t h e United s t a t e s 
50 
and i t s was known as S i n a i I Accord. under t h i s accord , 
I s r a e l d id drop t h e demand fo r a formal end t o b e l l i g e r e n c y 
and a l s o agreed t o some minor changes i n f o r £ e l e v e l s and 
t h e l i n e of disengagement^while Egypt agreed r e d u c t i o n i n 
48. Reich, n. 12, p. 31. 
49. Rubenberg, n.6, p. 175, 
50. For t e x t of S i n a i I Accord see , US Congress , House, 
sub-coirani t tee on Europe and Middle Eas t , Search fo r 
Peace i n t h e Middle Eas t , Documents and S ta t emen t s , 
1967-1979 (Washington, D.C. Government p r i n t i n g Of f i ce , 
1979) , p . 1. 
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forces and equipments . Egypt had a lso agreed t o reopen 
the Suez Canal and t o allow the t r a n s i t of I s r a e l i ships 
through i t . 
After having f a c i l i t a t e d the Sinai I accord, the us 
sec re ta ry of s t a t e , Henry K i s s inge r , s t a r t ed making at tempts 
t o f a c i l i t a t e a S y r i a n - I s r a e l i disengagement. After prolonged 
nego t i a t ions a disengagement accord was signed between 
I s r a e l and Syria on 31 May 1974. Under t h e agreement, I s r a e l 
was t o withdraw from t h e s a l i e n t captured in October 197 3 
war, t h e c i t y of Quneitra and a narrow s t r i p of t e r r i t o r y 
conquered in 1967. The spec i f ic disengagement procedures 
were to be worked out by a j o i n t m i l i t a r y working group. 
Technical agreements r e s u l t i n g from t h i s accord were signed 
on 5 June 1974 and provided for the exchange of p r i soners 
and other d e t a i l s of the implementation of t he agreement,^^ 
The conclusion of I s rae l -Egypt ian and I s r a e l i - S y r i a n 
accords in 1974 had generated considerable optimism in the 
united S ta tes about t he prospect of an ongoing peace process . 
During March 1975, Secretary of S t a t e , Henry Kissinger,, 
made an attempt to a t t a i n a second agreement between I s r a e l 
and Egypt but without any tangib le outcome in view of d i f fer ing 
51 . For t e x t see, john Norton Moore (ed.) The Arab-Is rae l i 
Conf l ic t , vol . I l l Documents (Princeton; N,j,» Princeton 
u n i v e r s i t y Press , 1974) , pp. 1193-1196, 
52. I b i d . 
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p o s i t i o n s of both I s r a e l and Egypt. In l a t e May 1975, a 
l e t t e r signed by seventy-si^c senators urged president Ford 
to make i t c lear t h a t " the uni ted S ta tes acting in i t s own 
nat ional i n t e r e s t s tands firmly with I s r a e l , in the search 
for peace in fu ture nego t i a t ions , and t h a t t h i s premise i s 
t h e 
the bas i s of the cur ren t reassessment of /uni ted s t a t e s pol icy 
53 
in t he Middle Eas t . "^  This l e t t e r came at a time when Washing-
ton and Cairo were engaged indeiicataenegotiation aimed a t 
resuming the I s rae l i -Egyp t ian ta lks .^ '^ The Egyptian Pa r l i a -
ment denounced the l e t t e r as "a f lagran t b i a s in favour of 
I s r a e l " . According to George Bull, a former US Under sec-
r e t a ry of S ta te , the l e t t e r weakened K i s s i n g e r ' s a b i l i t y t o 
secure concessions from I s r a e l and increased the amount of 
subsidy the united S t a t e s had t o pay I s r a e l in order to 
achieve Sinai 1 1 . ^ ^ 
I t was only a f te r pro t rac ted nego t ia t ions t h a t Henry 
Kissinger succeeded in having the complex of agreements known 
as Sinai I I formally i n i t i a t e d on i September 1975, which 
were signed in Geneva on 4 September t h a t year by represen-
5 3. Washington Post . 22 May 1975. 
54, John F, Roehm j r . , "Congressional P a r t i c i p a t i o n in united 
S t a t e s - Middle East pol icy , October 1973-1976", in 
John spaniser and Joseph Nogee (eds.) Congress, the 
presidency and American Foreign Pol icy (Garden c i t y , 
N.Y. J Double day, 1977^, p . 36. 
55. George Bul l , "^ow to save I s r a e l I n s p l t e of Herself" 
Foreign Affairs , vol , 55, April 1977, p . 471. 
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eg 
t a t l v e s of I s rae l and Egypt, For agreeing t o sign the s i n a i -
II accord, I s r a e l ex trac ted big concess ion from Washington 
in the form of $ 2 b i l l i o n in m i l i t a r y and economic aid along 
57 with new m i l i t a r y hardware. 
The advent of Carter administrat ion in January 1977 
i n i t i a l l y gave the impression that Washington was preparing 
i t s e l f to take a f resh approach t o the west Asian problem. 
The v i s i t of US secre tary of s t a t e in mid-February 1977 t o 
I s r a e l and other Arab countr i e s was perhaps a pointer to 
the forthcoming new i n i t i a t i v e . President Carter 's p u b l i c 
pronouncements l a i d emphasis on need for a comprehensive 
se t t l^nent of west Asian problem, reconvening of Geneva 
58 
Conference and centr ia l i ty of the P a l e s t i n i a n i s s u e . Accor-
ding to William Quandt, pres ident Carter was "openly commi-
t t ed to an a c t i v e American r o l e in t ry ing t o break the 
deadlock in Arab-Israel n e g o t i a t i o n s . He saw the Middle East 
d i spute as c l o s e l y r e l a t e d to both the energy c r i s i s and 
the danger of superpower confrontat ion. He was a l so convinced 
59 that progress roust be made in 1 9 7 7 . . . . " . 
56. For t e x t of Sinai I I agreement s e e . Search for Fe^ce^ 
n. 48, pp. 3-5. 
57. I b i d . , pp. 6-11 . 
58. Mohammed K. Shadid, uni ted Sta tes and the PaxCstinians 
(New York i S t , Mart in's Press , 1981), p . 133, 
59. William B. Quandt, Camp David i Peace Making and 
P o l i t i c s (Washington, D. C. * Brooking I n s t i t u t e , 
1986) , pp. 58-60. 
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However, I s r ae l disapproved of pres ident C a r t e r ' s 
three-pronged approach. Even when Pres ident Carter , on 1 
October 1977, p a r t i c i p a t e d in issuing j o i n t Soviet-American 
statement on the Middle East which mainly refer red t o com-
prehensive set t lement , Geneva Conference and Pa les t in ian 
i s sue , I s r a e l reacted vehemently to i t , Yigal Allon, former 
Foreign Minister of I s r a e l pronounced i t " unnecessary i l l -
timed, and i l l - p h r a s e d " . ^ I s r a e l i Foreign Minister Moshe 
Dayan's v i s i t t o Washington and h i s meeting with president 
Carter on 4 October 1977 proved instrumental in bringing a 
change in C a r t e r ' s stance in West Asia p a r t i c u l a r l y on I s r a e l . 
The I s rae l i -US j o i n t communique issued a f t e r Dayan's v i s i t , 
included US Commitments t h a t r eso lu t ions 242 and 338 would 
6 5 
remain t he bas i s for the resumption of Geneva Conference, 
This changed stance was d i sce rn ib le in pres ident C a r t e r ' s 
address t o the UN General Assembly on 4 October 1977 where 
he l a i d s t r e s s on t he need for a "true peace" based on 
r e so lu t ions 242 and 338 and s t a ted t h a t I s r a e l must have 
"borders t h a t are recognised and secure and r e i t e r a t e d 
America's absolute commitment t o I s r a e l ' s secur i ty . 
During the l a t e r months of 1977 and ear ly month of 
1978, b i l a t e r a l nego t ia t ions continued between Egypt and 
60. New york Times, 2 October 1977. 
6 i . William E, F a r r e l l , "united S ta tes Move on Mideast", 
li^ ew X9^^ Time8^ 3 October 1977, 
62. Quandt, n, 59, pp. 126-131. 
63. New York Tiroes, 6 October 1977. 
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I s r a e l t o remove t h e main i r r i t a n t s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p and 
t o resume s t e p s f o r normal iz ing t h e r e l a t i o n s . But t h e r e was 
no f r u i t f u l outcome. During J u l y 1978, Un i t ed S t a t e s f a c i l i -
t a t e d a meeting of Egyp t i an and I s r a e l i r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a t 
t h i s t o break t h e dead lock . H o w e v e r , i s r a e l « s i n f l e x i b l e 
a t t i t u d e i n conceding Egypt ian demands l e t t he impasse con-
t i n u e , on 23 J u l y 1978, I s r a e l i prime M i n i s t e r Menachem Pegln 
responded t o S a d a t ' s p l e a f o r a "goodwil l g e s t u r e " from 
I s r a e l — f o r example, t h e r e t u r n of Mt. S i n a i t o g e t t h e 
t a l k s going on aga in , w i th a b l a n t r e p o r t s " . Not even one 
64 g r a i n of d e s e r t sand. Nobody can g e t any t h i n g f o r no th ing" . 
i n view of t h e p r e v a i l i n g s t a l e m a t e , p r e s i d e n t 
C a r t e r took t h e i n i t i a t i v e of i n v i t i n g pr ime M i n i s t e r of 
I s r a e l and Egypt fo r a summit meeting t o Camp David, i n t h e 
mountains of Maryland i n USA. Consequent ly on 5 September 
1978, I s r a e l i Prime M i n i s t e r Begin, Egypt ian P r e s i d e n t # S a d a t ^ 
and p r e s i d e n t C a r t e r , a longwi th t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e a ides were 
c l o a e t t e d fo r t h i r t e e n days a t camp David. The p r o t r a c t e d 
n e g o t i a t i o n s r e s u l t e d i n producing two documents on 17 
Septembier 1978 j (a) A framework fo r peace in t h e Middle 
Eas t ; and (b) A framework f o r t h e c o n c l u s i o n of a peace 
t r e a t y between I s r a e l and Egypt .^^ The Camp David accords 
invoked adverse r e a c t i o n i n t h e Arab world l ead ing t o E g y p t ' s 
64 . The Economist (London) 30 J u l y 1978, p . 5 1 . 
65 . For t e x t see Search f o r Peace, n, 50, pp . 18-29. 
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expulsion from Arab League and suspension of economic 
ass i s tance from Saudi Arabia, 
From then onward, Washington concentrated i t s e f fo r t s 
on f a c i l i t a t i n g a peace t r e a t y between I s r a e l and Egypt within 
the framework of Camp David accords. By the end of September 
1978, I s r a e l had hinted about i t s wi l l ingness to evacuate 
from Sinai i n case a peace t r e a t y was signed between I s r a e i 
and Egypt, Consequently, during the second week of October 
1978, under t he auspices of the United s t a t e s , t h e represen-
t a t i v e s of I s r a e l and Egypt s t a r t e d negot ia t ions for a peace 
t r e a t y . Tl^ e p ro t rac ted nego t ia t ions between October 1978 
t i l l March 1979 involved f i v e d i f f i c u l t months of bickering 
and arguing and u l t ima te ly on 26 March 1979 an Egyptian-
67 
I s r a e l i peace t r a t y was signed. The f ina l t r e a t y contained 
no s ign i f ican t depar tures from the Camp David framework, 
except t h a t t he f i r s t document, the frame work for peace, 
was rendered meaningless. 
The p o l i t i c a l inileage which President Car ter had 
intended t o incur by f a c i l i t a t i n g the conclusion of 
Egypt ian- Is rae l i peace t r e a t y was not so favourable t o him, 
66, S,P.Tillman, The United S t a t e s in the Middle Eastt 
I n t e r e s t s and ObatacTep (Bloomingtonj Indiana Universi ty 
p res s , 198 2) , P. 205, 
67. For d e t a i l s see Quandt, n, 59 pp, 280-285, 
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Dur ing h i s v i s i t t o I s r a e l on 10 March 1979 , P r e s i d e n t 
C a r t e r was g r e e t e d w i t h c o n s i d e r a b l e h o s t i l i t y and 
68 
e x t e n s i v e h a g g l i n g . Even i n t h e American media a l s o , 
t h e r e was mixed r e a c t i o n . As h e l a t e r w r o t e t h a t h e was 
• • d i s g u s t e d " w i t h t h e American p r e s s * n e g a t i v e comments 
abou t t h e a g r e e m e n t s b e i n g ••bought a t a p r i c e of ^ 10 t o 
$ 20 b i l l i o n and i n v o l v i n g a m u t u a l d e f e n c e t r e a t y w i t h 
69 I s r a e l , 
The f o r e g o i n g a n a l y s i s makes i t amply c l e a r t h a t 
w i t h US s u p p o r t , p o l i t i c a l , economic and m i l i t a r y I s r a e l 
was a b l e t o a s s e r t i t s s u p e r i o r i t y i n t h e r e g i o n . I n f a c t , 
Wash ing ton had a p r o - I s r a e l i " t i l t " i n I t s p o l i c y t o w a r d s 
w e s t A s i a . The U n i t e d S t a t e s n o t o n l y h e l p e d I s r a e l d u r i n g 
t h e O c t o b e r 197 3 war , b u t a l s o b u i l t up p r e s s u r e on Egypt 
t o make c o n c e s s i o n s t o I s r a e l f o r s i g n i n g t h e Camp David 
a c c o r d s and E g y p t - I s r a e l i p e a c e t r e a t y . 
6 8 , New York Tinnes, 13 March 1979 . 
6 9 , j immy C a r t e r , Keep ing F a l t h t Memoirs of a P r e s i d e n t 
(New y o r k t Bantam Books , 198 2) P . 4 2 6 . 
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(B) US-IRAN RELATIONS j 
p r i o r t o t h e advent of Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n * 
I r a n ' s Shah had p e r f o r c e , t o be c o n t e n t e d w i t h an Ameri-
can s t r a t e g y which was b a s i c a l l y a t odds w i t h h i s own 
a m b i t i o n s f o r t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of I r a n i a n s e c u r i t y p r o g r a -
mmes. B e s i d e s , t h e US b e l i e f s i n t h e " n e c e s s i t y of i n t e r -
v e n t i o n i s t p o l i c y , c o u p l e d w i t h what i t c o n s i d e r e d to be 
t h e r i g h t and o b l i g a t i o n t o p l a v an a c t i v e r o l e i n t h e 
f o r m u l a t i o n of I r a n i a n f o r e i g n and d o m e s t i c p o l i c y g i v e n 
f a c t t h r o u g h t h e e x t e n s i v e c i v i x and m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e 
programines , i m p o s e d s e v e r e c o n s t r a i n t s upon t h e S h a h ' s 
70 p l a n s f o r a m i l i t a r i l y and p o l i t i c a l l y s t r o n g I r a n , 
The B r i t i s h announcement of i t s d i c i s i o n t o w i t h -
draw from t h e Gul f and t h e Nixon d o c t r i n e w e r e two s i g n i -
f i c a n t f a c t o r s "which h e l p e d I r a n i n i t s d e s i r e f o r 
r e c o g n i t i o n a s a r e g i o n a l p o w e r . And a t t h i s j u n c t u r e t h e 
Shah of I r a n made no s e c r e t of h i s d e s i r e and a b i l i t y t o 
become a r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y m a n a g e r , w h i l e c o u n s e l l i n g 
Wash ing ton t o " p h y s i c a l l y k e e p o u t " of t h e Gulf ( a l t h o u g h 
n o t from t h e I n d i a n Ocean s i n c e t h a t was q u i t e a n o t h e r 
7 0 . C . D . C a r r , "The U n i t e d S t a t e s - I r a n i a n R e l a t i o n s h i p 
1948-1978J A S tudy a t R e v e r s e I n f l u e n c e . " i n Hassen 
Ami r sadegh i ( e d . ) The S e c u r i t y of P e r s i a n Gulf (London: 
Groom Helm, 1981) , p , 7 4 . 
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m a t t e r . shah a t t he same t ime c la imed t h a t I r a n could 
p r o v i d e the Gulf S t a t e s " a s much p r o t e c t i o n as B r i t i s h fo rces 
i n t h e area t o d a y . 
Gi rd ing up h i s l i o n s f o r assuming t h e onus of 
r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y . Shah contempla ted p l a n s t o b u i l d a 
"balanced and s i g n i f i c a n t defence f o r c e s of I r a n * with the 
"moral suppor t , a s s i s t a n c e of our f r i e n d s t h e g r e a t e s t of 
7 3 
them being t h e U.S. The Uni ted S t a t e s was more than p r e -
pared to h e l p I r a n f u l f i l l i t s d e s i r e . As Joseph S i s co , 
l a t e r had s a id t h a t I r a n had "both t h e w i l l and t h e capa-
b i l i t y to p l a y a major r o l e in p rov id ing f o r s t a b i l i t y i n 
t h e Gulf and t h e con t inued flow of o i l t o consumer countries':^"* 
i n t h i s r e g a r d , Henry K i s s i n g e r had l a t e r s t r e s s e d t h a t 
I r a n ' s d e s i r e d r o l e was not on ly c o n s i s t e n t wi th U.S. 
s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s , i t was a l s o a t t a i n a b l e "wi thout any 
American r e s o u r c e s , s i nce t h e shah was w i l l i n g t o pay for 
75 t h e (American) equipment out of h i s o i l r e v e n u e s . 
7 1 . Middle East Record, Vo l .5 (1965-1970) , P. 487. 
7 2, Ci ted i n Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Za ib ih The Foreign 
R e l a t i o n s of I r a n : A Developing S t a t e i n a Zone of 
Grea t Power C o n f l i c t (Berke ley . C.A.: U n i v e r s i t y of 
C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s , 1974) , p . 238. 
73 . Middle Eas t Record, Vol .4 (1968) , pp . 83 -84 . 
7 4. Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , 4 September 197 2, 
p . 244. 
75 . Henry K i s s i n g e r , The whi t e House y e a r s (London: 
weidenfe ld and Nicoloson, 1979) , p . 1264. 
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The Deputy Assis tant s ec r e t a ry of Defence, James M. 
Noyes, l a t e r wrote t h a t I r a n ' s r o l e was pre fe rab le since 
a d i rec t American ro l e "would have become an acute ly d iv i -
s ive force in the Arab world" and conf l ic ted with Saudi 
Arabia 's and I r a n ' s growing r^nse of nat ional s t a t u t e , ^ ^ 
In Ju ly 1969, Nixon's s ecu r i t y Adviser Henry Kissinger, 
had a review of the Gulf s i t u a t i o n by the staff of the us 
77 National Secur i ty Council. Consequently the National 
Securi ty Council in i t s r epor t , reached the conclusion tha t 
I r an , together in par tnersh ip with Saudi Arabia, should be 
f u l l y supported in i t s des i r e t o f i l l the vacuum l e f t by the 
78 
B r i t i s h Withdrawal. The then US -Under s ec re t a ry of s t a t e , 
E l l i o t L. Richards in a press Conference in Tehran, on 
2 April 1970, said t h a t the United Sta tes was aware of 
t h r e a t s to peace in the Persian Gulf region and would be 
wi l l ing to offer the necessary help in the form of mi l i t a ry 
7Q 
and economic aid a f te r the B r i t i s h withdrawl in 1971, 
When the energy c r i s i s in the aftermath of October 
197 3 war erupted, US dependence on the Gulf o i l , especia l ly 
76. Ib id . 
77. Tad Szuld, The I l l u s i o n of peace (New Yorkj Viking Press , 
1970) , p . 167. 
78. Ib id . 
79. News Review West Asia (New Delhij IDSA) , May 1970, 
p . 10. 
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on I r a n , i n c r e a s e d . Thus t h e American p e r s p e c t i v e , I r a n 
assuming t h e t a s k of t h e g u a r d i a n of the s e a - l a n e g of the 
Gulf, seemed t o f u l f i l an i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n t h e US s t r a t e g y 
and t h e r e f o r e , was deemed worthy of m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e . 
Thus I r a n succeeded by us ing the v a r i a t i o n s i n t h e i n t e r -
n a t i o n a l environment t o e l i c i t augmented m i l i t a r y a i d . 
After t a k i n g a s tock of t h e p r e v a i l i n g s i t u a t i o n s 
and o p t i o n s a v a i l a b l e t o i t i n t h e Gulf, Nixon a d m i n i s t r a -
t i o n devised a t h r ee -p ronged s t r a t e g y . F i r s t l y , t h a t t h e 
Uni ted S t a t e s would not r e p l a c e U.K.; secondly t h a t a 
symbolic U,S, m i l i t a r y p r e s e n c e i n '•.he form of t h e f i v e -
sh ip US command Middle East Force (COMIDEASTFOR) would be 
r e t a i n e d , and t h i r d t h a t t h e governing framework of US 
p o l i c y i n t h e Gulf would be t o encourage and a s s i s t I r an 
and Saudi Arabia t o t a k e up t h e pr imary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for 
80 
r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y . 
In t h i s "twin p i l l a r " approach adopted by t h e 
Uni ted s t a t e s , i t was I r a n which was going t o p l a y dominant 
r o l e . As Joseph S i sco had i n d i c a t e d t h a t " I r an i n p a r t i -
c u l a r " i s i n t h e fo re f ron t " of P e r s i a n Gulf s e c u r i t y 
80 , US Congress , House Committee of Fore ign A f f a i r s 
New p e r s p e c t i v e on t h e P e r s i a n Gulf (Washington 1973), 
pp , 38-44, 
138 
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management . S u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s d e c i d e d t o 
u n d e r w r i t e t h e I r a n i a n p r o c u r e m e n t programme i n an e f f o r t 
t o b u i l d I r a n I n t o t h e u n d i s p u t e d m i l i t a r y power i n t h e Gulf, 
w i t h c r e d i t s made a v a i l a b l e by Wash ing ton and w i t h i n c r e a s e d 
o i l r e v e n u e , t h e shah began t o p l a c e o r d e r s f o r m i l i t a r y 
equ ipmen t of q u a l i t a t i v e and q u a n t i t a t i v e n a t u r e . Between 
1 9 6 9 - 1 9 7 1 , I r a n i a n o r d e r s f o r u s e q u i p m e n t i n c l u d e d 30 C-130 
t r a n s p o r t a i r c r a f t , more t h a n 200 h e l i c o p t e r s and h u n d r e d s 
8 2 
of a rmoured v e h i c l e s . 
I t i s w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g h e r e t h a t S h a h ' s o e n c h a n t 
f o r s o p h i s t i c a t e d d e f e n c e equipm-^nt had s u b s t a n t i a l l y 
i n c r e a s e d from mid««a.960s onward . As e a r l y a s 1 9 6 4 - 6 5 , I r a n 
had a sked f o r t h e HAWK,SAMs and t h a n t o m p l a n e s w i t h a view 
t o g a i n an edge o v e r I r a q which had a c q u i r e d Mig -21 i n t e r -
c e p t o r s and TU-16 b o m b e r s . Though u n i t e d S t a t e s h a d , i n 
p r i n c i p l e a g r e e d t o s u p p l y them b u t t o o k t h e p l e a t h a t s i n c e 
t h e I r a n i a n s c o u l d n o t h a n d l e a t t h a t t i m e t h e s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
weapon sys tem h e n c e i t u rged I r a n t o h a v e more F - 5 p l a n e s . 
At t h i s s t a g e , t h e shah a p p l i e d h i s t a c t i c a l m a n o u e v r a b i l i t y 
by r e p o r t e d l y s t a t i n g t h a t i n c a s e .Washington f a i l e d t o 
a c c e d e t o h i s demands h e migh t s eek weapons from Moscow. 
As R.K. Ramazanl h a s o p i n e d t " T h e r e was i n t e n t i o n t o 
8 1 , Midd le E a s t R e c o r d , v o l , 5 ( 1 9 6 9 - 7 0 ) , p . 4 6 4 . 
8 2 . C a r i , n , 6 8 , p . 7 5 , 
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wreck the alliance with the united States, but rather to 
use the Soviet deal as a liver to acquire more sophisticated 
Weapons from the united States". Either probably the 
threat worked or the united States relented in adopting 
a flexible attitude. The tangible result was that Iran got 
HAWK by 1966,^ "^  And by December 1966, Washington had also 
announced to supply F-4 fighter airCraft to Iran. The sale 
of two squadrons of the Phantoms was made public by Novem-
ber 1967 and Iran was the first country in Asia to get the 
American rhantom aircraft. The military assistance acquired 
by Iran between 1965 and 1973 is shown in the following table : 
Table 4. 2 
US MlLlTAi^Y ASSISTANCE TO IRAN, 1965-197 3 
(in $ million) 
Year us Credit Sales (FMS) Military loans 
1965 48.8 
1966 90.0 
1967 161.1 
1968 100.0 
1969 104.0 
1970 
1971 - 120.0 
1972 - 100.0 
1973 - 200,0 
455.0 420 ,0 
Tota l A s s i s t a n c e $ 875,0 m i l l i o n 
SOURCL . US Fore ign Ass i s t ance and Ass i s t ance from I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Organ i za t i on , O b l i g a t i o n s and Loan Autho-
r i z a t i o n AID, 24 May 1972, p . 16, 
H' 
8 3 . R.K. Ramazani, l r a n * s Fore ign Po l i cv 1941-1973 ( C h a r l o t l e s 
V i n e J u n i v e r s i t y of Virginia p r e s s , 1975) , p , 343, 
84 . SIPRI, Arms Trade wi th t h e Thi rd World (New York: 1975), 
P . 48. 
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I t i s evident from the above t ab l e t h a t between 1965 and 
1973, Iran got subs tan t i a l c r e d i t and loans from the united 
S ta tes to purchase mi l i t a ry equipment, while between 1965 
to 1969, Washington provided c r e d i t t o Tehran for procuring 
weapons whereas between 1971 and 1973, Iran acquired long 
term loans works $ 420,0 mi l l ion . 
The regional and global development which occurred in 
ear ly 1970s had t h e i r impact f e l t on Shah of I r a n ' s t h rea t 
percept ions and h i s quest for equipping I ran ian armed forces 
with l a t e s t weapons. The I ran ian pol icy a f te r 1971 was 
governed by a scenario ca l led "the t h r ea t of encirclement" 
t h a t was worked out by i n t e r l i n k i n g p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y 
developments around I ran . One of them was t h e Bangladesh 
c r i s i s of 1971. The indo-Soviet t r e a t y , Bangladesh c r i s i s 
and Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, a l l were t r e a t e d as a 
po ten t i a l t h r e a t t o I ran . As Shah of Iran had pointed out 
in May 197 3 : "I was against t h e in te rvent ion of the Pakistan 
army in Last Pakis tan, But t h i s does not de t r ac t from the 
fac t tha t India invaded and dismembered the country. I t 
may even, be t h i s way, but we are ta lk ing about a dangerous 
precedent for t h e fu tu re t h a t convinced me we could only 
r e ly as ourse lves" . 
85. Arhaud de Barchgrawe, "Colossus of the Oil Lanes 
New week, 21 May 1973, p , 44. 
I 9 I' 
Along with shah ' s percept ion of " threat from the east" 
were other f a c t o r s l i k e I raq-Sovie t t r e a ty of 197 2, the 
growing Soviet presence in the region, the involvement of 
Cubans in South Yemen af te r 197 2 , and in Ethiopia af ter 
1977, proved instrumental in giving more substance to the 
I ran hypothesis t h a t i t s secur i ty was in danger. Even the 
I r aq - i r an detente of 1975 f a i l e d to minimize I ran ian th rea t 
percept ions . The shah of I ran had repor tedly s t a t ed tha t 
I raq had more tanks and plane and tha t I r an had no equivalent 
t o soviet scud m i s s i l e ava i l ab le with Iraq.®^ The October 
1973 Arab-Israel conf l i c t fu r the r cast i t s impact on I r a n ' s 
po l i t i co - sn i l i t a ry thinking. The success of i n i t i a l Arab 
a t tach caused I ran t o take measures against the p robab i l i ty 
of a s imilar a t tack from I raq , 
Shah's apprehensions about regional and global sources 
from which t h r e a t could em.anate to I ranian secur i ty were 
e i the r supported or echoes by Us adminis t ra t ion . I ran was 
regarded as an important v i s - a - v i s Soviet union in the context 
of global s ecu r i t y . Joseph sisc:) , Under-Secretary of State 
for p o l i t i c a l Affairs , in a testimony before the House sub-
committee as i nves t i ga t i ons on 10 June 1975 touched tha t 
aspect . When questioned s p e c i f i c a l l y if the uni ted States 
supported I ran with arms in t he context of global s t r a t eg i c 
86. There were about lOO Cubans t r a in ing South Yemenis in the 
use of Mig-21, Washington Post, 25 June ^973. 
87. Shah of I ran in an Interview with Business week. 17 
November 1975, p . 57. 
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considerations, Sisco replied : "I do not know if it is a 
fact in our sales of arms. It is a factor in our overall 
88 
relationship...." He further maintained that American 
decision to sell sophisticated arms to Iran and the progress 
made by the latter in improving its military capability had 
given Iran a "credible deterent" which had enabled it to 
play a more active role In protecting the vital trade routes 
of the Gulf".®^ 
The supply of American arms to I ran a f te r 1973 were 
j u s t i f i e d both in terms of an attempt to use them as a lever 
to ensure continuing o i l suppl ies in view of t h e po ten t ia l 
90 t h r e a t of energy c r i s i s , and a l so as a means of recycling 
p e t r o - d o l l a r s . There was also apprehension t h a t American 
re luc tance in supplying arms to I ran might prompt the l a t t e r 
91 to look elsewhere. 
In Kay 197 2, President Nixon v i s i t e d I ran and following 
tha t meeting, the Us President agreed to s e l l v i r t u a l l y any 
9 2 conventional weapon tha t t he Shah wanted. According to 
88 . US Congress House Committee on In te rna t iona l Affairs , 
The Persian Gulf 1975. 94th Congress 1st sess ion , June. 
Ju ly 1975 (Washington 1975) , p, 40. 
89. Ibid, pp, 10-11. 
90. US Congress, 93rd Congress, I Session, june-November 
1973, Sub-committee on Foreign Affairs , Hearings on New 
perspect ives on the Persian Gulf (Washington : 1973),p,13, 
9 1 . Statement by Joseph Sit,co, 10 June, 1975. Persian Gulf 
1975, n. 86, p . 34. 
9 2. Robert Kubal, "US Po l i c i e s in the Persian Gulf in 
Mohammed Mughisuddin (ed.) Conf l ic t and Cooperation in the 
Persian Gulf (New York : Praeger, 1975) , p . 159. 
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I aurance Martin, "Whatever the fu l l r a t i o n a l e for the decis ion, 
I ran was c lea r ly an ideal power t o be cast in the r o l e of regional 
guardian within t he concept of the Nixon doc t r ine" . The Shah 
also evinced i n t e r e s t in procuring l a t e s t /^e r ican weapons. Iran 
showed i n t e r e s t in laser-guided bombs and new ir'-l4 j e t s which 
were yet to be introduced in the U.S. armed forces and during 
Nixon's Tehran v i s i t , i t was repor ted ly decided t h a t the united 
94 S ta tes would supply these weapons t o I ran , The U.S. mi l i t a ry 
sa l e s to Iran during 1970-77 was worth $ 16,313.0 mi l l ion as 
shown in t he t ab l e below : 
Table 4.3 
M.S. Mi l i t a ry Sales to I ran , 1970-1977 
(in $ Million) 
Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Total 
Amount 113.1 397.5 522.1 2138,1 4270.6 2570.6 1301.3 35000.0 16313.0 
SOURCE : US, uni ted S ta tes Arms Po l i c i e s in t he Persian Gulf and 
Red Sea Area i Past , Present and i 'uture, (Washington 
1977) , p . 5, 
I t i s d i sce rn ib le from the above t a b l e tha t American sa les of 
arms to Iran' in the 1970s portended extreme t r ends . Between 
1970 and 197 2, Washington sold about $ 1 mil l ion worth of arms 
but about $ 15 b i l l i o n between 197 3 and 1977. 
9 3. Laurance Martin, "The Future s t r a t e g i c ro l e of I ran" in 
Hossein Amirsadeghi ( e d , ) , Twentieth Century Iran (New Yorkj 
1977), p . 230. 
94. Jerusalem Post . 13 Ju ly , 1972, 
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on the one hand, the Shah of I r a n ' s over ambitious 
programine helped I ran acquire sophis t ica ted and l a t e s t 
weapons, while on the other hand, he was faced with the 
problem regarding t h e i r t r a in ing programme and even routine-
maintenance. Consequently f ive d i f fe ren t types of American 
groups p a r t i c i p a t e d in the I r an ian mi l i t a ry t r a i n i n g progra-
mme - myJiSli ( the U.S. Army Mission), MAAG (Mil i ta ry Assis-
tance Advisory Group), TAFT (Technical Assistance F ie ld -
team) ; DEFREP (US Defence Representative) and the c iv i l i an 
an ex-mi l i t a ry personnel contracted by various American 
companies associated with the I r an ian mi l i t a ry programme. 
According to K. Booth, "Governments are always tempted 
to design defence p o l i c i e s to counter t h r e a t s which they can 
95 
afford ra ther than those which may ac tua l ly e x i s t " . And 
I r a n ' s arms acqu i s i t i on programme also proved Booth's dictum. 
Between 1973 and 1977, I ran signed agreements for acquiring 
new arms to t he tune of $ 16^339 b i l l i o n . However there was 
a gap between t h e amount denoting the agreement and the 
de l ivery of wea'^ons as evident from the t ab l e below : 
9 5. K. Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London- 1977), 
p . 198. 
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Table 4.4 
United Sta tes - I ran ian Foiei^n Mi l i t a ry Sales Agreements 
and Del iver ies : 1950-1977 
(in thousands of us Dollars) 
F i sca l year Agreements Del iver ies 
47, 29 2 
38,866 
56,717 
94,881 
127,717 
79,352 
214,807 
236,633 
510,347 
956,372 
1, 231,600 
2,433,000 
SOURCE : United S ta tes Arms Po l i c i e s in the Persian Gulf 
and Red Sea Area : Pas t , present and Future 
(Washington 1977), p . 135. 
I t i s c lear from t h e above t a b l e tha t between 1950 and 1977, 
I ran signed agreement for arms suppl ies from the uni ted 
Sta tes worth approximately $ 81.3 b i l l i o n . Of t h a t $ 17.98 
b i l l i o n was for the period 1967-77, when Iran began to pay 
for i t s arms out of o i l money. Following the hike in oi l 
1950-66 
1967 
1968 
1969 
19 70 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977* 
2, 
4 , 
3 . 
1, 
s. 
292,494 
1 4 3 , 8 7 3 
69 ,0 38 
251 ,573 
1 1 3 , 1 5 4 
3 9 6 , 3 4 1 
519 ,110 
, 1 5 7 , 3 5 5 
373 ,255 
-020 ,979 
. 382 ,062 
, 465 ,600 
* Lstimated. 
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p r i c e s , I r a n o r d e r e d arms w o r t h $ 164 b i l l i o n be tween 1973 
and 1977 . 
I r a n a c c o r d e d p r i o r i t y i n a c q u i r i n g arms from t h e u n i t e d 
S t a t e s , a s can b e s e e n from t h e f o l l o w i n g t a b l e : 
T a b l e 4 . 5 
U . S . - I r a n i a n M i l i t a r y S a l e s C a t e g o r y 1950-1977 
( i n t h o u s a n d s of US $) 
C a t e g o r y FMS FMS U n d e l i v e r e d 
o r d e r e d D e l i v e r e d B a l a n c e . 
A i r c r a f t 
S h i p s 
v e h i c l e 
Weapons 
Ammunition 
M i s s i l e s 
Communicat ion 
equ ipmen t 
O the r equ ipment 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 
R e p a i r / R e h a b i l i -
t a t i o n e q u i p m e n t 
4, 
1, 
1. 
Supp ly O p e r a t i o n s 
T r a i n i n g 
O the r S e r v i c e s 
u n d e f i n e d p l u s • 
A d j u s t m e n t s 
T o t a l 
1< 
12< 
, 7 7 3 , 1 4 3 
, 5 0 5 , 2 5 3 
5 3 8 , 0 6 3 
8 3 7 , 4 1 6 
, 2 0 7 , 6 3 3 
3 6 7 , 5 3 4 
245 , 987 
5 7 2 
132, U ^ 
5 2 2 , 8 8 5 
3 9 1 , 272 ' 
, 5 7 6 , 7 2 6 
345 ,309 
, 4 4 3 , 9 0 6 
2 , 2 8 2 , 404 
32 , 250 
29 2 ,764 
4 0 3 , 6 1 6 
352 ,0 26 
135 ,569 
1 1 1 , 3 4 7 
59 2 
7 ,688 
116, 490 
2 1 9 . 8 9 5 
4 2 6 , 3 5 4 
-
4 , 4 3 0 , 9 9 0 
2, 
1, 
1. 
8, 
, 4 9 0 , 7 39 
, 4 7 3 , 0 0 3 
245 ,299 
4 3 3 , 8 0 6 
8 5 5 , 6 0 7 
231 ,664 
134 ,640 
- 2 1 
124 ,426 
356 ,395 
171 ,377 
, 150 ,372 
345 ,309 
, 0 1 2 , 9 1 6 
Carried forward through 1980s. 
SOURCE : uni ted S ta tes ^^ rms Po l i c ies in the Persian Gulf and 
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I t i s evident from the above t ab l e t h a t while acquis i t ioning 
arms from the United S t a t e s , I ran l a id emphasis on Weapons 
and supporting f a c i l i t i e s . Of the t o t a l FMS ordered, almost 
$ 10.1 b i l l i o n (out of the t o t a l of $ 12,44 b i l l i o n t i l l 
1976) were devoted t o a i r c r a f t , ship, mi s s i l e s , and serv ices , 
Iran received about $ 3.5 b i l l i o n , out of a t o t a l of $ 4.43 
b i l l i o n of these items during the same period. 
I r a n ' s arm.s acqu i s i t ion programme was d i rec ted toward 
q u a l i t a t i v e as well as q u a n t i t a t i v e upgrading of I ran ian 
m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s , as can be seen from the t a b l e , 4 ,6, 
I t i s evident from the above t a b l e tha t the uni ted 
s t a t e s emerged as the s i ng l e l a rges t source of supply of 
sophis t i ca ted arms during 1973-78. The increased o i l revenues 
helped the Shah of I r a n ' s penchant for sophis t ica ted arms. 
While in 1968-69, I r a n ' s demand was for F-4 Phantoms, HAWK, 
SAMs, SAAM class F r i g a t e s , G_i30 t r anspor t planes and by 
1972 the demand included F_14 Tomcats, Phoenix AAKs, I-HAWK 
and Rapier SAMs, Boeing 707/747 t r anspor t planes and o i l 
t anke r s . After 1974, I r an was not s a t i s f i e d with anything 
l e s s than the spruance c l a s s des t royer s , submarines, condor 
and Kaverick ASMs, P-3 orion maritime reconnaissance planes 
e t c . 
Between- March 1970 and March 1977, I r a n ' s defence 
budget rose by 1,100 per cent from approximately $ 800 
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T a b l e 4 . 6 
MAJOR WEAPONS ACQUIRED OR ORDEP^D BY IRAN FROM US 
1 9 7 3 - 1 9 7 9 
Weapon Numiber Y e a r p r i c e i n 
$ m i l l i o n 
A i r c r a f t 14 l» 1 9 7 4 - 7 5 ) 
F - 5 E / F 28i 1 9 7 6 - 7 7 ) 
F - 4 E / R F - 4 E 
P h a n t o m 
1 4 1 J 1 9 7 3 - 7 6 
12i 1976) 
3 6 , 1977) 
F - 1 4 A 
P - 3 F O r i o n MR 
B o e i n g 7 0 7 / 3 J . 9 C 6 , 1974) 
R e f u e l i n g C e n t r e 7t 19 76) 
C-130 T y p t . a c 
B o e i n g 747 
a s t a n k e r 
169 1 9 7 4 - 7 7 462 
189 
80 
6 
13 
64 
6 
1 9 7 3 - 7 7 
1 9 7 6 - 7 8 
1 9 7 4 
1 9 7 4 - 7 6 
1 9 7 3 - 7 8 
1 9 7 6 
1185 
2338 
7 3 
224 
n. a 
234 
H e l i c o p t e r s 
B e l l 214A 
B e l l 214C 
A H - I J W i l l 
TOl^ - ASM 
M i s s i l e s 
AAM 
S i d u o n o d e r 
S p a r r o w - I I I 
P h o e n i x 
267 
39 
20 2 
1975-77 
1976-79 
1974 -77 
350 
350 
400 
1980s 
1980s 
1980s 
400 a p p r o x i -
mated f o r t h e 
who le s y s t e m . 
261 
SHIPS 
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T a b l e c o n t d , ^ ; ^ 
Weapons Number y e a r P r i c e i n $ mil Unn 
ASM 
Condor 
M a v e r i c k 
Tcw f o r AH-I j 
Harpoon 
2,500 
22 
1978 
1974-75 64 
19 75-79 38 
SsM, s e a k l l l e r MK. 2 
and Harpoon 200 1978-81 10 2 app rox . 
HAWK-I 1974-78 1000 a p p r o x , 
D e s t r o y e r s 1973 
West r o y e r s 
( S p r u a n c e c l a s s ) 
S u b m a r i n e 
4 
3 
1980-81 1940 a p p r o x . 
1978-79 75 
Armour AND A r t i l l e r y 
155 mm. SP Gun 390 1975-76 7 2 2 . 7 
20 3 mm SP now 28 1976 1 6 . 2 
SOURCE i SPIRI YKAR BOOKS 1970 -1979 . 
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m i l l i o n t o $ 9.4 b i l l i o n . ^ ^ Defence expend i tu re as a s h a r e 
of G.N.F. r o s e from 7.8 per cent in 1970 t o 14.6 pe r cen t 
i n 1978 whi le t h e v a l u e s of I r a n ' s annual arms impor t s r o s e 
from $ 264 m i l l i o n , 9.0 per cent of t o t a l impor t s , t o a 
peak of $ 2.6 b i l l i o n i n 1977.^ ' ' 
Th i s r i s i n g i n c r e a s e in t h e e x p e n d i t u r e had i t s 
impact oja t h e s i z e and q u a l i t y of I r a n ' s weapons i n v e n t o r y . 
Between 1971 and 1979, t h e s i z e of I r a n ' s armed f o r c e s grew 
from 181,000 t o 415,0^0' pe r sonne l wi th a s i m i l a r i n c r e a s e i n 
t h e number of main/medium t a n k s and combat a i r c r a f t . In 
1971 I r a n ' s weapon i n v e n t o r y inc luded few advanced systems 
whi l e by 1979 i t s e x i s t i n g or o rdered i n v e n t o r y i nc luded 
such s t a t e - o f - t h e - a r t systems as F-14 i n t e r c e p t o r s . Chie f ta in 
main b a t t l e t a n k s , F - l 6 f i g h t e r bombers on order , E-3 
a i r b o r n e warning and c o n t r o l systems, a l s o an o rder , and 
s p r u a n c e - c l a s s d e s t r o y e r s . Commenting on I r a n ' s m i l i t a r y 
b u i l d - u p a U.S. Sena te Committee r e p o r t i n 1976 observed : 
"upon d e l i v e r y now ( J u l y ' 1976) and 1981 or equipment 
o rde red t o d a t e , I r a n , on pape r , can be r ega rded as a r e g i o n a l 
99 superpower", 
96 . US Congress , s e n a t e , Cormdttee on Fore ign R e l a t i o n s 
US M i l i t a r y Sa jes t o I r a n (Washington, 1976) p . 13. 
9 7. US, ACDA, world M i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s and Arms T r a n s f e r s , 
1970-1979 (Washington, D.C.t Government p r i n t i n g p r e s s , 
1982) , p . 62. 
9 8 . M i l i t a r y Balance (London), 1970-1980. 
9 9. US Congress , Sena te , Committee on Fore ign R e l a t i o n s , 
U.S. M i l i t a r y s a l e s t o I r a n , (Washington -. 1976) , 
p . V I I I . 
.es 
10 2 
20! 
Thus, t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s emerged as t h e l a r g e s t 
and "most d e d i c a t e d " arms s u p p l i e r t o I r a n . In t h e a f t e r -
math of p r e s i d e n t Nixon and Henry K i s s i n g e r ' s v i s i t t o Tehran 
in 197 2, g u i d e l i n e s from t h e Nat iona l S e c u r i t y Council t o 
American o f f i c i a l a g e n c i e s i n t e r - a l i a s a i d ; "Decis ions on 
t h e a c q u i s i t i o n of m i l i t a r y equipment should be l e f t p r i -
m a r i l y t o t h e Government of i r a n " . ^ ° ° Between 1971 and 1978 
t h e American fo r e ign m i l i t a r y s a l e s (FKS) agreement with 
I r a n exceeded $ 20 b i l l i o n . ^ ° ^ At t h e t i m e of Shah ' s down 
f a l l i n l a t e 1978, some $ 12 b i l l i o n i n U.S. m i l i t a r y s a l ' 
was awai t ing d e l i v e r y t o I r a n over t h e next f i v e y e a r s . 
A c q u i s i t i o n of arms by I r a n between 1972 and 1978 i s shown 
in t h e t a b l e . 4 . 7 . 
i n mid-1978. P r e s i d e n t Ca r t e r had desc r ibed I r a n 
as "an i s l a n d of S t a b i l i t y " ^ ^ ^ and in November 1978, when 
an t i -Shah demons t r a t ions p a r a l y s e d t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , 
Washington approved, t h e d e l i v e r y of more p o l i c e equipment 
100. US Congress, House, Committee on I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , 
u n i t e d S t a t e s Arms P o l i c i e s i n t h e P e r s i a n Gulf and 
Red Sea Areas (Washington, D. C.; 1977), p . 35. 
101. Bernard , Reich, "The u n i t e d s t a t e s and I r a n : An 
Overview", in US Congress , j o i n t Economic Committee, 
Economic Consequences of Revolu t ion i n I r a n (Washington ; 
1979) , p . 8 . 
10 2. Andrew j . P i e r r e , The Global P o l i t i c s of Arms Sa l e s 
( P r i n c e t o n , N . j . P r i n c e t o n u n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 198 2 ) , 
pp . 142-156. 
103. SIPRI YEAR BOOK 1980, p . 98 . 
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t o the I ran ian Army. Following Shah of I r a n ' s abdication 
of throne and going to e x i l e on 17 January 1979 put an end 
to the most powerful American surrogate in t he Gulf region. 
As i t i s evident from tab le 4.7* the uni ted S ta tes 
accounted for 60 per cent of a l l suppl ies of major weapons 
to Iran during 1970s. However U.K.^ I t a l y and West Germany 
also secured large orders for the supply of weapons to I ran 
during tha t period, in 1971, the Shah purchased 764 Chieftain 
tanks from U.K., and then ordered 125 u n i t s of the spec ia l ly 
modified and improved version known as S h i r - I , and 1,225 
Sh i r -2s .^"^ 
However the new Islamic regime in I ran Cancelled a l l 
U.S. arms orders , including for example, I6O, F-I6 f i g h t e r s , 
worth $ 3,500 mi l l ion , seven AlVACS worth $ 1,300 mil l ion and 
400 Phoenix miss i les worth $ 1000 mil l iTn. In addi t ion, t he 
agreement worth $ 12,000 mil l ion for bui ld ing the Shah Bahar 
naval base was cancelled, as were numerous smaller cont rac ts 
covering ammunitions, corrmunications, equipment vehic les , 
spares, support equipment and se rv ices .^°^ 
in t h e uni ted S t a t e s , repor ts in mid-i979 about 
the resumption of us arms sa les to Is lamic regime in Iran 
caused p r o t e s t s in congress. The suggestion concerned the 
104. Ib id . 
105. Ib id . 
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a e l l v e r i e s t o I r a n of s p a r e p a r t , , h e l i c o p t e r s and a ^ n u n t t i o n . 
valued a t $ 5,000 m i l l i o n . i . . - t o r „ o s c i . « i r e i s on r e c o r d 
have s a i d : 
"Mr. p r e s i d e n t p l a n s t o resume ^^ol lars , 5000 
m i l l i o n in arms s a l e s t o I r a n a r e foo lha rdy 
and s h o r t s i g h t e d , s e c r e t a r y K i s s i n g e r s 
b lank check arms p o l i c y « ^ ^ I f ^ . ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^ i ^ t " 
I r a n and now t h e c u r r e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s 
moving down t h e same p a t h . When P r e s i d e n t 
Nixon and S e c r e t a r y K i s s i n g e r gave t h e Shah 
of I r a n a b iank check on which t o o rde r any 
S t s ' weapons. U.S . P o l i c y i n r h a t r e g i o n 
took an i n e x o r a b l e course toward J ^ i ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ " -
c t i o n . The d o l l a r s 8 m i l l i o n p e r day i n wea-
pons o rdered by t h e Shah <3rained h i s count ry 
Sf f i n a n c i a l r e s o u r c e s needed f o r i n t e r n a l 
development, e d u c a t i o n , h e a l t h and t h e 
b u i l d i n g of democra t i c I n s t i t u t i o n s , U.S. 
p o l i c y f a i l e d m i s e r a b l y " . 1 ^ ^ 
Fol lowing t h e l o s s of I r a n , as a r e l i a b l e s t r a t e g i c 
a l l y , and i n t h e a f te rmath of Afghanis tan c r i s i s , u n i t e d 
S t a t e s s t a r t e d seeking c l o s e s t r a t e g i c t i e s wi th t h e p r o -
Western c o u n t r i e s i n t h e Southwest A s i a a r e g i o n . As Harold 
Brown emphasized i n an add re s s t o t h e Counci l on Foreign 
R e l a t i o n s i n March 1980"; We cannot hope, nor do we p l a n , 
t o defend peop les i n t h e r e g i o n who w i l l not h e l p defend 
107 thcMiisel v e s " . 
The foregoing a n a l y s i s makes i t amply c l e a r t h a t 
I s r a e l and I r a n emerged as t he l a r g e s t and b i g g e s t r e c i p i e n t s 
of VS arms s u p p l i e s dur ing 1970s. U n t i l t h e f a l l of Shah, 
106. C i t ed i n I b i d . , p . 100, 
107. Department of S t a t e Bu] , le t in , Fiay 1980, p . 65. 
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in mid January 1979, I ran functioned e f fec t ive ly as an 
American proxy. Wash-" ngton provided Iran with enormous 
q u a n t i t i e s of American weapons and Tehran acted to fur ther 
American i n t e r e s t s . I s r a e l was another matter , while i t 
received unl imited suppl ies of weapons and massive economic 
support; I ran paid for i t s weapons with i t s o i l revenues. 
While I s r a e l p e r s i s t e n t l y persued p o l i c i e s t h a t undermined 
ra tne r than served American i n t e r e s t s . The un i ted Sta tes 
e i the r gave or loaned t h e money needed by I s r a e l for acquiring 
weapons. 
CHAPTER - V 
US APPROACH TO ARMS PROUFER^TION IN WEgT ASIA 
The r eg ion compr is ing west Asia i n c l u d i n g Pe r s i an 
Gulf s t a t e s , and a l so known as t h e Middle Eas t r e g i o n , 
has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been t h e l a r g e s t i m p o r t e r of arms i n t h e 
Th i rd wor ld . S ince t h e onset of Cold War i n t h e inroedlate 
a f t e rma th of t h e conc lus ion of Second World War, t h e r e 
has been a r a p i d p r o l i f e r a t i o n of arms i n West Asia . I t 
has been " t h e l a r g e s t arms import ing r e g i o n as th roughout 
t h e whole pe r iod s i n c e 19 45, account ing f o r 48 pe r cen t of 
t h e major arms impor t s dur ing t h e 1970s" 
Seve ra l f a c t o r s <?re r e s p o n s i b l e f o r r a p i d arms p r o -
l i f e r a t i o n in West A s i a . S ince t h e end of Second world War 
and e s t a b l i s h m e n t of s t a t e of I s r a e l , t h e r e has been a 
con t inued s t a t e of h o s t i l i t y between Arabs and I s r a e l w i th 
each decade wi tnes s ing a major war between I s r a e l and some 
of i t s Arab ne ighbours l e ad ing t o a marked i n c r e a s e i n 
m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e s and arms Impor t s i n t h e c o u n t r i e s 
concerned . During 1970s, v a r i o u s o t h e r i n t e r - a n d i n t r a - s t a t e 
c o n f l i c t s which o c c u r r e d in West Asia e s p e c i a l l y along t h e 
Pe r s i an Gulf a l so caused s p u r t i n arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n . Another 
c o n t r i b u t o r y f a c t o r was t h e phenomenal i n c r e a s e i n crude 
1- ^^^^^ TEARgOgK J,9^0 (London, 1981). p . 94. 
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o i l priceswhich brought"new and q u i O * wealth t o some coun-
t r i e s In the reg ion . And t h i s wealth was used for ex tens ive 
purchases of iiodern arms and m i l i t a r y equipment as we l l as 
for investments in r e s p e c t i v e in fras truc ture p r o j e c t s . Besides , 
f i n a n c i a l support from severa l of t h e r i c h e r countr ies of 
the reg ion , notably Saudi Arabia, in turn, allowed also some 
of the poorer countr ies t o ennbark upon ambitious arms 
purchasing schemes. 
The rank of West Asian region in Third World arms 
importers during 19708 i s shown in t a b l e s , 5 .1 and 5 , 2 . 
During 19 70s , the p o s i t i o n s of the indiv idual 
West Asian countr ies had sh i f t ed as compared to 1960s, In 
the 19 60s , the major arms importers were I s r a e l , Egypt and 
Syria, In the f i r s t half of 1970s, Iran appeared as the third 
l a r g e s t arms importer a f t e r Syria and Egypt while a f t er 1975, 
Iran and Saudi Arabia emerged on the top. 
I t becomes amply ev ident from t h e above tab l e s that 
during 19 70-19 74, West Asia accounted f o r 50 per cent of 
t o t a l arms imports by the Third World, Syria was the 
l arges t r e c i p i e n t of arms imports fo l lowed by Egypt, Iran 
and I s r a e l . The share of Iraq and Saudi Arabia was nominal. 
While s o v i e t union provided bulk arms s u p p l i e s to Syria, 
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Egypt and Iraq, the United States catred to the arms 
requirements of Iran, I srae l and Saudi Arabia, 
During the second half of 1970s, i . e . 1975-1979, West 
Asia continued to retain its pre. eminent posit ion as the lar-
gest arms importing region with i t s share of 48 per cent of 
total arms imports by the Third World. Iran emerged as the 
largest recipient of arms imports followed by Saudi Arabia, 
Jordan, Iraq, Israel and Syria. United States remained the 
major supplier of arms to Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel , and 
Jordan whereas Iraq and Syria received the i r arms supplies 
mainly from Soviet Union, 
while outlining the underlying reasons for rapid 
arms prol iferation in west Asia or Middle East, i t has 
been apt ly observed. 
The interaction of local tensions and conf l i c t s , 
ready a v a i l a b i l i t y of cash, appetite for sophist i -
cated arms, the opportunity for p o l i t i c a l Influence 
through arms transfers ends l i t t l e prospect of 
success for attempts to achieve regional arms 
control. Indeed, the underlying trends point to an 
intens i f icat ion of arms spending and an Increase 
in competitlo.i to land lucrative contracts. Some 
patterns are Indeed changing, but these wi l l bring 
the ir own problems; one instance i s the gradual 
sh i f t of American supplies from equipment to 
training and support, which i f l e s s litroedlately 
l e tha l , necess i tates the introduction of any army 
of American advisers and technicians into the 
region. Broadly speaking, however, the opportunity 
and encouragement to spend lav i sh ly on weapons 
208 
wi l l p e r s i s t u n t i l such time as the stubborn 
unresolved confrontat ion are s e t t l e d . I t i s 
one of the grim i r o n i e s of the Middle East 
t h a t few p a r t i e s to those c o n f l i c t s seem 
wi l l ing t o contemplate compromise without t h e 
assurance of massive mi l i t a ry backing,2 
The r e spec t ive percept ions of na t ional s e c u r i t y by I s r a e l 
and the neighbouring Arab countr ies have been the major 
determinant of spurt in arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n in west Asia, 
I s r a e l ' s perception of na t iona l secur i ty i s very akin to 
and based on famous Jewish saying, "By f i r e and blood the 
j«wish s t a t e f e l l and by f i r e and blood i t wi l l r i s e again." 
According to Amln Hewedy, I s r a e l i Secur i ty percep-
t i o n s a re based on th ree main elements t 
i) Expansionary annexations of a l l Pa le s t ine and Arab 
lands and e s t ab l i sh ing se t t lements in the land 
occupied to ac t as defensible borders of the s t a t e . 
I t i n s i s t s on being a big regional power by e s t a b l i -
shing t h e most powerful m i l i t a r y force in the region 
(conventional and nuclear) ; 
i i ) Recognition and acceptance by s o c i a l , economical, 
p o l i t i c a l i n t e r a c t i o n s with the Arabs (normaliza-
tion) ; .and 
4 i i i ) Defusing t h e Pa le s t ine quest ion. 
The Jewish leadership in I s r a e l always harped on the use 
of force as the only element of defence pol icy , David Ben-
Gurion, t h e Chief a r c h i t e c t of I s r a e l i s ecur i ty doctr ine 
2. Amin Hewedy, M i l i t a r i z a t i o n and secur i ty in the Kiddie East 
(London: p r i n t e r s Publ ishers , 1989) , pp. 51-52. 
3. Cited in Amin Hewedy, Mi l i t a r i z a t i on and Security 
in the Middle East (Londonj P i n t e r ' s Publ ishers , 
1989) , p . 17, 
4. I b id , 
2C9 
once said t 
The pol icy of I s r a e l must be bui ld only on 
the secu r i ty fac tor3- inmigra t ion , in support 
of a big power, s t a t e without boundaries and 
enci rc l ing t h e Arabs. We have to encourage the 
Jews to immigrate to I s r a e l , cause t h i s wi l l 
s e t t l e t h e s e c u r i t y problem on the long run and 
w i l l pave the way for one expansion in the 
r e g i o n , , , (w) e havu to make war as a Jewish 
profess ion. The boundaries of I s r a e l are those 
boundaries which Zahal (the I s r a e l i Army) can 
reach, Zahal i s t h e only instrument which can 
define the I s r a e l i borders ,^ 
Similar s tance was r e i t e r a t e d by Moshe Dayan, once a 
defence and foreign a f f a i r s minister of I s r a e l , when he 
said t ha t I s r a e l refused to withdraw to the 1967 borders 
or to acknowledge the same agreements t h a t the existed 
"since foundation of I s r a e l " , , , W h a t do we mean by securi ty? 
I t I s b l u n t l y the annexation of t e r r i t o r i e s , . . . 
While r e i t e r a t i n g I s r a e l ' s r i gh t to use force in 
annexing t h e t e r r i t o r i e s , Ereal Sharoom, former I s r a e l i 
defence minis ter , emphasized the need of arms for I s r a e l 
when he said on 14 December 1981» 
The I s r a e l i s e c u r i t y problems in the 19808 
confront two t h r e a t s ; t h e Arab confrontation 
and t h e Soviet expansion. Thus the I s r a e l i 
s t r a t e g y has to move ins ide t h r e e c i r c l e s i 
the conventional b e l t of t h e Arab Front 
5, Quoted in T.Sease, "David Ben-Gurion" Pa les t ine 
Monographs No. 44 (Beirut i Pa l e s t ine Research 
Centre, n.d.) , pp. 13-14, 
6. Cited in Hewedy, n , 3 , p, 19. 
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s ta tes , ttiB Arab s tates in the regional 
periphery; and those s tates which can threat 
our security (Turkey, Pakistan, Persian Gulf 
and Africa) , To preserve our national security 
qual i ta t ive and technological superiority must 
be achieved over a l l the ^rab s ta tes to prevent 
aggression by deterrence or to.achieve victory on 
the case of the fa i lure of deterrence. This can 
be done only, (by evaluating) our arms and 
equipment putting in mind that I srae l cannot 
tape with the conventional arms race with the 
Arabs who have superiority in manpower and 
capi ta l . New arms generation have to replace 
the old ones. 
I t emerges from the above pronouncements of I srae l i leaders 
that immigration of jews and annexation of terri tories forir 
the core of I s r a e l ' s security policy. Besides, using force 
i s the only element for annexation, but because of i t s 
limited population compared with the Arabs, the principle 
of the "Nation in arms* occupies the top priori ty , I srae l i 
leadership i s equally aware of the constraints of dependence 
on arms imports as the so le element of meeting security 
dependence, hence i t started concentrating on developing 
indigenous military industrial complex. The tangible outcome 
of I s r a e l i strategy had been the exacerbation of regional 
arms race. 
The Arab perceptions of security in the region are 
based on different elements. In the f i r s t place, one i s 
7. Amin Hewedy, The I s r a e l i Military Industry 
(Cairoj 1986), pp. 30-32. 
21 
unable to define a unified Arab security theory. According 
to Amin Hewedy, the Arab security theory depended mainly 
on three elements » 
i) Continuous entanglements with Israel on 
a l l fronts with an objective to i n f l i c t 
continuous casua l i t i es on I s r ae l and to 
cause i n s t a b i l i t y in the in te r io r front 
to limit immigration ,, and a t the same 
time to encourage emigration; 
i i) depriving I s rae l from gaining pol i t i ca l 
resul t s through continuous aggression; and 
i i i ) Ctontinuous efforts to build thei r 
arsenals in a deadly regional arms race 
by arms transfer from both super powers 
and other sources and by building a humble 
indigenous mil i tary industry,8 
I t i s in th is backgroupdthat the arms proliferation 
has occurred In West Asia, Apart from "Israel factor ," the 
t radi t ional in te r s ta te conflicts especially on border issues 
between and among the Arab countries especial ly in the Persi 
Gulf region have also contributed to the proliferation of 
arms in the region. 
During the decade of 1970s, massive arms acquisitions 
by I s rae l and Iran and the outbreak of Arab-Israeli host i-
l i t i e s in October 19 73 provided a fresh impetus to arms 
prol iferat ion in the region. As analysed in the preceeding 
an 
8, Hewedy, n. 3, p, 22, 
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fourth chapter. United S t a t e s was the s i n g l e l a r g e s t 
suppl ier of arms to I s r a e l and Iran, the neighbouring 
countr ie s of I s r a e l e s p e c i a l l y Egypt and Syria acquired 
arms from the Soviet Union, and Gulf c o u n t r i e s e s p e c i a l l y 
Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait a lso imported weapons from the 
United S t a t e s , France and U,K, 
Between 1970 and 19 79, there was massive increase 
in m i l i t a r y expenditure of I s r a e l as w e l l as Arab countri«>s. 
In 19 70, the m i l i t a r y expenditure of Arab countr ies was 
$ 4,451 mi l l ion which rose to $ 28,463 m i l l i o n by 1979 
r e g i s t e r i n g , thereby, seven times i n c r e a s e . The I s r a e l i 
m i l i t a r y expenditure rose three - fo ld from $ 1,417 mi l l ion 
in 1970 to $ 4,724 m i l l i o n by 1979, as shown in table 
5 , 3 . There was increase in the number of armed forces 
as wel l during t h i s per iod . While in 1970, the strength 
of armed f o r c e s of Arab countr i e s stood a t 7,90,000 and 
i t increased t o 12,42,000 by 1979. S imi lar ly , t h e strength 
of I s r a e l i armed forces a l so rose from 1,05,000 in 1970 
to 1,65,000 in 1979. 
The continuing s t a t e of h o s t i l i t i e s between I s r a e l 
and i t s neighbouring countr i e s had adverse impact on the 
economies of these c o u n t r i e s . The outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s 
in 1967 and October 1973 had led both I s r a e l and Arab 
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c o u n t r i e s to a c q u i r e l a t e s t s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons with 
a view to have s t r a t e g i c s u p e r i o r i t y . T h i s could be 
achieved o n l y by i n c r e a s i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e defence 
e x p e n d i t u r e s as shown i n Tab le 5,4 
During 1971, t h e I s r a e l i defence e x p e n d i t u r e was 
$ 2,166 m i l l i o n which i n c r e a s e d to $ 3,880 mi l l i on in 1973. 
Though t h e subsequent y e a r s wi tnessed a d e c l i n i n g t r e n d 
in I s r a e l i defence e x p e n d i t u r e which s tood a t $ 2,78 3 
m i l l i o n in 1979 and $ 2218 m i l l i o n in 1980, bu t t h i s was 
due t o t h e f a c t t h a t Uni ted S t a t e s p rov ided l i b e r a l economic 
and m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h to ^ s r a e l dur ing 19 70s which did not 
g 
pu t much s t r a i n on I s r a e l i economy. The defence expend i tu re 
of Egypt which stood a t $ 2,972 m i l l i o n in 1970 r o s e to 
$ 5,927 m i l l i o n in 1974 b u t i t s t a r t e d d e c l i n i n g t h e r e a f t e r 
and by 1979 stood a t $ 2,790 m i l l i o n . Between 1971 and 
1979, t h e I r a q i defence expend i tu r e had r e g i s t e r e d t h r e e 
fo ld i n c r e a s e . In 1971, t h e I r a q i m i l i t a r y expend i tu re 
which s tood a t 9 862 m i l l i o n had i n c r e a s e d t o $ 2,440 
m i l l i o n i n 1979, Saudi A r a b i a ' s defence expend i tu re i n c r e a s e d 
phenomenal ly. In 1971, t h e Saudi defence e x p e n d i t u r e which 
s tood a t $ 2,006 m i l l i o n had reached to $ 18,514 m i l l i o n 
thus r e g i s t e r i n g n ine t ime i n c r e a s e . T h e r e was t h r e e - f o l d 
9 . SIPRI YEARBOOK 19P. . p . 158. 
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i n c r e a s e i n Syr ian m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e between 1971 and 
1980. The Syr ian m i l i t a r y e x p e n d i t u r e i n 1971 which stood 
a t $ 370 m i l l i o n had i n c r e a s e d to $ 3,186 m i l l i o n in 1980. 
I t i s wor thnot ing h e r e t h a t t h e r i s e t h e m i l i t a r y expen-
d i t u r e s of Arab c o u n t r i e s was phenomenal a f t e r t h e Arab-
I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t of October 1973. The i n c r e a s e i n t h e 
r evenues of t h e Arab Oi l producing c o u n t r i e s in t h e wake 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l h i k e in o i l p r i c e s was a l so p a r t i a l l y 
^ 10 i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t h i s r e g a r d . 
The o v e r a l l i n c r e a s e i n de fence e x p e n d i t u r e a l so 
l e a d s t o augmentat ion in p e r c e n t a g e i n c r e a s e of GNP as 
shown in Tab le 5 . 5 . The Egyptian de fence e x p e n d i t u r e 
which formed 12.7 p e . c en t of t h e GNP i n 19 67 i n c r e a s e d 
to 31.0 pe r cen t of t h e GNP i n 1973 and by 1975 i t had 
become about 50 .4 p e r c e n t of t h e GNP b u t d e c l i n e d to 
31.1 pe r cen t i n 1979. In 1967, t h e I s r a e l i defence expen-
d i t u r e c o n s t i t u t e d 11.1 pe r c e n t o f . i t s GNP i n 1967 and 
by 1979 i t had i n c r e a s e d t h r e e f o l d to 35.3 p e r cen t of 
t h e GNP. While I r a q mainta ined a lmos t c o n s t a n t pe rcen tage , 
t h e Saudis had formal i n c r e a s e d . 
S imi l a r t r e n d i s d i s c e r n i b l e i n pe r c a p i t a defence 
e x p e n d i t u r e s of Israel and Arab c o u n t r i e s as shown in 
10. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1978, p . 183, 
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Table 5.6, The I s r a e l i per cap i t a expenditure stood a t 
$ 483ni in 1970 and by 1981 i t had reached $ 1,835m thus 
r eg i s t e r ing four- fo ld inc rease . The increase in per capita 
defence expenditure of Egypt was four-fold between 1970 
and 1974, whereas by 1979 i t dec l ined . .There had been 
phenomenal inc rease in per c a p i t a defence expenditure of 
Saudi Arabia which stood a t mere $ 5 3m in 1970 but by 
1981 i t rose to $ 2,664m. 
Table 5.5 
WEST ASlAj Defence Expenditure as a percentage of GNP 
19 67-1980 
Y e a r 
1 9 6 7 
1968 
19 69 
19 70 
1 9 7 2 
1 9 7 3 
19 74 
1975 
19 79 
1980 
SOUf 
E g y p t 
1 2 . 7 
1 2 . 5 
1 3 . 0 
1 9 . 0 
1 9 . 9 
3 1 . 0 
2 2 . 8 
5 0 . 4 
3 1 . 1 
N.A. 
iCE , 1 
S y r i a 
1 4 . 7 
1 2 . 1 
1 1 . 6 
1 2 . 1 
9 . 0 
1 6 . 0 
1 1 . 0 
1 5 . 1 
2 2 . 1 
1 3 . 1 
Phe M i l l 
I r a q 
9 . 1 
9 . 1 
9 . 6 
9 . 4 
7 . 2 
9 . 8 
1 8 . 7 
7 . 9 
1 0 . 9 
N.A. 
t a r v Ba: 
J o r d a n 
1 1 . 1 
1 4 . 7 
2 1 , 0 
1 6 . 4 
1 6 . 0 
1 6 . 4 
1 2 . 1 
1 2 . 2 
N . A . 
N . A . 
l a n c e 19' 
L i b y a 
1 . 5 
1 . 6 
4 . 4 
2 . 1 
2 . 6 
2 . 3 
1 . 4 
1 . 7 
N.A. 
N .A. 
7 1 - 7 2 - Di 
S a u d i 
A r a b i a 
1 1 . 9 
8 . 9 
8 . 8 
9 . 4 
1 9 . 2 
1 7 . 9 
7 . 3 
1 8 . 0 
1 5 . 0 
N . A . 
3, 6 0 - 6 1 , 
I s r e a l 
1 1 . 1 
1 4 . 7 
2 1 . 0 
1 6 . 4 
2 0 . 3 
4 6 . 3 
3 1 . 8 
3 5 . 9 
3 5 . 3 
2 3 . 2 
Table 5.6 
WEST ASIA } Per cap i ta Defence Expenditure 
(in $ US) 1970-81 
216 
Year E^ypt Syria I raq Jordan Libya Saudi 
Arabia 
I s r ae l 
19 70 
19 72 
1 9 7 3 
1 9 7 4 
19 75 
1 9 7 6 
1 9 7 7 
19 78 
19 79 
1980 
1 9 8 1 
30 
43 
77 
m 
163 
128 
112 
N.A. 
54 
N.A. 
N.A, 
29 
37 
59 
64 
9 6 
1 3 2 
138 
138 
243 
459 
261 
30 
47 
80 
251 
10 7 
123 
141 
N.A. 
18 3 
N.A. 
N .A. 
47 
47 
58 
54 
57 
57 
70 
10 3 
125 
N . A . 
N . A . 
43 
58 
67 
72 
8 3 
90 
130 
162 
N .A . 
34 
56 
5 3 
115 
267 
327 
1 , 1 5 3 
1 , 5 0 6 
1 , 0 0 5 
1, 344 
1 , 4 0 4 
2 , 5 1 8 
2 , 6 6 4 
48 3 
466 
1, 146 
1 , 1 7 3 
1 , 0 4 5 
1 , 2 0 1 
1 ,176 
8 8 7 
425 
1 , 3 3 3 
1 ,835 
SOURCE t The Mi l i t a ry Balance 1971-72, pp. 60-6l , 
1975-76, pp. 76-77, 1981-82, pp. 112-113. 
N.B. J N.A. = Not ava i l ab le . 
I s r a e l and i t s inme'iiate neighbouring Arab countr ies 
had been maintaining h o s t i l i t i e s which consequentialy led 
to t he outbreak of Arab-Is rae l i wars in 1948-49, 1956, 
June 1967 and October 1973. These countr ies also took 
measures to strengthen t h e i r r e spec t ive arms bui ld-up. The 
Table 5,7 shows t h e pa t t e rns in the Arab-Israel mi l i t a ry 
bui ld up between 1947-49 to 1973. 
During 1947-49, I s r a e l had s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y advan-
t age over the neighbouring Arab coun t r i e s . While Arabs 
had 22,500 ground forces whereas I s r a e l ' s s t rength v/as 
70,000. During t h i s period I s r a e l had a i r s u p e r i o r i t y over 
i t s Arabs neighbours, I s r a e l had 80 a i r c r a f t whereas there 
were 45 a i r c r a f t s ava i l ab le with the Arabs during tha t 
per iod . However, by 19 67, the s t r a t e g i c balance had become 
advantageous to the Arabs, The Arab ground forces were 
two times la rger than that of I s r a e l in 1967, In terms 
of weapons as well Arabs had s t r a t e g i c advantage over 
I s r a e l . However by 1973, I s r a e l had a t ta ined p a r i t y with 
i t s Arab adver sa r i e s . 
In the wake of continued s t a t e of h o s t i l i t i e s 
between I s r a e l and i t s Arab neighbours, the s t r a t e g i c 
environment was charged with mutual suspicion and each 
country affected by i t was keen to ensure i t s s acu r i ty 
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and niaintaln s t r a t e g i c p a r i t y aga ins t i t s adversary. The 
r e s u l t a n t outcome was d i s ce rn ib l e in t h e increase in armed 
forces and a r s e n a l s . This trend i s shown in t ab l e 5.8, 
5.9 and 5.10. 
I t i s evident from Table 5 .8 , which revea ls Egyptian 
armed forces s t rength between 1966-81, t ha t in ce r t a in cases 
Egypt maintained statusquo while increase followed the 
o t h e r s , Egypt which had two armoured d iv i s ions in 1966 main-
ta ined the statusquo in t h i s regard from 1977 onward. In 
case of i n fan t ry d iv i s ions i t had maintained statusquo 
since 197'', Egypt also ifaaintained statusquo in respec t to 
i t s tanks and APCS, However the re have been va r i a t ions in 
the combat a i r c r a f t s t rength of Egypt between 1966 and 1981. 
In 1966, Egypt had 357 combat a i r c r a f t s which increased to 
520 in 1971 and by 1981 declined to 290, The decrease could 
be seen in the wake of signing of Egypt-Israel peace t r ea ty 
of 1978, 
The augmentation in I r aq i Armed Forces s t rength 
between 1971 and 1981 as shown in Table 5,9 presents a 
d i f f e r en t p i c t u r e . In 1971 Iraq had two armoured d iv is ions 
which increased to four in 1976 and by 1981 i t remained 
the same, I raq r a i sed t h e number of i t s mechanized divisions 
from two in 1976 to four in 1980, However, Ireq 
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maintained s t a tu s quo in in fan t ry d iv i s i ons . There had 
been subs tan t i a l i nc rease in tanks and APCS of I raq during 
t h i s period. In 1971 I raq had 905 tanks and by 1980 i t had 
2,800 tanks. S imi lar ly , in 1975, I raq had 1,300 APCS which 
increased to 2,500 by 1980. There was also augmentation in 
I r a q i cambat a i r c r a f t . In 1971, I raq had 220 combat a i rc raf t 
and by 1980 i t had 332 combat a i r c r a f t . There was phenomenonal 
i nc rease in I r a q i s surf ace-to-Air mis s i l e b a t t a r i e s . In 
19 75 Iraq had 3 SA miss i le b a t t e r i e s and by 1980 the strength 
of I r a q i SA miss i le b a t t e r i e s had increase to 50. 
An i n t e r e s t i n g fac t in case of I r a q i s mi l i t a ry s t ren-
gth i s tha t from mid-1970s onward there had been subs tan t ia l 
inc rease in I r a q i a r r e n a l s . The increase in I r aq i revenue 
in the aftej,math of hike in o i l p r i c e s and the outbreak of 
I r a n - I r a q l i o s t i l i t i e s in September 1980 were two main 
reasons , instrumental in the augmentation of I r a q ' s defence 
bui ldup. 
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I s r a e l . ' s armed f o r c e s s t r e n g t h be tween 1971 and 
1 9 8 1 , a s shown i n T a b l e 5 .10 r e v e a l s t h a t a f t e r O c t o b e r 
1973 war , t h e r e h a s been s u b s t a n t i a l i n c r e a s e i n I s r a e l i 
a rmoured d i v i s i o n , i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s , t a n k s , APCS, comloat 
a i r c r a f t and S-A m i s s i l e b a t t e r i e s . I n 1971 I s r a e l had 3 
a rmoured d i v i s i o n s wh ich i n c r e a s e d t o 5 i n 1977, £ i n 1979 
and 11 i n 1 9 6 1 . I n 1971 I s r a e l had two i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s and 
by 1975 i t r o s e t o f o u r and s i n c e t h e n t h e r e had been s t a t u s q u o . 
I n 1971 I s r a e l had 1 ,075 t a n k s which g o t d o u b l e d by 1977 
and i n 1981 I s r a e l had 3,500 t a n k s . Between 1971 and 1 9 8 1 , 
t h e r e h a s f o u r f o l d i n c r e a s e i n I s r a e l ' s APCS, i n 1971 I s r a e l 
had 1000 APCS and by 1981 i t had 4 ,000 APCS. S i m i l a r l y , 
t h e r e h a s been a s t e a d y i n c r e a s e i n I s r a e l ' s s t r e n g t h of 
combat a i r c r a f t . ( T g b l e 5 . 1 0 ) . 
Arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n i n w e s t A s i a d u r i n g 1970s can 
b e t t e r be u n d e r s t o o d by a n a l y s i n g t h e a rms a c q u i s i o n by each 
of t h e l e a d i n g arms i m p o r t i n g c o u n t r i e s of t h e r e g i o n . I n t h e 
p r e c e d i n g f o u r t h c h a p t e r , t h e phenomenon of i m p o r t of arms 
by I s r a e l and ^ r a n h a s been a n a l y s e d . I n t h e s u c c e e d i n g p a g e s , 
an a n a l y s i s of arms a c q u i s i t i o n b y S a u d i A r a b i a , J o r d a n , 
K u w a i t , Kgypt , S y r i a and I r a q i s p r e s e n t e d , 
ARMS ACQUISITION BY SAUDI ARABIA 
Saud i A r a b i a m a i n t a i n e d a l ^ w - k e y p r o f i l e w i t h r e g a r d 
t o i m p o r t i n g s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms i n t h e b e g i n n i n g of 19 7 0 s . 
2 2 i 
But in t h e wake of A r a b - I s r a e l c o n f l i c t i n October 1973 
and i n c r e a s e in i t s revenues fol lowing t h e h ike in petroleuni 
p r i c e s , Saudi Arabia a l s o enhanced i t s b i l l of arms impor t s . 
As shown in Table 5 .17 . Saudi A r a b i a ' s share of arms imports 
i n t h e t o t a l sha re of .^est Asia between 1970 and 19 74 was 
o n l y 3 per c e n t . However during 19 75-79 , Saudi Arabia 
accounted fo r over 14 per cent of t h e t o t a l arms impor t s in 
t h e r e g i o n . The arms a c q u i s i t i o n by Saudi Arabia between 
1974 and 1980 i s shown in T a b l e 5 . 1 1 . 
I t i s apparen t from t h e above Table t h a t during 
1974-75, United S t a t e s and France made bulk of the s u p p l i e s 
of arms a v a i l a b l e to Saudi Arabia , and from 1976 to 1960, 
Uni ted S t a t e s remained the l a r g e s t s u p p l i e r of arms t o 
Saudi Arabia fol lowed by France , U.K. and West Germany. 
During 19 74, v a r i o u s arms d e a l s were signed between 
Saudi Arabia and Uni ted S t a t e s . I n A p r i l 1974, an agreement 
worth $ 260 m i l l i o n was s igned between V«ashington and Riyadh 
under which t h e former agreed to p r o v i d e an u h s p e c i f i e d 
number of Ray theers MIM-23B, an improved vers ion of S-A 
Hawk m i s s i l e system to Saudi Arab ia . In December 1974 
both c o u n t r i e s s igned two a d d i t i o n a l agreements ; under one 
agreement . United S t a t e s o f fe red 440 Bel l AM-IJ cobra h e i i . 
c o p t e r s t o be d e l i v e r e d to Saudi Arabia between 1978-84, 
1 1 . SIPRI YEARBOOK 19 75. p . 229 
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Under the second agreement, which came to be known as 
"arms for o i l " d e a l . t h e US agreed to provide Hughes 
Maverick r s A-3 and r*-T missi le systems to Saudi Arabia. 
This deal was worth $828 mi l l ion .^^ In 1974, US also offered 
to de l ive r 26 Destrogees and guided miss i le boats during 
1978-84 oeriod. Other agreements concluded in 1974 included 
the US supply of 10 t;_i30M Hercula t r anspor t planes which 
were del ivered by mid 1974. 
In January 1975, Saudi Arabia placed bulk orders 
for the supply of 60 Northrop F-5t T i g e r - I I f igh te r a i r -
c r a f t . This deal worth $ 756 mill ion also included 20 
J['-5F type a i r c r a f t s , Maverick a i r to surface Missi les and 
laser-guided weapons." Besides^ Saudi Arabia also placed 
orders with the United Sta tes in January 1975 for the supply 
of armoured personnel c a r r i e r s and M-60 AE ty^.e b a t t l e tanks. 
In 1974, Saudi Arabia also procured arms from France. 
In l a t e 1973, Saudi Arabia has entered in to an arms deal 
with France for the supply of 38 Dassault Mirage-5 f igh te r 
a i r c r a f t of these 3 a i r c r a f t were d i r e c t l y del ivered to 
Egypt in 1974 and by 1975, the e n t i r e l o t was del ivered 
by France to Saudi Arabia, In December 1974, France and 
Saudi Arabia entered in to another major arms deal under 
12. Ib id . 
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which the former had agreed to supply 8 Aerospatiale 
Alouette I I I h e l i c o p t e r s , 38 Dasault Mirage-III-E f igh te r 
a i r c r a f t SS-II A-T mi s s i l e system and medium and l i gh t 
13 b a t t l e t anks . 
In October 197 3, Saudi Arabia had also placed 
orders with United Kingdom for the supply of 6 Sikarsky 
seaking ASW he l i cop t e r s and 24 Sikarsky commando he l i cop te r s , 
In 19 75, Saudi Arabia and France signed an agree-
ment for the supply of 300 Roanne AMX-30S type main b a t t l e 
tanks . Under t h i s agreement, France supplied 100 tanks 
in 19 77, another 100 in 1978 and the remaining 100 tanks in 
14 19 79. In i976AArabia placed orders with France for the 
supply of 250 Pauhard AML-90 armoured c a r r i e r s which were 
del ivered during 1977-78. Again during 1977-78 France also 
supplied 449 Giat AMX-10 P armoured c a r r i e r s to Saudi 
Arabia orders for which had been placed in 1976. In 1978, 
Saudi Arabia and France also signed agreement for the 
supply of MM-40 ococet sh ip - to - sh ip mi s s i l e s . 
During 1975-78, United S ta tes supplied various 
v a r i e t i e s of weapons to Saudi Arabia, In 1975 Washington 
13. I b i d . 
1 4 . SIPRI YE>JIB00K 1979 , p . 232 . 
15. I b i d . 
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a g r e e d t o s u p p l y 2 0 f - 5 r T i g e r - 2 t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t t o 
Saud i A r a b i a which were d e l i v e r e d i n 1 9 7 7 - 7 8 . Dur ing t h e 
same y e a r S a u d i s a l s o r e q u e s t e d f o r 6 c o r v e t t l e and 4 
P e t e r s o n MSC-322 c o a s t m i n e s w e e p e r s f rom t h e U n i t e d s t a t e s 
wh ich were d e l i v e r e d i n 1 9 7 8 - 7 9 , I n 1976, Saudi A r a b i a 
a s k e d f o r 20 B e l l - 2 0 9 AH-IS h e l i c o p t e r s from t h e U n i t e d 
o 16 S t a t e s and i n 1978 50 s u c h h e l i c o p t e r w e r e d e l i v e r e d . 
I n 1976, Wash ing ton a l s o a g r e e d t o s u p p l y M-60-AI 
main b a t t l e t a n k s , a rmoured p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r s . Hawk, Red«ge 
and Harpoon m i s s i l e s t o Saudi A r a b i a , I n F e b r u a r y 1978 
U n i t e d s t a t e s i n a p a c k a g e d e a l w i t h Saud i A r a b i a w o r t h 
$ 2 ,500 m i l l i o n a g r e e d t o s u p p l y 60 F-15A e a g l e f i g h t e r 
17 
a i r c r a f t and 20 F - 5 r T i g e r - 2 t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t t o t h e l a t t e r . 
F o l l o w i n g t h e f a l l of Shah of I r a n i n l a t e 1978 , 
wh ich s e n t a s e v e r e ^ e l t t o t h e US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s i n 
t h e P e r s i a n G u l f , and S o v i e t i n v a s i o n of A g h a n i s t a n i n 
December 1979, S a u d i A r a b i a was deemed a s t h e c u s t o d i a n of 
US i n t e r e s t s i n t h e Gul f r e g i o n . From t h e p e r i o d F e b r u a r y 
1979 u n t i l 15 August 1979, c o n t r a c t e d US f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y 
s a l e s (FMS) had r e a c h e d $ 6300 m i l l i o n i n g o o d s and s e r v i c e s , 
of t h i s , Saudi A r a b i a ' s s h a r e was a s much a s $ 370 m i l l i o n 
18 
o r 58 p e r c e n t . W i t h i n o n e week of Saud i announcement 
16 . I b i d , , p . 233 . 
1 7 . I b i d , , P , 234 , 
1 8 . SIPRI YSARBOOK 1980, P , 100 
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of t h e J u l y 1979 t h a t o i l p r o d u c t i o n was t o be i n c r e a s e d , 
t h e US S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t recornnended t h e a d d i t i o n a l s a l e of 
$ 1,200 m i l l i o n w o r t h of arms f o r t h e p a r a m i l i t a r y n a t i o n a l 
g u a r d of Saudi A r a b i a . 
S i n c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n i n I r a n , Saudi A r a b i a assumed 
u n t o i t s e l f p r i m a r y s e c u r i t y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e P e r s i a n 
Gul f and t h e o i l f i e l d s of t h e r e g i o n . However, t h e Saudi 
g o v e r n m e n t t u r n e d down a n e a r l y o f f e r i n 1979 by t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s t o send a s q u a d r o n of F _ i 5 E a g l e f i g h t e r s t o t h e 
19 
c o u n t r y a s a t o k e n of s u p p o r t . 
Saudi A r a b i a a l s o s i g n e d d e f e n c e c o o p e r a t i o n agreeeaent 
on F r a n c e on 15 J u l y 1979, One i m m e d i a t e r e s u l t was 
t h e d e l i v e r y of t h e c r o l a t e l a n d m o b i l e SAM s y s t e m t o Saudi 
A r a b i a . 
ARMS ACQUISITION BY JORDAN » 
p r i o r t o O c t o b e r 1973 A r a b - I s r a e l i war , J o r d a n s 
i m p o r t of arms was a l m o s t n e g l i g i b l e . I t n was o n l y d u r i n g 
t h e s e c o n d h a l f of 1970s t h a t a h e a v y h e a r i n g o f t h e p r o -
W e s t e r n n a t i o n s i n West A s i a had t a k e n p l a c e . As shown 
i n T a b l e 522, J o r d a n emerged a s t h e t h i r d l a r g e s t i m p o r t e r 
of arms d u r i n g t h e s econd h a l f of 1 9 7 0 s , I t s arms i m p o r t s 
1 9 . I b i d . , p . 1 0 1 , 
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were worth $ 2,6i5 mil l ion which accounted for 13 per 
cent of r eg ion ' s t o t a l arm imports.. Import of arms by 
Jordan during 1970s i s shown in t ab l e 5.12. 
I t i s evident from t h e t ab le t h a t during 197 3-74. 
Jordan imported arms mainly from t h e United Sta tes and some 
items from U.K. i n 1974, Jordan requ i s i t ioned for 25 North-
rop F_5A f i g h t e r s from I r a n . Since these a i r c r a f t s were 
o r i g i n a l l y supplied by USA to Iran hence i t s t r a n s f e r to 
Jordan en ta i led American approval. Following US approval 
in January 1974, I ran delivered the a i r c r a f t to Jordan 
in 1975.^° in e a r l y 1974, Jordan also placed orders with 
U.K, for the supply.of 5 Sco t t i sh Aviation Bulldog type 
t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t s worth $ 353,000 which were del ivered 
21 in June 1974. 
In February 1974, United S t a t e s under Kutual 
Assistance Programme (MAP) agreed to provide 36 P_5EA-5B 
f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t to Jordan, Besides, United Sta tes also 
provided improved version of Hawk S-A«mis si Its system, 
Hughes TOW A-T m i s s i l e system to Jordan during 1974. 
During 1976-78, Jordan requ i s i t ioned Bell-709 
AH-IS he l i cop te r s , 4 F-5E-Tiger-2 t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t , one 
20 . SIPRI YEARBpOK 197^ , p . 227 . 
21. Ib id . 
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C-130 H t r a n s p o r t p l a n e , and 4 s l k o r s k y S-76 h e l i c o p t e r s 
f rom t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . B e s i d e s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a l s o 
s u p p l i e d M-48 P a t t o n and M-60-AI t y p e main b a t t l e t a n k s . 
TO* and Hawk m i s s i l e s t o J o r d a n . ^^ The arms b u i l d - u p i n 
J o r d a n was accompan ied by t h e US d e c l a r a t i o n s t o t h e e f fec t , 
t h a t i t was n o t an arms b u i l d - u p b u t m « r e l y a r e p l a c e m e n t 
of e q u i p m e n t . J o r d a n ' s a c q u i s i t i o n of arms d i d n o t c a u s e 
much a l a r m ir . '-he r e g i o n . "^^  T h e J o r d a n i a n g o v e r n m e n t wanted 
t o a c q u i r e t h e MIM-23B Hawk s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m o b i l e m i s s i l e 
s y s t e m b u t i n t h e end s e t t l e d f o r a f i x e d s y s t e m . I n 19 79 , 
J o r d a n c o n c l u d e d a d e a l f o r 36 M i r a g e - 3 f i g h t e r s , b r e a k i n g 
t h e p a t t e r n i n wh ich t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s was v i r t u a l l y t h e 
s o l e s u p p l i e r of m a j o r a r n o . J o r d a n a l s o o r d e r e d t h e P i l a t u s 
PC-7 m i l i t a r y t r a n s p o r t from S w i t z e r l a n d i n 1979 and 200 
S h i r _ I b a t t l e t a n k s , f rom U.K. wh ich were o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d 
f o r I r a n . 
ARKS ACQUISITION BY KUWAIT i 
During 1970s , Kuwa i t , i n i t s m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p s , 
had been a b l e t o r e i n f o r c e i t s n o n - c o m m i t t a l s t a n c e t o w a r d s 
t h e s u p e r p o w e r s . D u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d , Kuwai t was t h e o n l y 
Gul f c o u n t r y " t h a t m a i n t a i n e d a r e a s o n a b l e l e v e r a g e a s w e l l 
22 . SIPRI YEARBOOK 1979, p . 220 
2 3 , SIPRI YEARBOOK 1980 , p . 10 3 
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a s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union in t h e s p h e r e s 
of p o l i t i c s , f i n a n c e and nxLl i t a ry a f f a i r s , a l b i e t on a 
23 l o w e r s c a l e t h a n t h a t of i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e West . 
During 1964-80 p e r i o d , o v « r $ 918" m i l l i o n w o r t h 
of a rms was t r a n s f e r r e d t o Kuwai t f rom t h e major a rms 
s u p p l i e r s , a s shown i n T a b l e 5 . 1 3 b e l o w . T h e S o v i e t Union 
t r a n s f e r r e d $ 50 m i l l i o n , USA $ 396 m i l l i o n , U.K. $ 280 
m i l l i o n , F r a n c e s $ 130 m i l l i o n . West Germany $ 30 m i l l i o n 
and o t h e r s $ 12 m i l l i o n w o r t h of a rms t o K u w a i t . 
T a b l e - 5 . 1 3 
ARMS TRANSFERS TO KUWAIT ^1964-1980) 
{$ m i l l i o n ) 
P e r i o d T o t a l , ^ 7 ^ ® ^ U . S . F r a n c e U.K. West I t a l y A l l i e d 
Un ion ^^ , .„=„ 
Germany 
1964-74 68 - 6 - 60 - - 2 
1975-80 850 50 390 130 220 20 30 10 
T o t a l 918 50 396 130 280 20 30 12 
SOURCE i US Arms c o n t r o l and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) 
World M i l i t a r y E x p e n d i t u r e and Arms T r a n s f e r s 
v a r i o u s volumea 
2« . Abdul-Reda A s s i r i , Kuwc-^t 's F o r e i g n P o l i c y 
(San F r a n c i s c o * West ' v i e w p r e s s , 1 9 9 0 ) , p . 7 9 , 
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Although United Kingdom traditionally had been Kuwait's 
sole supplier of arms, it was gradually supplanted by 
other competing arms suppliers; still the 1977 military 
development plan involved the purchase of some 150 
Chieftain tanks at the cost of $ 200 million. 
The first tangible Kuwaiti-Soviet military rappro-
chment took place in August 1976 when Kuwait concluded a 
$ 300 million deal to purchase air-to-air and ground-to-
air SAM-7 missiles, advanced artillery, tanks and anti-
personnel weapons. This Kuwait-Soviet arms deal had 
created some discomfort domestically and regionally. There 
were accusations that Kuwait was open to Marxist indoctrination 
through military training of its personnel in Moscow as well 
as opening the door to a possible Soviet advisory capacity 
25 in Kuwait's military Infrastructure. More significantly, 
the Saydi's opposition to Soviet penetration into the 
peninsula through Kuwait prompted Riyad, among other things, 
to occupy the Kuwaiti islands of Gary and Umu-Al-Maradim 
off the Saudi Kuwaiti Coasw in summer 1977, However, the 
crisis was defused through the influential channel of 
communication between the royal families of the two countries. 
25. Ibid., P. 344. 
26. William B. Quandt, "Saudi Arabia in 1980s, Foreign 
Policy, Security and oil (Washington, D.C.: The Brooki 
Institution, 1981), p. 24. 
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And t h e K u w a i t i - S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p a c k a g e was r e v i s e d so t h a t 
t h e K u w a i t i s c o u l d r e c e i v e t h e i r t r a i n i n g on new e q u i p m e n t 
27 i n Egyp t , S y r i a and Kuwai t i t s e l f f rom E g y p t i a n a d v i s o r s . 
However, t h e K u w a i t i o b j e c t i v e of b a l a n c e d arms 
p u r c h a s e d from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f a c e d rough w e a t h e r i n 
t h e p r o - I s r a e l i u s g - o n g r e s s . As p a r t o f a m i l i t a r y m o d e r n i z a -
t i o n scheme i n t h e 1 9 7 0 s , a t e a m of American d e f e n c e e x p e r t s 
v i s i t e d Kuwait and p r o p o s e d a p l a n t o d e v e l o p i t s m i l i t a r y 
c a p a b i l i t i e s . The U n i t e d S t a t e s p r o p o s e d t o s e l l Kuwai t 
a rms w o r t h n o r e t h a n $ 750 m i l l i o n , c o m p r i s i n g improved 
a n t i - a i r c r a f t Hawk m i s s i l e s , A-4 f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t and Cargo a i r . 
c r a f t . K u w a i t ' s d e s i r e t o p u r c h a s e arms from t h e U n i t e d 
S t a t e s was seen i n Wash ing ton a^ "a p o l i t i c a l g e s t u r e and, 
a s s u c h , , , s y m p a t h e t i c of K u w a i t ' s d e s i r e f o r c l o s e r c o o p e -
r a t i o n w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , Arms a c q u i s i t i o n by Kuwait 
from d i f f e r e n t s o u r c e s i s shown i n t a b l e 5 . 1 4 . 
ARMS ACQUISITION BY EX3Yt^  » 
During t . ie f i r s t h a l f of 1 9 7 0 s , Egypt r a n k e d second 
a f t e r S y r i a , i n i m p o r t i n g a r m s . Between 1970 and 1974 E g y p t ' s 
i m p o r t e d arms w o r t h $ 2 ,181 m i l l i o n wh ich a c c o u n t e d f o r 23 
p e r c e n t of West A s i a n r e g i o n ' s t o t a l I m p o r t o f arms a s 
27, Ass i r i , n. 23, p . 82, 
28. US Congress, House, Conmittee on In t e rna t iona l Affairs 
Hearings, Proposed Sales tp Kuwait of Air- to-Air Missives 
94th Congress, F i r s t Session,24 October 1975(Washington, 
D.C, Government Pr int ing Office, 1976), p . 21. 
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hown m Table 5 .15 .The October 1973 war was fol lowed by 
l a r g e r e s u p p l i e s of armaments t o I s r a e l whereas Bgypt, due 
t o break in m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s wi th t h e Sovie t Union, 
went down the l i s t , E g y p t ' s swi tPhs t o t h e US and t h e o the r 
wes te rn armaments began to show up in t h e s t a t i s t i c s a f t e r 
1975 and was rare v i s i b l e as c o n t r a c t e d s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
29 
weapons, such as t h e F-5E s t a r t e d a r r i v i n g i n C a i r o . 
The arms a c q u i r e d oy Egypt dur ing 1970s, a s shown 
in T a b l e 5 .15 , r e v e a l t h a t dur ing t h i s decade 
Egypt d i v e r s i f i e d i t s sou rces of arms a c q u i s i t i o n . During 
t h i s p e r i o d , France acqu i red a major chunk of arms market 
i n Egypt, having sold Mirage-5 f i g h t e r s , h e l i c o p t e r s , t h e 
c r o t a l e SAM system and Euro m i s s i l e KILAN. In 1980 n e g o t i a -
t i o n s s tair ted between France and Egypt fo r t h e supp ly of 
Mirage 2000 and t h e Mirage F-IC f i g h t e r s . 
B r i t a i n ' s e n t r y i n t o t h e Egyptian arms market 
commenced on ly a f t e r 1975, in p a r t i c u l a r i n connec t ion with 
Arab O r g a n i s a t i o n of I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n (Aol) p r o j e c t s for 
l i c e n s e d p roduc t ion of the Hawk t r a i n e r , t he s w i n g f i r e 
a n t i - t a n k m i s s i l e and t h e Lynx h e l i c o p t e r , 
29. SIPRI YEARBOOK 198p, p. 104 
30. Ibid, 
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Th« peace t r e a t y signed between I s r a e l and Egypt 
on 17 September 1978 was accompanied by a mi l i t a ry aid 
package to both coun t r i e s by the United States worth $ 
3000 1 l l ion for "^srael and $ 1,500 mill ion for Egypt. This 
suppleaental 1979 m i l i t a r y and package was not ivated in the 
U.S. Congress as being cheaper for the United Sta tes than 
the cos t of another war in West Asia. 
What i s more even in economic terms peace 
i s surely l e s s cos t ly than a continuation 
of the s t a t e of war. The U.S. and t h e r e s t 
of the world have paid an inca lcu lab le eco-
nomic pr ice of war because of disrupt ion 
caused t o our economy and economies of the 
o t h e r s . I t has been est imated, for example, 
t ha t even a p a r t i a l recknoning of the d i r e c t 
cost to U.S. tax payers of four Middle East 
Wars t o t a l s something between $ 55 and $ 70 
b i l l i o n while the pr ice we have paid in in -
f l a t i o n , unemployment and other adverse 
economic developments a t t r i b u t a b l e at l e a s t 
in p a r t to Middle East i n s t a b i l i t y would add 
b i l l i o n s more to t h i s t o t a l , 3 1 
The U.S. mi l i t a ry aid packages to I s r a e l and Egypt, agreed 
on the connection with t he signing of the peace t r e a t y tha t 
would c rea te s t a b i l i t y in the region, included the supply 
to Egypt of r-SE f i g h t e r s and poss ib ly the F_i6, plus 750 
M-113-A-2 armoured personnel c a r r i e s and several hundred 
o the r m i l i t a r y veh ic l e s , the AIM-7 and AIM-9 a i r to a i r 
mi s s i l e s and 500 Maverick a i r to surface miss i l e s . 
31. Cited in Ib id . 
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ARMS ACQUISITION BY SYRIA » 
During t h e f i r s t h a l f of 1 9 7 0 s , S y r i a had been t h e 
l a r g e s t c u s t o m e r of S o v i e t arms i n t h e r e g i o n . Between 
1970 and 1974, S y r i a i m p o r t e d arms w o r t h $ 2,320 m i l l i o n 
t h u s a c c o u n t i n g f o r 25 p e r c e n t of t h e t o t a l arms i m p o r t e d 
i n t h e r e g i o n , a s shown i n t a b l e 5 , 1 . i n l a t e 1973 , S y r i a 
r e q u i s i t i o n e d f o r 54 MlG-21 f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t from S o v i e t 
32 Union which were d e l i v e r e d by May 1 9 7 4 , Accord ing t o 
I s r a e l i i n t e l l i g e n c e r e_x>r t s , i n l a t e 1973 , Damascus 
p l a c e d o r d e r s f o r t h e s u p p l y of M i g - 2 3 • ¥ l o g g e r " f i g h t e r 
33 
a i r c r a f t which were s u p p l i e d by 1 9 7 4 , Again i n l a t e 
197 3 , u n d e r a n o t h e r ag reemen t b e t w e e n Moscow and Damascus, 
t h e fo rmer a g r e e d t o s u p p l y 25 Sukhov SU-7 f i g h t e r / g r o u n d 
a t t a c k a i r c r a f t wh ich were d e l i v e r e d by 1974 t o S y r i a . 
Dur ing 1 9 7 3 , S y r i a p l a c e d o r d e r s f o r t h e s u p p l y of 
SAM_7, SAM-6 s u r f a c e t o a i r and F r o g - 7 s S „ l _ c Scab and 
S tyx t y p e s u r f a c e t o s u r f a c e m i s s i l e s w i t h t h e S o v i e t 
Union which were d e l i v e r e d i n 1974 , B e s i d e s , S y r i a a l s o 
a s k e d f o r t h e s u p p l y of BTR-50 a r m o u r e d p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r s , 
T - 6 2 b a t t l e t a n k s and 'Osa* c l a s s m i s s i l e b o a t s from 
S o v i e t Union wh ich w e r e d e l i v e r e d t o i t by 1974, Most of 
t h e weapons s u p p l i e d by S o v i e t Union t o S y r i a d u r i n g 
1973-74 were t h e r e p l a c e m e n t f o r O c t o b e r 1973 War, 
32 . SIPRI YEARBOOK 1975 . p . 229, 
33. I b id . 
234 
During t h e s e c o n d h a l f of t h e 1970s , S y r i a i m p o r t e d 
arms w o r t h $ 1,170 m i l l i o n which a c c o u n t e d f o r a b o u t 6 p e r 
c e n t of r e g i o n ' s t o t a l i m p o r t s of a r m s , a s shown i n T a b l e 
5 . 2 , Though S o v i e t Un ion r e m a i n e d t h e b i g g e s t s u p p l i e r of 
arms t o S y r i a d u r i n g t h e second h a l f of 1970s y e t a t r e n d 
t o w a r d s d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n was a l s o n o t i c e a b l e from 1975 
onward when F r a n c e , wes t Germany, S w i t z e r l a n d and I t a l y a l s o 
e n t e r e d I n S y r i a n arms m a r k e t , a s i s e v i d e n t from T a b l e 
5 . 1 6 . 
i n 1977, S y r i a o r d e r e d f o r t h e s u p p l y of HOT t y p e 
E u r o m i s s i l e from F r a n c e and c o o s e q u e n t l y t h e l a t t e r s u p p l i e d 
138 HOT m i s s i l e s d u r i n g 1977-78."^^ Again i n 1977, S y r i a a l s o 
s i g n e d a n o t h e r a g r e e m e n t w i t h F r a n c e f o r t h e s u p p l y of inOO 
l a n d i r o b i l e Mi l an t y p e of m i s s i l e s . T h i s d e a l was w o r t h 
$ 224 m i l l i o n and F r a n c e s u p p l i e d t h e s e m i s s i l e s d u r i n g 
1 9 7 8 - 7 9 . F r a n c e a l s o s u p p l i e d AS-34 Kormoran t y p e of a i r - t o -
s h i p m i s s i l e s t o S y r i a n i n 1979 o r d e r s f o r which were p l a c e 
35 i n 1977 . - ' ^ 
B e s i d e s , S y r i a a c q u i r e d AD_212 and SH-3X) S e a k i n g 
h e l i c o p t e r s from I t a l y i n 1978 o r d e r s f o r which had been 
p l a c e d i n 1976. S y r i a a l s o g o t 16 MBB-223K t y p e t r a i n e r 
34 . SIPRI YEARBOOK 1979 . p . 236 . 
35. Ib id . . 
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a i r c r a f t from S w i t e e r l a n d and 2 L -100 -20 t r a n s p o r t p l a n e s 
from t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s I n 1978 . 
During 1 9 7 7 - 7 8 , S y r i a a c q u i r e d 12 MlG-27 f i g h t e r 
a i r c r a f t , 10 M i - 8 - H i p h e l i c o p t e r , T-6 2 t a n k s , AT-3 s a g g e r , 
S A - g a i n f u l l a n d m o b i l e s u r f a c e - t o - a i r and SA-8 Grecko and 
SA-9 G a s k i n s u r f a c e t o a i r m i s s i l e s from t h e S o v i e t Un ion . 
A c c o r d i n g to S I P R I , f u n d i n g f o r t h e s e s u p p l i e s was d o n e 
36 by L ibya , 
i n e a r l y 1979 , S y r i a had p l a c e d o r d e r s w i t h Moscow 
f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of MIG-25 F o x b a t - A figh&-r i n t e r c e p t o r 
37 
a i r c r a f t which were d e l i v e r e d i n Sep tember 1979, I n 
J a n u a r y 1978, S y r i a n e g o t i a t e d a d e a l w i t h S o v i e t Union 
f o r t h e s u p p l y of h e l i c o p t e r , T . 6 2 main b a t t l e t a n k s 
and a n t i - t a n k m i s s i l e s . Funds f o r t h i s p u r c h a s e w e r e e i t h e r 
33 
p r o v i d e d by L i b y a o r I r a q , A c c o r d i n g t o I s r a e l i i n t e l l i -
g e n c e s o u r c e s , S o v i e t u n i o n a l s o made a v a i l a b l e t o S y r i a 
100 T-7 2 main b a t t l e t a n k s , SU-22 f i g h t e r a i r c a r f t and 
s u r f a c e - t o - a i r l a n d - m o b i l e mis s i l e s d u r i n g 1979 . 
36. Ibid., p. 237. 
37. SIPRI YEARBOOK 1980, p. 158 
38. Ibid. 
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ARMS ACOJISITION BY IRAQ j 
Between 19 70 and 1974, I r a q ' s ' i m p o r t of arms was 
w o r t h $ 336 m i l l i o n which c o n s t i t u t e d 4 p e r c e n t of 
r e g i o n ' s t o t a l arms i m p o r t s , a s shown i n t a b l e 5 . 1 . How-
e v e r , d u r i n g 1975-79 p e r i o d I r a q ' s i m p o r t of arms was 
w o r t h $ 2 ,418 m i l l i o n which c o n s t i t u t e d 12 p e r c e n t of 
r e g i o n ' s t o t a l i m p o r t s of a r m s . 
Though f o r many y e a r s I r a q had depended on S o v i e t 
Union f o r t h e s u p p l y of arms however , t h i s t r e n d was 
r e v e r s e d from 1974 o n w a r d s when I r a q d i v e r s i f i e d i t s p r o -
c u r e m e n t of arms from F r a n c e , B r a z i l , and C z e c h o s l o v a k i a 
a s shown i n T a b l e 5 , 1 7 , , 
I n 1973, I r a q s i g n e d an a g r e e m e n t w i t h C z e c h o s l o v a k i a 
f o r t h e p u r c h a s e of 24 L-39 A l b a t r o s t y p e t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t 
which were d e l i v e r e d t o Baghdad d u r i n g 1 9 7 8 - 7 9 . I n 1974, 
I r a q r e q u e s t e d f o r t h e s u p p l y of 31 A e r o s p a t i d e A l o u t t e - I I l 
h e l i c o p t e r s and S S - I I a n t i - t a n k m i s s i l e s from F r a n c e . The 
m i s s i l e c o n t r a c t was w o r t h $ 18-8 m i l l i o n . ^^ ^ I n 1977, 
P a r i s had a g r e e d t o p r o v i d e t o Baghdad AM>:^10P a rmoured 
c a r r i e s 4 M i r a g e F - I B t r a i n e r a i r c r a f t , 36 Mi rage F-K 
f i g h t e r ( i n t e r c e p t o r a i r c r a f t , H O T l a n d ^ b i l e and C r o t a l e -
t y p e a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s and R-550 MagiC a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e s . 
39 . SIPRI YEARBOOK l ? ? ^ . p . 225. 
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40 These cont rac ts were worth $ 960 mi l l ion . Further 
o rders were placed during 1978-79 for addi t ional supplies 
of Mirage F_IC f i g h t e r / i n t e r c e p t o r s , c ro t a l e and Hagic 
m i s s i l e s . 
I r a q ' s purchases from Brazil included armoured 
personnel c a r r i e r s during 1979. From Soviet Union, Iraq 
imported v a r i e t i e s of weapons. In 1976 Baghdad signed 
a con t rac t with Moscow for the suppl ies of 138 MIG-27 
f i g h t e r / s t r i k e a i r c r a f t Moscow commenced the d e l i v e r i e s 
from 1977 and by 1979, Iraq had received 120 MIG-27. 
Besides, in 1976, I raq also asked for the supply of 600 
T-6 2 main b a t t l e tanks from Soviet Union and the l a t t e r 
commenced i t s de l ive ry from 1977 a t the r a t e of 150 per 
year. 
During 1977-78, Moscow had agreed to provide 
Mi-S Hip h e l i c o p t e r s , SSN-2 sign mis s i l e s , lL-76 candid 
41 t r anspor t planes and other equipment. During 1979, 
I raq requested for the supply of IL-18 and lL-20 t r a n s -
42 por t planes and 3 submarines. In t h i s way the arms 
bui ld-up by Iraq r e f l ec t ed i t s p o l i t i c a l involvement both 
in the Arab I s r a e l i conf l i c t and in r e l a t i on to the 
development in I ran and along the Persian Gulf, 
4 0 . SIPRI YEARBOOK 1979. p . 218 . 
4 1 . I b i d . , 1980. p . 146. 
42. Ib id . 
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I t can be surmised from the above analysis that 
t he r* was exCacerbated pace of arms p ro l i f e r a t i on in 
west Asia during 1970s. The October 1973 war and t h e 
increased o i l revenues played major ro le in prompting 
t h e West Asian and Persian Gulf coun t r i es to import arms. 
Arms build up by I s r a e l with the c lose cooperation and 
ac t i ve support of the United Sta tes and I s r a e l ' s hos t i l e 
a t t i t u d e towards i t s immediate Arab neighbours had crea-
ted a sense of i n s e c u r i t y among the Arab countr ies of 
west Asian region who in turn planned to acquire weapons 
from d ivers i f i ed sources to have m i l i t a r y p a r i t y with 
I s r a e l , 
Besides, the I s r a e l i fac tor in the ln t ra_regional 
r i v a l r i e s between the Arab coun t r i es , for example, I ran-
I r a q , iraq-Kuwait, Iraq-Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia-Yemen 
e t c . also prompted t h e respec t ive r i v a l s to a t t a in 
s t r a t e g i c and m i l i t a r y p a r i t y against t h e i r adversa r ies . 
The t ang ib l e outcome of these developments was a compe-
t i t i o n between and among the count r ies to acquire 
sophis t i ca ted weapons which u l t ima te ly culminated in the 
arms p r o l i f e r a t i o n in the reg ion . West Aslarregion had 
the d i s t i nc t i on of being t h e l a r g e s t importer of arms 
during 197ns. 
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United S ta tes approach to arms p ro l i f e r a t ion 
in West Asia seemed to encourage the race and not to stop 
i t . Keeping in view i t s s t r a t e g i c and economic i n t e r e s t s 
in the region, Washington could i l l - a f f o r d to l e t the 
region s l i p out of i t s fold and thus pave way for Soviet 
expansion. I t continued to build up I s r a e l and Iran by 
providing them sophis t i ca ted weapons as a pressure t a c t i c s , 
The countr ies l i k e Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan had 
also to r e l y on United S ta te s , However, Egypt,Syria and 
I raq sought weapons from Soviet Union, France also emerged 
as a major suppl ier of arms. Besides, U.K., f.est Germany 
and I t a l y also shared the arms market in west Asia, 
CONCLUSION 
I n t h e p o s t - s e c o n d wor ld war p e r i o d , r e g i o n s 
of South and West Asia have p l ayed c r u c i a l r o l e in 
t h e o v e r a l l g l o b a l s t r a t e g y of t h e Uni t ed S t a t e s . These 
r e g i o n s assumed tremendous s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e in t h e 
wake of co ld war r i v a l r i e s h o t l y chased between Washington 
and Moscow and t h e p re sence of pe t ro leum in P e r s i a n Gulf 
r e g i o n . Under Truman d o c t r i n e . U n i t e d S t a t e s focussed 
i t s a t t e n t i o n on t h e c o u n t r i e s which had geograph ic c o n t i n -
g u i t y and p rox imi ty t o Sov ie t Union and People* s Republic 
of China, t h e two main bas toons of communism and arch 
r i v a l s of t h e Un i t ed S t a t e s . S ince t h e main pianK of 
Truman d o c t r i n e was t h e g l o b a l conta inment of communism, 
hence Washington dev i sed t h e s t r a t e g y of sponsor ing r eg iona l 
m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s i nvo lv ing c o u n t r i e s g e o g r a p h i c a l l y 
proximate t o S o v i e t union and China t o sei~ve as an a f t r o n t 
xo -Che expension of communism. 
In Wes-c Asia* s Guif r e g i o n , I r a n and I r a q responded 
p o s i t i v e l y -co US o v e r t u r e s i n e a r l y 1950s. I r a n i a n response 
was p r i m a r i l y mo t iva t ed by Shah of I r a n ' s p e r s o n a l ambit ion 
t o c u l t i v a t e u n i t e d S t a t e s as an a l l y because Washington 
had he lped him in r e s t o r a t i o n of t h r o n e . B e s i d e s , t h e 
Shah of I r a n wanted t o s t r e n g t h e n h i s own p o s i t i o n 
w i t h i n t h e coun t ry as we l l as t o make I r a n as t h e s t rong 
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power in the r eg ion . Such a mission could be accomplished 
by acquiring soph i s t i ca t ed weapons from the United S t a t e s . 
Thus mutuali ty of i n t e r e s t s brought Washington and 
Tehran c lose r t o each other which got reinforced in 
succeeding yea r s . 
When by mid-1950s United S ta t e s implemented i t s 
t a c t i c a l p o l i c i e s of sponsoring regional mi l i t a ry a l l i ances 
and conclusion of b i l a t e r a l defence pac t s , I ran readi ly 
expressed i t s w i l l i ngness . I r a n , along with I r a q , Turkey 
and Pakistan became the member of cen t r a l Treaty organi-
zat ion (CENTO) following t h e change of regime in I r aq , i t 
withdrew from CEWTO «ven before i t was formally launched. 
In South Asia, India and Pakistan were the major 
count r ies which couxd play significant; ro ie in preserving 
US s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in t he reg ion . The p a r t i t i o n of 
Indian subcontinent in -August 1947 which led t o the 
emergence of Ind ia and Pakistan as two sovereign independent 
countr ies had proved instrumental in envisaging b i t t e r 
and acrimonious r e l a t i o n s between the two count r ies mainly 
on the question of Jammu and Kashmir, Consequently 
Pakistan s t a r t e d looking for ou ts ide support t o a t t a i n 
which 
mi l i t a ry p a r i t y with I n d i a ^ w a s bigger in s i ze and endowed 
with b e t t e r resources than the former. 
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India* s response t o US over tures was r a the r cool 
because Indian leadership had declared, even p r i o r t o 
t h e attainment of independence, i t s opposition t o mi l i t a ry 
pacts and to pursue t he pol icy of nonalignment. However 
a mutuality of i n t e r e s t s between United S ta tes and Pakistan 
as complementary and supplementary t o each other could 
be discerned when Washington had s t a t t e d looking for 
regional a l l i e s t o implement truman doc t r ine . By mid 
19508, Pakistan had joined CENTO as well as signed mutual 
defence pact with the United S t a t e s , Consequently Pakistan 
s t a r t e d receiving economic and mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance from 
the uni ted S t a t e s . 
Once having become an ••ally" Pakistan continued 
t o receive soph i s t i ca ted weapons from uni ted S ta t e s during 
1960s and 1970s, I n d i a ' s pleadings t h a t such a massive 
doses of American arms t o Pakis tan could not enalbe the 
l a t t e r t o stem Soviet expansion in the region but would 
be used against Ind ia had almost no impact as American 
leadership which continued arming Pakistan t o the t e e t h . 
Following the outbreak of s ino-Indian h o s t i l i t i e s in 
19 62, in which Ind ia suffered a mi l i t a ry debacle Pakistan 
s t a r t e d improving i t s r e l a t i o n s with China. During the 
sino-Indlan h o s t i l i t i e s . United S ta t e s and U.K. provided 
some M l i t a r y a s s i s t ance to Ind ia t o enable the l a t t e r to 
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meet t he aggress ion. However Pakis tan opposed the supply 
of American m i l i t a r y equipment t o Ind ia pleading t h a t 
i t would portend ser ious t h r e a t t o Pakistan* s s ecu r i ty . 
Following the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan war in 
1965, United S t a t e s imposed embargo on the suppl ies of 
American arms t o both India and Pakis tan , However, despite 
t he embargo, Pakis tan continued t o receive US arms 
c landes t ine ly while India was denied arms. In view of 
P a k i s t a n ' s acqu i s i t ion of arms, mainly from the United 
S t a t e s , Ind ia sought soph i s t i ca ted arms trom Soviet 
union t o have s t r a t e g i c pa r i t y with Pakis tan, The growing 
f r iendship between Pakistan and China a lso enabled to the 
former t o receive mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance from China, 
In the wake of Indo-Pakistan war, Soviet Union 
used i t s good of f ices to he lp ending h o s t i l i t i e s through 
Tashkent agreement. Moscow t r i e d t o wean Pakistan away 
from United S t a t e s and China by offer ing economic and 
mi l i t a ry a s s i s t a n c e . However, I nd i a , which continued t o 
receive arms and economic a s s i s t ance from Soviet Union, 
opposed Soviet move to render mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance t o 
Pakis tan , The Soviet-Pakistan honeymoon proved temporary 
and soon Islamabad turned towards Washington and Beij ing, 
The advent of Nixon adminis t ra t ion in Washington 
in 19 69 brought ^-akistan in to focus as the main custodian 
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of us s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in South Asia, The ro le played 
by Pakistan in f a c i l i t a t i n g nego t ia t ions between Washington 
and Beiging earned i t t he goodwill of both s ides which 
rec iprocated by making avai lab le massive economic and mi l i ta ry 
a s s i s t ance t o Pakis tan , 
The onset of 1970s inaugurated s ingni f icant changes 
a t in te imat ional l eve l which had t h e i r impact on south and 
West Asian region. Sino-American rapproachment and growing 
f r iendship between China and Pakistan on the one hand and 
between US and Pakis tan on the o ther was seen as the emergence 
of US-Pak-China axis against Ind i a , The Br i t i sh announcement 
with regard t o withdraw t h e i r forces from eas t of Suez ra ised 
the question of the perceived t h r e a t t o US regional i n t e r e s t s . 
The f a l l of Shah regime in I r an and advent of the 
Is lamic revolut ion in I ran in ear ly 1979 and Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan in December 1979 proved a turning point 
in t he US global s t r a t e g i c posture in general and i t s policy 
towards South and west Asia in p a r t i c u l a r . These twin deve-
lopments marked the erosion, both in a p o l i t i c a l ana a 
s t r a t e g i c sense, of the so-ca l led Vietnam syndrome and paved 
way for g e o - p o l i t i c a l a s se r t i veness . Within United S t a t e s , 
the domestic pressure t o r use of force in support of US 
foreign policy goals s t a r t e d gaining ground. Manifestation 
of t h i s t r a n s i t i o n in American foreign policy could be 
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discerned in Soviet-US deal ings , where i t led t o the relega-
t i on of detente in to obxevion and crea ted renewed t ens ions . 
U t i l i t y of mi l i t a ry force as a pol icy instrument became 
pre-eminent fea ture of US policy towards t h i r d world. 
The events in and around south west Asia played s ign i -
f ican t ro le in ca ta lys ing such a t r a n s i t i o n in US foreign 
po l i cy . During the 1970s no other region outs ide of t r a d i t i o n a l 
US a l l i ances assumed so v i t a l s igni f icance for the secur i ty 
of -^he uni ted S t a t e s and i t s a l l i e s as South West Asia, The 
US and Western i n t e r e s t s en t a i l i ng access to o i i , containment 
of Soviet influence and the preservat ion of consera t ive regimes 
in -Che region, had evolved s t ead i ly since the end of second 
worla war. However the relevance of these i n t e r e s t s assumed 
added s igni f icance during the 1970s as a consequence of 
number of f a c t o r s , t h e increas ingly c r i t i c a l dependence of the 
WesTiem consumer connt r ies on Persian Gulf o i l as the resu l t 
of r i s i ng consumption and shrinking domestic reserves and 
poss ib le t h r e a t s t o American regional i n t e r e s t s in the wake 
of B r i t i sh decision t o withdraw from eas t of Suez. American 
apprehensions of a poss ib le co l lapse of the consera t ive 
order in the pers ian gulf region from the pressures of rapid 
socio-economic change were aggravated by the po t en t i a l for 
increased competition from the Soviet Union backed by i t s 
growing naval c a p a b i l i t y . 
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The new awakening and solidarity among the Arab 
oil producing countries, who seemed determined to wrest 
control of their oil resources from western multinational 
and subject to their availability to the satisfaction of 
their economic and political demands, added to the uncertain-
ities being faced by the US policy makers towards west Asia. 
The demonstrated (willingness) and ability of the Arab Oil 
producing countries to use oil as a political weapon ended 
hitherto successful effort by policy makers in Washington 
to keep the issue of oil supply from the Gulf separate from 
the Arab-Israel conflict and forced them to take greater 
cognizence of Saudi Arabia's senstiviry toward US support 
for Israel. 
While this realization was beginning to take hold, 
the October 1973 war and the accompanying oil price-hike 
led to a considerable strengthening of US economic stakes 
in the Gulf region. The emergence of the Guif countries as 
significant financial powers with huge reserves of surplus 
revenues, which could oe recycled to the West either in the 
form of import of goods and services or investments in 
Western financial markets, became another factor in the 
emergence of the Gulf from the backwaters of international 
politics to the forefront of the U.S. global strategic agenda. 
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Though the Arab o i l embargo underscored t h r e a t s 
t o U.S. access t o Pers ian Gulf o i l posed by de l ibe ra t e 
ac t ion by the producers , the revolut ion in I ran and the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, h igh l igh ted , in the American 
toind, the t h r e a t s of d i s m p t i o n , which might be caused by 
domestic i n s t a b i l i t y and external i n t e rven t ion . But the 
impact of t he twin c r i s e s on American s t r a t e g i c perceptions 
touched more than the question of a cutoff in the flow of o i l . 
The American view of the perception of the events of 1979 
in South West Asia was marked by an unprecedented degree of 
alarm and pessimism. The f a l l of t he shah of I ran was a major 
setback to the us reg iona l , indeed, global pos i t i on , under 
mining basic economic and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s of the Western 
coun t r i e s . Besides, the I ranian revolut ion a lso aggravated the 
c a r t e r admin i s t r a t i on ' s fears about the poss ib le col lapse 
of pro-US regimes in the so-ca l led arc of c r i s i s " . Similar 
apprehensions were aroused by Afghanistan c r i s i s mainly 
per ta in ing to the p o s s i b i l i t y ot Soviet expansion in to the 
Persian Gulf. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reinforced 
percept ions of an a l leged Soviet "Geopoli t ical Offensive" 
aimed at eventual domination of the whole region and control 
of Western access t o raw ma te r i a l s . 
The American response t o these problems and c r i s e s 
was in the form of added emphasis on mi l i t a ry force as the 
instrument for p ro tec t ing Western i n t e r e s t s . The Nixon 
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doc t r ine , which had been applied t o the Gulf in a s i tua t ion 
where a l t e r n a t i v e opt ions were severely r e s t r i c t e d by the 
Vietnam debacle survived as the bas i c framework of US policy 
on t h e aftermath of the f i r s t " o i l cr ises '* . However at the 
sametime i t had become evident t h a t t he United S ta te was not 
averse t o changes in i t s s t ra tegy as i t concerned the use 
of mi l i t a ry force in pursu i t of i t s regional goa l s . Ford 
admin i s t r a t i on ' s t h r e a t s t o r e t a l i a t e against embargoes with 
mi l i t a ry action represented the f i r s t important; move away 
from the policy of re lying on local stooges. 
However continued adherence t o the Nixon doctr ine 
became fur ther complicated consequent upon growing resen t -
ment. Within the uS policy making organizat ion,shah of I r a n ' s 
"hawkish** stand on o i l p r i c e s , and the congressional and 
media disapproval of t he o f f i c i a l pol icy of l i b e r a l compli-
ance with the Shah's p e r s i s t e n t quest for American Weapons. 
In t h i s sense, the Nixon doct r ine could more properly 
be described as a stop-gap arrangement "imposed" on the 
United S ta tes by the Vietnam predicament. Of course, the 
pol icy makers in Washington might not have perceived i t 
as such at the time of the Br i t i sh withdrawl. The Vietnam 
syndrome did not discourage the ford admin i s t r a t i on ' s 
s tatements r e l a t i n g t o se izure of Gulf o i l f i e l d s , nor did i t 
allegedly ^^ 
disuadethe/moralistic carter administration from developing 
the blueprint for a global intervention force, with the 
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Persian Gulf as a spec ia l ly i d e n t i f i e d focus. 
During 1970s, the US s t r a t egy towards south-west 
Asia was pr imari ly governed by the Nixon doctr ine under 
which Washington t r i e d t o prop up loca l surrogates by 
providing massive mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance t o safeguard v i t a l 
American s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in the region. In the South 
Asian Context, t he ear ly years of 1970s witnessed the emer-
gence of Bangladesh c r i s i s in which US played duioious role 
by rendering unin te r rupted economic and mi l i t a ry ass i s tance 
despi te the overt embargo on supplies of arms t o both 
I n d i a and Pakis tan . 
In view of US'-Pak-China axis at the time of Bangla-
desh c r i s i s , Ind ia had entered in to a t r e a t y of peace and 
f r iendship with Soviet Union in August 1971 which served 
as a de ter rent t o both Washington and Bejing from d i r ec t l y 
intervening the Indo-Pakistan war in December 1971, The 
massive supplies of American arms t o Pakistan made India to 
procure armaments from Soviet Union, France and U.K.However 
c a r t e r admin i s t r a t i on ' s i n s i s t ence on l inking US economic 
and mi l i t a ry a s s i s t ance t o Pakistan with l a t t e r ' s nuclear 
programme made Islamabad t o seek arms from China as we l l . 
The r e su l t an t outcome of these developments was the exacer-
bat ion of arms race in south Asia. In the wake of Soviet 
in te rven t ion in Afghanistan, United S ta tes t r i e d t o bui ld 
up Pakistan as " f ron t l ine" s t a t e which could safeguard v i t a l 
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strategic interests of the United States in the region. 
The loss of Iran as American surrogate was also a countri-
butory factor which enhanced Pakistan strategic significance 
for the United states. 
As regards West Asia and Persian Gulf region. United 
States poxicy was strictly governed by national interests 
and to keep the region out of Soviet sphere of influence. 
Unqualified support to Israel and help build it up as a 
powerful regional military power served as a pressure 
tactics to impress upon other Arab and Gulf regimes the 
need for relying on Washington. When the oil producing 
countries successfully used oil as a political weapon. 
United States used "Sale of American arsenal" as a leverage 
for recycling of petro-dollars back to American Coffers. 
Intrigued by personal ambitions to acquire military 
might and to emerge as the regional "policeman", as shah of 
Iran did, perceived threat perceptions by local regimes 
from the neighbours because of intra-regional rivalries 
and Israel as the main determinant of security perceptions, 
led most of the countries of West Asia to seek sophisticated 
weapons from the united States, and other Western countries. 
However coxantries like Egypt, Syria and Iraq sought weapons 
firom Soviet Union and other sources mainly France. 
The US strategy, during 1970s, met with satisfactory 
success in West Asia where it managed to safeguard its 
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v i t a l s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s , dump i t s armament and recycle 
the p e t r o - d o l l a r s , reduce Soviet inf luence espec ia l ly a f t e r 
the signing of camp David accord and winning Egypt t o 
American fold. The f a l l of Shah regime in I ran did serve a 
severe blow t o US s t r a t egy but i t soon succeeded in propping 
up Saudi Arabia t o assume t h a t t o l e in t h e Persian Gulf 
region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided another 
opportunity for the United S ta tes t o prove the indispensa-
b i i i t y of Washington against perceived Soviet t h r e a t t o the 
region. The renewed American i n t e r e s t in Pakistan in 1979-80 
in the aftermath of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was more 
proximate t o American s t r a t e g i c ob jec t ives in the Persian 
uulf r a the r than an independent pol icy move for South Asia, 
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